This document is obsolete. Please
refer to RFC 3739.
Network Working Group S. Santesson Request for Comments: 3039 AddTrust Category: Standards Track W. Polk NIST P. Barzin SECUDE M. Nystrom RSA Security January 2001
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document forms a certificate profile for Qualified Certificates, based on RFC 2459, for use in the Internet. The term Qualified Certificate is used to describe a certificate with a certain qualified status within applicable governing law. Further, Qualified Certificates are issued exclusively to physical persons.
The goal of this document is to define a general syntax independent of local legal requirements. The profile is however designed to allow further profiling in order to meet specific local needs.
It is important to note that the profile does not define any legal requirements for Qualified Certificates.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
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RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001
This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. It is based on RFC 2459, which defines underlying certificate formats and semantics needed for a full implementation of this standard.
The standard profiles the format for a specific type of certificates named Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates and the assumptions that affects the scope of this document are discussed in Section 2.
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RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001
Section 3 defines requirements on information content in Qualified Certificates. This profile addresses two fields in the basic certificate as well as five certificate extensions. The certificate fields are the subject and issuer fields. The certificate extensions are subject directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, a private extension for storage of biometric data and a private extension for storage of statements related to Qualified Certificates. The private extensions are presented in the 1993 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), but in conformance with RFC 2459 the 1988 ASN.1 module in Appendix A contains all normative definitions (the 1993 module in Appendix A is informative).
In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are assumed to be utilized. Section 5 contains the references.
Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 [X.680] structures that are not already defined in RFC 2459. Appendix B contains a note on attributes. Appendix C contains an example certificate. Appendix D contains authors' addresses and Appendix E contains the IETF Copyright Statement.
It should be noted that this specification does not define the specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and does not define the policies that should be used with them. That is, this document defines what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but not what that information means. A system that uses Qualified Certificates must define its own semantics for the information in Qualified Certificates. It is expected that laws and corporate policies will make these definitions.
The term "Qualified Certificate" has been used by the European Commission to describe a certain type of certificates with specific relevance for European legislation. This specification is intended to support this class of certificates, but its scope is not limited to this application.
Within this standard the term "Qualified Certificate" is used more generally, describing the format for a certificate whose primary purpose is identifying a person with high level of assurance in public non-repudiation services. The actual mechanisms that will decide whether a certificate should or should not be considered to be a "Qualified Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside the scope of this standard.
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RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001
Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential within several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 2459. The most important aspects that affect the scope of this specification are:
- Definition of names and identity information in order to identify the associated subject in a uniform way.
- Definition of information which identifies the CA and the jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular certificate.
- Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified Certificates.
- Definition of information structure for storage of biometric information.
- Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements with relevance for Qualified Certificates.
A Qualified Certificate as defined in this standard is assumed to have the following properties:
- The certificate is issued by a CA that makes a public statement that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2
- The certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with liabilities, practices and procedures undertaken by the CA, as discussed in 2.3
- The certificate is issued to a natural person (living human being).
- The certificate contains an identity based on a pseudonym or a real name of the subject.
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For a certificate to serve the purpose of being a Qualified Certificate, this profile assumes that the CA will have to include in the certificate information that explicitly defines this intent.
The function of this information is thus to assist any concerned entity in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate.
This profile defines two complementary ways to include this information:
- As information defined by a certificate policy included in the certificate policies extension, and
- As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements extension.
Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to be understood and used. It is however outside the scope of this profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern services that issue or utilize certificates according to this profile.
It is however assumed that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a publicly available certificate policy that is consistent with its liabilities, practices and procedures.
Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that identifies a particular object from among the set of all objects. An object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its object entry could have had if it were represented in the Directory. In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is unambiguous within a certain domain that forms either a real or a virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree)[X.501]. In the case of subject names the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain of the CA. The distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field, during the whole life time of the CA.
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RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001
This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates. The profile is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459 which in turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format. For full implementation of this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459.
ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix A.
This specification provides additional details regarding the contents of two fields in the basic certificate. These fields are the issuer and subject fields.
The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for issuing the certificate. The name SHOULD be an officially registered name of the organization.
The identity of the issuer SHALL be specified using an appropriate subset of the following attributes:
domainComponent; countryName; stateOrProvinceName; organizationName; localityName; and serialNumber.
Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary to identify the issuing organization.
Attributes present in the issuer field SHOULD be consistent with the laws under which the issuer operates.
A relying party MAY have to consult associated certificate policies and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to determine the semantics of name fields and the laws under which the issuer operates.
The subject field of a certificate compliant with this profile SHALL contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name).
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The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the following attributes:
The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country of residence, nor does it have to indicate the country of issuance.
Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName in the DIT. In cases where the subject name, as specified in the subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.
The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name of the subject. This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some other format. Pseudonyms, nicknames and names with spelling other than defined by the registered name MAY be used. To understand the nature of the name presented in commonName, complying applications MAY have to examine present values of the givenName and surname attributes, or the pseudonym attribute.
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Note: Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname or pseudonym attribute values.
The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL, if present, contain the registered name of the subject, in accordance with the laws under which the CA prepares the certificate. These attributes SHALL be used in the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present. In cases where the subject only has a single name registered, the givenName attribute SHALL be used and the surname attribute SHALL be omitted.
The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym of the subject. Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or givenName.
The serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to differentiate between names where the subject field would otherwise be identical. This attribute has no defined semantics beyond ensuring uniqueness of subject names. It MAY contain a number or code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a government or civil authority. It is the CA's responsibility to ensure that the serialNumber is sufficient to resolve any subject name collisions.
The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant information of an organization with which the subject is associated. The type of association between the organization and the subject is beyond the scope of this document.
The postalAddress, the stateOrProvinceName and the localityName attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store address and geographical information with which the subject is associated. If an organizationName value also is present then the postalAddress, stateOrProvinceName and localityName attribute values SHALL be associated with the specified organization. The type of association between the postalAddress, stateOrProvinceName and the localityName and either the subject or the organizationName is beyond the scope of this document.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes named in this section.
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This specification provides additional details regarding the contents of five certificate extensions. These extensions are the subject directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, private extension for biometric information and private extension for Qualified Certificate statements.
The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY contain additional attributes, associated with the subject, as complement to present information in the subject field and the subject alternative name extension.
Attributes suitable for storage in this extension are attributes, which are not part of the subject's distinguished name, but which MAY still be useful for other purposes (e.g., authorization).
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following attributes:
title; dateOfBirth; placeOfBirth; gender; countryOfCitizenship; and countryOfResidence.
Other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions.
The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a designated position or function of the subject within the organization specified by present organizational attributes in the subject field. The association between the title, the subject and the organization is beyond the scope of this document.
The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the date of birth of the subject. The manner in which the date of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the place of birth of the subject. The manner in which the place of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
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The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the gender of the subject. For females the value "F" (or "f") and for males the value "M" (or "m") have to be used. The manner in which the gender is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries of citizenship at the time that the certificate was issued. If the subject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country MAY be present. Determination of citizenship is a matter of law and is outside the scope of this document.
The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of at least one country in which the subject is resident. If the subject is a resident of more than one country, more than one country MAY be present. Determination of residence is a matter of law and is outside the scope of this document.
The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at least one certificate policy which reflects the practices and procedures undertaken by the CA. The certificate policy extension MAY be marked critical.
Information provided by the issuer stating the purpose of the certificate as discussed in Section 2.2SHOULD be evident through indicated policies.
The certificate policies extension SHOULD include all policy information needed for validation of the certificate. If policy information is included in the QCStatements extension (see 3.2.5), then this information SHOULD also be defined by indicated policies.
Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in RFC 2459.
The key usage extension SHALL be present. If the key usage nonRepudiation bit is asserted then it SHOULD NOT be combined with any other key usage , i.e., if set, the key usage non-repudiation SHOULD be set exclusively.
The key usage extension MAY be marked critical.
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RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001
This section defines an extension for storage of biometric information. Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash of a biometric template.
The purpose of this extension is to provide means for authentication of biometric information. The biometric information that corresponds to the stored hash is not stored in this extension, but the extension MAY include an URI pointing to a location where this information can be obtained. If included, this URI does not imply that this is the only way to access this information.
It is RECOMMENDED that biometric information in this extension is limited to information types suitable for human verification, i.e., where the decision of whether the information is an accurate representation of the subject is naturally performed by a person. This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented by, for example, a graphical image displayed to the relying party, which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of the subject.
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX BiometricSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001
The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical image of the subject. The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the image type.
The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present, SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature. The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the image type.
This section defines an extension for inclusion of defined statements related to Qualified Certificates.
A typical statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as discussed in Section 2.2).
Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which the certificate is issued. As an example this MAY include a maximum reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's liability.
Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the statementInfo parameter.
If the statementInfo parameter is included then the object identifier of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the semantics of this parameter. If the object identifier does not define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.
This extension may be critical or non-critical. If the extension is critical, this means that all statements included in the extension are regarded as critical.
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX QCStatements IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
This profile includes one predefined object identifier (id-qcs- pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifying conformance with syntax and semantics defined in this profile. This Qualified Certificate profile is referred to as version 1.
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 } -- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and -- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile -- (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain -- additional semantics information as specified.
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
The SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs- pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier and MAY identify one or more name registration authorities.
The semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID, defining semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate fields and certificate extensions. The OID may define semantics for all, or for a subgroup of all present attributes and/or names.
The NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain a name of one or more name registration authorities, responsible for registration of attributes or names associated with the subject. The association between an identified name registration authority and present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a certificate policy (or CPS) or some other implicit factors.
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If a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement then at least one of the fields semanticsIdentifier and nameRegistrationAuthorities must be present, as indicated.
The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy governing the use of the associated private key. Both the private key holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key holder.
Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue certificates as Qualified Certificates. The associated private keys must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the subject's sole control. That is, a CA should not issue a qualified certificate if the means to use the private key is not protected against unintended usage. This implies that the CA have some knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.
The CA must further verify that the public key contained in the certificate is legitimately representing the subject.
CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions are met.
Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications and this specification therefore recommends against such practices.
The ability to compare two qualified certificates to determine if they represent the same physical entity is dependent on the semantics of the subjects' names. The semantics of a particular attribute may be different for different issuers. Comparing names without knowledge of the semantics of names in these particular certificates may provide misleading results.
This specification is a profile of RFC 2459. The security considerations section of that document applies to this specification as well.
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[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R. and S. Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", RFC 2247, January 1998.
[RFC 2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, November 2000.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, June 1993.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected Attribute Types, June 1993.
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director.
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As in RFC 2459, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants of the ASN.1 syntax.
Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros. However, since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e., Appendix A.1 may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC 2459's 1988 modules.
Appendix A.2 is in the 1993 syntax. However, since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 which are not completely in the 1993 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e., Appendix A.2 may be parsed by an 1993 ASN.1-parser by removing the UTF8String choice from the definition of DirectoryString in the module PKIX1Explicit93 in RFC 2459. Appendix A.2 may be parsed "as is" by an 1997 ASN.1 parser, however.
In case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is the normative one.
-- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and -- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile -- (Version 1). This statement may optionally contain -- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE { semanticsIndentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL } -- At least one field shall be present
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of legal certificate extensions. Note that this set is an -- extension of the ExtensionSet defined in RFC 2459. ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= { authorityKeyIdentifier | subjectKeyIdentifier | keyUsage | extendedKeyUsage | privateKeyUsagePeriod | certificatePolicies | policyMappings | subjectAltName | issuerAltName | basicConstraints | nameConstraints | policyConstraints | cRLDistributionPoints | subjectDirectoryAttributes | authorityInfoAccess | biometricInfo | qcStatements, ... }
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in -- distinguished names. The set may of course be augmented to meet -- local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may -- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations, and that -- this set is an extension of the SupportedAttributes set in RFC 2459.
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in -- subjectDirectoryAttribute extensions. The set may be augmented to -- meet local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set -- may prevent interoperability with conforming implementations. PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { title | dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth | gender | countryOfCitizenship | countryOfResidence, ... }
-- Attributes
-- serialNumber from X.520 serialNumber ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1..64)) ID id-at-serialNumber }
-- postalAddress from X.520 postalAddress ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString { 30 } ID id-at-postalAddress }
-- pseudonym from (forthcoming) X.520) pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name } ID id-at-pseudonym }
-- domainComponent from RFC 2247 domainComponent ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX IA5String ID id-domainComponent }
dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime ID id-pda-dateOfBirth }
placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name } ID id-pda-placeOfBirth }
gender ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f")) ID id-pda-gender }
countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
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(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- }) ID id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }
countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2)) (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- }) ID id-pda-countryOfResidence }
-- Private extensions
-- Biometric info extension
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX BiometricSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001
WITH SYNTAX { [SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1} -- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and -- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile -- (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain -- additional semantics information as specified.
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs. SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1, ... -- For future extensions -- }
This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the subject field of issued certificates and in the subjectDirectoryAttributes extension. In the interest of conformity, they have been defined here using the ASN.1 ATTRIBUTE definition from RFC 2459, which is sufficient for the purposes of this document, but greatly simplified in comparison with ISO/ITU's definition. A complete definition of these new attributes (including matching rules), along with object classes to support them in LDAP-accessible directories, can be found in [PKCS 9].
This section contains the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the DER-encoding of a certificate issued in conformance with this profile. The example has been developed with the help of the OSS ASN.1 compiler. The certificate has the following characteristics:
1. The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm 2. The issuer's distinguished name is O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH; C=DE
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3. The subject's distinguished name is CN=Petra M. Barzin, O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE 4. The certificate was issued on May 1, 2000 and will expire on November 1, 2000 5. The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key 6. The certificate includes a critical key usage extension exclusively indicating non-repudiation 7. The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1). The certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust, Germany. It is required to be set in a certificate conformant to the German digital signature law. 8. The certificate includes a subject directory attributes extension containing the following attributes:
surname: Barzin given name: Petra date of birth: October, 14th 1971 place of birth: Darmstadt country of citizenship:Germany gender: Female
9. The certificate includes a qualified statement private extension indicating that the naming registration authority's name as "municipality@darmstadt.de". 10. The certificate includes, in conformance with RFC 2459, an authority key identifier extension.
Since extensions are DER-encoded already when placed in the structure to be signed, they are for clarity shown here in the value notation defined in [X.680].
The signed portion of the certificate is shown here in the value notation defined in [X.680]. Note that extension values are already DER encoded in this structure. Some values has been truncated for readability purposes.
This section contains the DER-encoded public RSA key of the CA who signed the example certificate. It is included with the purpose of simplifying verifications of the example certificate.
Magnus Nystrom RSA Security AB Box 10704 S-121 29 Stockholm Sweden
EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.com
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Full Copyright Statement
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