Network Working Group R. Braden
Request for Comments:
3097 ISI
Updates:
2747 L. Zhang
Category: Standards Track UCLA
April 2001
RSVP Cryptographic Authentication --
Updated Message Type Value
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This memo resolves a duplication in the assignment of RSVP Message
Types, by changing the Message Types assigned by
RFC 2747 to
Challenge and Integrity Response messages.
1. Introduction
RFC 2747 ("RSVP Cryptographic Authentication") [
RFC2747] assigns RSVP
Message Type 12 to an Integrity Response message, while
RFC 2961 ("RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction Extensions") [
RFC2961] assigns the
same value to a Bundle message. This memo resolves the conflict over
RSVP Message Type 12 by assigning a different value to the Message
Type of the Integrity Response Message in
RFC 2747. It is believed
that the protocol defined by
RFC 2961 entered use in the field before
the RFC's publication and before the conflicting Message Type was
noticed, and that it may be easier to install new software in
environments that have deployed the Integrity object than in those
that have deployed the refresh reduction extension.
To simplify possible interoperability problems caused by this change,
we also assign a new value to the Message Type of
RFC 2747's
Challenge message, to which the Integrity Response message is a
reply.
2. Modification
Message Types defined in the RSVP Integrity extension [
RFC 2747]
shall be changed as follows:
o Challenge message has Message Type 25.
o Integrity Response message has Message Type 25+1.
3. Compatibility
Two communicating nodes whose Integrity implementations are
conformant with this modification will interoperate, using Message
Type 12 for Bundle messages and Message Types 25 and 26 for the
Integrity handshake. A non-conformant implementation of the
Integrity extension will not interoperate with a conformant
implementation (though two non-conformant implementations can
interoperate as before).
There is no possibility of an Integrity handshake succeeding
accidentally due to this change, since both sides of the handshake
use the new numbers or the old numbers. Furthermore, the Integrity
Response message includes a 32-bit cookie that must match a cookie in
the Challenge message, else the challenge will fail. Finally, a
non-conformant implementation should never receive a Bundle message
that it interprets as an Integrity Response message, since
RFC 2961 requires that Bundle messages be sent only to a Bundle-capable node.
4. References
[
RFC2747] Baker, F., Lindell, R. and M. Talwar, "RSVP Cryptographic
Authentication",
RFC 2747, January 2000.
[
RFC2961] Berger, L., Gan, D., Swallow, G., Pan, P., Tommasi, F.
and S. Molendini, "RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction
Extensions",
RFC 2961, April 2001.
Security Considerations
No new security considerations are introduced beyond
RFC 2747 itself
and the compatibility issues above.