This document is obsolete. Please
refer to RFC 2437.
Network Working Group B. Kaliski Request for Comments: 2313 RSA Laboratories East Category: Informational March 1998
PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
Overview
This document describes a method for encrypting data using the RSA public-key cryptosystem.
This document describes a method for encrypting data using the RSA public-key cryptosystem. Its intended use is in the construction of digital signatures and digital envelopes, as described in PKCS #7:
o For digital signatures, the content to be signed is first reduced to a message digest with a message-digest algorithm (such as MD5), and then an octet string containing the message digest is encrypted with the RSA private key of the signer of the content. The content and the encrypted message digest are represented together according to the syntax in PKCS #7 to yield a digital signature. This application is compatible with Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) methods.
o For digital envelopes, the content to be enveloped is first encrypted under a content-encryption key with a content-encryption algorithm (such as DES), and then the content-encryption key is encrypted with the RSA public keys of the recipients of the content. The encrypted content and the encrypted
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content-encryption key are represented together according to the syntax in PKCS #7 to yield a digital envelope. This application is also compatible with PEM methods.
The document also describes a syntax for RSA public keys and private keys. The public-key syntax would be used in certificates; the private-key syntax would be used typically in PKCS #8 private-key information. The public-key syntax is identical to that in both X.509 and Privacy-Enhanced Mail. Thus X.509/PEM RSA keys can be used in this document.
The document also defines three signature algorithms for use in signing X.509/PEM certificates and certificate-revocation lists, PKCS #6 extended certificates, and other objects employing digital signatures such as X.401 message tokens.
Details on message-digest and content-encryption algorithms are outside the scope of this document, as are details on sources of the pseudorandom bits required by certain methods in this document.
FIPS PUB 46-1 National Bureau of Standards. FIPS PUB 46-1: Data Encryption Standard. January 1988.
PKCS #6 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax. Version 1.5, November 1993.
PKCS #7 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax. Version 1.5, November 1993.
PKCS #8 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax. Version 1.2, November 1993.
RFC 1319 Kaliski, B., "The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm," RFC 1319, April 1992.
RFC 1320 Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm," RFC 1320, April 1992.
RFC 1321 Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm," RFC 1321, April 1992.
RFC 1423 Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers," RFC 1423, February 1993.
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X.208 CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988.
X.209 CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988.
X.411 CCITT. Recommendation X.411: Message Handling Systems: Message Transfer System: Abstract Service Definition and Procedures.1988.
X.509 CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory-- Authentication Framework. 1988.
[dBB92] B. den Boer and A. Bosselaers. An attack on the last two rounds of MD4. In J. Feigenbaum, editor, Advances in Cryptology---CRYPTO '91 Proceedings, volume 576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 194-203. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1992.
[dBB93] B. den Boer and A. Bosselaers. Collisions for the compression function of MD5. Presented at EUROCRYPT '93 (Lofthus, Norway, May 24-27, 1993).
[DO86] Y. Desmedt and A.M. Odlyzko. A chosen text attack on the RSA cryptosystem and some discrete logarithm schemes. In H.C. Williams, editor, Advances in Cryptology---CRYPTO '85 Proceedings, volume 218 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 516-521. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1986.
[Has88] Johan Hastad. Solving simultaneous modular equations. SIAM Journal on Computing, 17(2):336-341, April 1988.
[IM90] Colin I'Anson and Chris Mitchell. Security defects in CCITT Recommendation X.509--The directory authentication framework. Computer Communications Review, :30-34, April 1990.
[Mer90] R.C. Merkle. Note on MD4. Unpublished manuscript, 1990.
[Mil76] G.L. Miller. Riemann's hypothesis and tests for primality. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences, 13(3):300-307, 1976.
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[QC82] J.-J. Quisquater and C. Couvreur. Fast decipherment algorithm for RSA public-key cryptosystem. Electronics Letters, 18(21):905-907, October 1982.
[RSA78] R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21(2):120-126, February 1978.
Upper-case symbols (e.g., BT) denote octet strings and bit strings (in the case of the signature S); lower-case symbols (e.g., c) denote integers.
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ab hexadecimal octet value c exponent BT block type d private exponent D data e public exponent EB encryption block k length of modulus in octets ED encrypted data n modulus M message p, q prime factors of modulus MD message digest x integer encryption block MD' comparative message y integer encrypted data digest PS padding string mod n modulo n S signature X || Y concatenation of X, Y ||X|| length in octets of X 5. General overview
The next six sections specify key generation, key syntax, the encryption process, the decryption process, signature algorithms, and object identifiers.
Each entity shall generate a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. The encryption process shall be performed with one of the keys and the decryption process shall be performed with the other key. Thus the encryption process can be either a public-key operation or a private-key operation, and so can the decryption process. Both processes transform an octet string to another octet string. The processes are inverses of each other if one process uses an entity's public key and the other process uses the same entity's private key.
The encryption and decryption processes can implement either the classic RSA transformations, or variations with padding.
Each entity shall select a positive integer e as its public exponent.
Each entity shall privately and randomly select two distinct odd primes p and q such that (p-1) and e have no common divisors, and (q-1) and e have no common divisors.
The public modulus n shall be the product of the private prime factors p and q:
n = pq .
The private exponent shall be a positive integer d such that de-1 is divisible by both p-1 and q-1.
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The length of the modulus n in octets is the integer k satisfying
2^(8(k-1)) <= n < 2^(8k) .
The length k of the modulus must be at least 12 octets to accommodate the block formats in this document (see Section 8).
Notes.
1. The public exponent may be standardized in specific applications. The values 3 and F4 (65537) may have some practical advantages, as noted in X.509 Annex C.
2. Some additional conditions on the choice of primes may well be taken into account in order to deter factorization of the modulus. These security conditions fall outside the scope of this document. The lower bound on the length k is to accommodate the block formats, not for security.
An RSA private key shall have ASN.1 type RSAPrivateKey:
RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { version Version, modulus INTEGER, -- n publicExponent INTEGER, -- e privateExponent INTEGER, -- d prime1 INTEGER, -- p prime2 INTEGER, -- q exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) coefficient INTEGER -- (inverse of q) mod p }
Version ::= INTEGER
The fields of type RSAPrivateKey have the following meanings:
o version is the version number, for compatibility with future revisions of this document. It shall be 0 for this version of the document.
o modulus is the modulus n.
o publicExponent is the public exponent e.
o privateExponent is the private exponent d.
o prime1 is the prime factor p of n.
o prime2 is the prime factor q of n.
o exponent1 is d mod (p-1).
o exponent2 is d mod (q-1).
o coefficient is the Chinese Remainder Theorem coefficient q-1 mod p.
Notes.
1. An RSA private key logically consists of only the modulus n and the private exponent d. The presence of the values p, q, d mod (p-1), d mod (p-1), and q-1 mod p is intended for efficiency, as Quisquater and Couvreur have shown [QC82]. A private-key syntax that does not include
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all the extra values can be converted readily to the syntax defined here, provided the public key is known, according to a result by Miller [Mil76].
2. The presence of the public exponent e is intended to make it straightforward to derive a public key from the private key.
This section describes the RSA encryption process.
The encryption process consists of four steps: encryption- block formatting, octet-string-to-integer conversion, RSA computation, and integer-to-octet-string conversion. The input to the encryption process shall be an octet string D, the data; an integer n, the modulus; and an integer c, the exponent. For a public-key operation, the integer c shall be an entity's public exponent e; for a private- key operation, it shall be an entity's private exponent d. The output from the encryption process shall be an octet string ED, the encrypted data.
The length of the data D shall not be more than k-11 octets, which is positive since the length k of the modulus is at least 12 octets. This limitation guarantees that the length of the padding string PS is at least eight octets, which is a security condition.
Notes.
1. In typical applications of this document to encrypt content-encryption keys and message digests, one would have ||D|| <= 30. Thus the length of the RSA modulus will need to be at least 328 bits (41 octets), which is reasonable and consistent with security recommendations.
2. The encryption process does not provide an explicit integrity check to facilitate error detection should the encrypted data be corrupted in transmission. However, the structure of the encryption block guarantees that the probability that corruption is undetected is less than 2-16, which is an upper bound on the probability that a random encryption block looks like block type 02.
3. Application of private-key operations as defined here to data other than an octet string containing a message digest is not recommended and is subject to further study.
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4. This document may be extended to handle data of length more than k-11 octets.
A block type BT, a padding string PS, and the data D shall be formatted into an octet string EB, the encryption block.
EB = 00 || BT || PS || 00 || D . (1)
The block type BT shall be a single octet indicating the structure of the encryption block. For this version of the document it shall have value 00, 01, or 02. For a private- key operation, the block type shall be 00 or 01. For a public-key operation, it shall be 02.
The padding string PS shall consist of k-3-||D|| octets. For block type 00, the octets shall have value 00; for block type 01, they shall have value FF; and for block type 02, they shall be pseudorandomly generated and nonzero. This makes the length of the encryption block EB equal to k.
Notes.
1. The leading 00 octet ensures that the encryption block, converted to an integer, is less than the modulus.
2. For block type 00, the data D must begin with a nonzero octet or have known length so that the encryption block can be parsed unambiguously. For block types 01 and 02, the encryption block can be parsed unambiguously since the padding string PS contains no octets with value 00 and the padding string is separated from the data D by an octet with value 00.
3. Block type 01 is recommended for private-key operations. Block type 01 has the property that the encryption block, converted to an integer, is guaranteed to be large, which prevents certain attacks of the kind proposed by Desmedt and Odlyzko [DO86].
4. Block types 01 and 02 are compatible with PEM RSA encryption of content-encryption keys and message digests as described in RFC 1423.
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5. For block type 02, it is recommended that the pseudorandom octets be generated independently for each encryption process, especially if the same data is input to more than one encryption process. Hastad's results [Has88] motivate this recommendation.
6. For block type 02, the padding string is at least eight octets long, which is a security condition for public-key operations that prevents an attacker from recoving data by trying all possible encryption blocks. For simplicity, the minimum length is the same for block type 01.
7. This document may be extended in the future to include other block types.
The encryption block EB shall be converted to an integer x, the integer encryption block. Let EB1, ..., EBk be the octets of EB from first to last. Then the integer x shall satisfy
k x = SUM 2^(8(k-i)) EBi . (2) i = 1
In other words, the first octet of EB has the most significance in the integer and the last octet of EB has the least significance.
Note. The integer encryption block x satisfies 0 <= x < n since EB1 = 00 and 2^(8(k-1)) <= n.
This section describes the RSA decryption process.
The decryption process consists of four steps: octet-string-to- integer conversion, RSA computation, integer-to-octet-string conversion, and encryption-block parsing. The input to the decryption process shall be an octet string ED, the encrypted data; an integer n, the modulus; and an integer c, the exponent. For a public-key operation, the integer c shall be an entity's public exponent e; for a private-key operation, it shall be an entity's private exponent d. The output from the decryption process shall be an octet string D, the data.
It is an error if the length of the encrypted data ED is not k.
For brevity, the decryption process is described in terms of the encryption process.
The encryption block EB shall be parsed into a block type BT, a padding string PS, and the data D according to Equation (1).
It is an error if any of the following conditions occurs:
o The encryption block EB cannot be parsed unambiguously (see notes to Section 8.1).
o The padding string PS consists of fewer than eight octets, or is inconsistent with the block type BT.
o The decryption process is a public-key operation and the block type BT is not 00 or 01, or the decryption process is a private-key operation and the block type is not 02.
This section defines three signature algorithms based on the RSA encryption process described in Sections 8 and 9. The intended use of the signature algorithms is in signing X.509/PEM certificates and certificate-revocation lists, PKCS #6 extended certificates, and other objects employing digital signatures such as X.401 message tokens. The algorithms are not intended for use in constructing digital signatures in PKCS #7. The first signature algorithm (informally, "MD2 with RSA") combines the MD2 message-digest algorithm with RSA, the second (informally, "MD4 with RSA") combines the MD4 message-digest algorithm with RSA, and the third (informally, "MD5 with RSA") combines the MD5 message-digest algorithm with RSA.
This section describes the signature process and the verification process for the two algorithms. The "selected" message-digest algorithm shall be either MD2 or MD5, depending on the signature algorithm. The signature process shall be performed with an entity's private key and the verification process shall be performed with an entity's public key. The signature process transforms an octet string (the message) to a bit string (the signature); the verification process determines whether a bit string (the signature) is the signature of an octet string (the message).
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Note. The only difference between the signature algorithms defined here and one of the the methods by which signatures (encrypted message digests) are constructed in PKCS #7 is that signatures here are represented here as bit strings, for consistency with the X.509 SIGNED macro. In PKCS #7 encrypted message digests are octet strings.
The signature process consists of four steps: message digesting, data encoding, RSA encryption, and octet-string-to-bit-string conversion. The input to the signature process shall be an octet string M, the message; and a signer's private key. The output from the signature process shall be a bit string S, the signature.
The message digest MD and a message-digest algorithm identifier shall be combined into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo, described below, which shall be BER-encoded to give an octet string D, the data.
The fields of type DigestInfo have the following meanings:
o digestAlgorithm identifies the message-digest algorithm (and any associated parameters). For this application, it should identify the selected message-digest algorithm, MD2, MD4 or MD5. For reference, the relevant object identifiers are the following:
For these object identifiers, the parameters field of the digestAlgorithm value should be NULL.
o digest is the result of the message-digesting process, i.e., the message digest MD.
Notes.
1. A message-digest algorithm identifier is included in the DigestInfo value to limit the damage resulting from the compromise of one message-digest algorithm. For instance, suppose an adversary were able to find messages with a given MD2 message digest. That adversary might try to forge a signature on a message by finding an innocuous- looking message with the same MD2 message digest, and coercing a signer to sign the innocuous-looking message. This attack would succeed only if the signer used MD2. If the DigestInfo value contained only the message digest, however, an adversary could attack signers that use any message digest.
2. Although it may be claimed that the use of a SEQUENCE type violates the literal statement in the X.509 SIGNED and SIGNATURE macros that a signature is an ENCRYPTED OCTET STRING (as opposed to ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE), such a literal interpretation need not be required, as I'Anson and Mitchell point out [IM90].
3. No reason is known that MD4 would not be for very high security digital signature schemes, but because MD4 was designed to be exceptionally fast, it is "at the edge" in terms of risking successful cryptanalytic attack. A message-digest algorithm can be considered "broken" if someone can find a collision: two messages with the same digest. While collisions have been found in variants of MD4 with only two digesting "rounds"
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[Mer90][dBB92], none have been found in MD4 itself, which has three rounds. After further critical review, it may be appropriate to consider MD4 for very high security applications.
MD5, which has four rounds and is proportionally slower than MD4, is recommended until the completion of MD4's review. The reported "pseudocollisions" in MD5's internal compression function [dBB93] do not appear to have any practical impact on MD5's security.
MD2, the slowest of the three, has the most conservative design. No attacks on MD2 have been published.
The data D shall be encrypted with the signer's RSA private key as described in Section 7 to give an octet string ED, the encrypted data. The block type shall be 01. (See Section 8.1.)
The encrypted data ED shall be converted into a bit string S, the signature. Specifically, the most significant bit of the first octet of the encrypted data shall become the first bit of the signature, and so on through the least significant bit of the last octet of the encrypted data, which shall become the last bit of the signature.
Note. The length in bits of the signature S is a multiple of eight.
The verification process for both signature algorithms consists of four steps: bit-string-to-octet-string conversion, RSA decryption, data decoding, and message digesting and comparison. The input to the verification process shall be an octet string M, the message; a signer's public key; and a bit string S, the signature. The output from the verification process shall be an indication of success or failure.
The signature S shall be converted into an octet string ED, the encrypted data. Specifically, assuming that the length in bits of the signature S is a multiple of eight, the first bit of the signature shall become the most significant bit of the first octet of the
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encrypted data, and so on through the last bit of the signature, which shall become the least significant bit of the last octet of the encrypted data.
It is an error if the length in bits of the signature S is not a multiple of eight.
The data D shall be BER-decoded to give an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo, which shall be separated into a message digest MD and a message-digest algorithm identifier. The message-digest algorithm identifier shall determine the "selected" message-digest algorithm for the next step.
It is an error if the message-digest algorithm identifier does not identify the MD2, MD4 or MD5 message-digest algorithm.
The message M shall be digested with the selected message-digest algorithm to give an octet string MD', the comparative message digest. The verification process shall succeed if the comparative message digest MD' is the same as the message digest MD, and the verification process shall fail otherwise.
The object identifier rsaEncryption identifies RSA public and private keys as defined in Section 7 and the RSA encryption and decryption processes defined in Sections 8 and 9.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
The rsaEncryption object identifier is intended to be used in the algorithm field of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. The parameters field of that type, which has the algorithm-specific syntax ANY DEFINED BY algorithm, would have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm.
The object identifiers md2WithRSAEncryption, md4WithRSAEncryption, md5WithRSAEncryption, identify, respectively, the "MD2 with RSA," "MD4 with RSA," and "MD5 with RSA" signature and verification processes defined in Section 10.
These object identifiers are intended to be used in the algorithm field of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. The parameters field of that type, which has the algorithm-specific syntax ANY DEFINED BY algorithm, would have ASN.1 type NULL for these algorithms.
Note. X.509's object identifier rsa also identifies RSA public keys as defined in Section 7, but does not identify private keys, and identifies different encryption and decryption processes. It is expected that some applications will identify public keys by rsa. Such public keys are compatible with this document; an rsaEncryption process under an rsa public key is the same as the rsaEncryption process under an rsaEncryption public key.
Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.
Revision history
Versions 1.0-1.3
Versions 1.0-1.3 were distributed to participants in RSA Data Security, Inc.'s Public-Key Cryptography Standards meetings in February and March 1991.
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Version 1.4
Version 1.4 is part of the June 3, 1991 initial public release of PKCS. Version 1.4 was published as NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-18.
Version 1.5
Version 1.5 incorporates several editorial changes, including updates to the references and the addition of a revision history. The following substantive changes were made:
o Section 10: "MD4 with RSA" signature and verification processes are added.
o Section 11: md4WithRSAEncryption object identifier is added.
Supersedes June 3, 1991 version, which was also published as NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-18.
Acknowledgements
This document is based on a contribution of RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA Data Security, Inc. Any substantial use of the text from this document must acknowledge RSA Data Security, Inc. RSA Data Security, Inc. requests that all material mentioning or referencing this document identify this as "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS #1".
Author's Address
Burt Kaliski RSA Laboratories East 20 Crosby Drive Bedford, MA 01730
Phone: (617) 687-7000 EMail: burt@rsa.com
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Full Copyright Statement
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