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RFC 7520
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Miller
Request for Comments:
7520 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Category: Informational May 2015
ISSN: 2070-1721
Examples of Protecting Content Using
Abstract This document contains a set of examples using JSON Object Signing
and Encryption (JOSE) technology to protect data. These examples
present a representative sampling of JSON Web Key (JWK) objects as
well as various JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) results given similar inputs.
Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see
Section 2 of RFC 5741 .
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7520 .
Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(
http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info ) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................5
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................5
2. Terminology .....................................................6
3. JSON Web Key Examples ...........................................6
3.1. EC Public Key ..............................................6
3.2. EC Private Key .............................................7
3.3. RSA Public Key .............................................8
3.4. RSA Private Key ............................................8
3.5. Symmetric Key (MAC Computation) ...........................10
3.6. Symmetric Key (Encryption) ................................11
4. JSON Web Signature Examples ....................................11
4.1. RSA v1.5 Signature ........................................12
4.1.1. Input Factors ......................................12
4.1.2. Signing Operation ..................................12
4.1.3. Output Results .....................................13
4.2. RSA-PSS Signature .........................................15
4.2.1. Input Factors ......................................15
4.2.2. Signing Operation ..................................16
4.2.3. Output Results .....................................17
4.3. ECDSA Signature ...........................................19
4.3.1. Input Factors ......................................19
4.3.2. Signing Operation ..................................19
4.3.3. Output Results .....................................20
4.4. HMAC-SHA2 Integrity Protection ............................21
4.4.1. Input Factors ......................................22
4.4.2. Signing Operation ..................................22
4.4.3. Output Results .....................................23
4.5. Signature with Detached Content ...........................24
4.5.1. Input Factors ......................................25
4.5.2. Signing Operation ..................................25
4.5.3. Output Results .....................................26
4.6. Protecting Specific Header Fields .........................27
4.6.1. Input Factors ......................................27
4.6.2. Signing Operation ..................................27
4.6.3. Output Results .....................................28
4.7. Protecting Content Only ...................................29
4.7.1. Input Factors ......................................30
4.7.2. Signing Operation ..................................30
4.7.3. Output Results .....................................31
4.8. Multiple Signatures .......................................32
4.8.1. Input Factors ......................................32
4.8.2. First Signing Operation ............................33
4.8.3. Second Signing Operation ...........................34
4.8.4. Third Signing Operation ............................36
4.8.5. Output Results .....................................37
5. JSON Web Encryption Examples ...................................39
5.1. Key Encryption Using RSA v1.5 and AES-HMAC-SHA2 ...........39
5.1.1. Input Factors ......................................39
5.1.2. Generated Factors ..................................41
5.1.3. Encrypting the Key .................................41
5.1.4. Encrypting the Content .............................42
5.1.5. Output Results .....................................43
5.2. Key Encryption Using RSA-OAEP with AES-GCM ................45
5.2.1. Input Factors ......................................46
5.2.2. Generated Factors ..................................47
5.2.3. Encrypting the Key .................................48
5.2.4. Encrypting the Content .............................48
5.2.5. Output Results .....................................49
5.3. Key Wrap Using PBES2-AES-KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 ...52
5.3.1. Input Factors ......................................53
5.3.2. Generated Factors ..................................54
5.3.3. Encrypting the Key .................................54
5.3.4. Encrypting the Content .............................55
5.3.5. Output Results .....................................56
5.4. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping Using ECDH-ES and
AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM ..................................59
5.4.1. Input Factors ......................................59
5.4.2. Generated Factors ..................................60
5.4.3. Encrypting the Key .................................60
5.4.4. Encrypting the Content .............................61
5.4.5. Output Results .....................................63
5.5. Key Agreement Using ECDH-ES with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 ........65
5.5.1. Input Factors ......................................66
5.5.2. Generated Factors ..................................66
5.5.3. Key Agreement ......................................67
5.5.4. Encrypting the Content .............................67
5.5.5. Output Results .....................................68
5.6. Direct Encryption Using AES-GCM ...........................70
5.6.1. Input Factors ......................................70
5.6.2. Generated Factors ..................................70
5.6.3. Encrypting the Content .............................71
5.6.4. Output Results .....................................72
5.7. Key Wrap Using AES-GCM KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 .....73
5.7.1. Input Factors ......................................73
5.7.2. Generated Factors ..................................74
5.7.3. Encrypting the Key .................................74
5.7.4. Encrypting the Content .............................75
5.7.5. Output Results .....................................77
5.8. Key Wrap Using AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM ...................79
5.8.1. Input Factors ......................................79
5.8.2. Generated Factors ..................................80
5.8.3. Encrypting the Key .................................80
5.8.4. Encrypting the Content .............................80
5.8.5. Output Results .....................................82
5.9. Compressed Content ........................................84
5.9.1. Input Factors ......................................84
5.9.2. Generated Factors ..................................84
5.9.3. Encrypting the Key .................................85
5.9.4. Encrypting the Content .............................85
5.9.5. Output Results .....................................86
5.10. Including Additional Authenticated Data ..................88
5.10.1. Input Factors .....................................88
5.10.2. Generated Factors .................................89
5.10.3. Encrypting the Key ................................90
5.10.4. Encrypting the Content ............................90
5.10.5. Output Results ....................................91
5.11. Protecting Specific Header Fields ........................93
5.11.1. Input Factors .....................................93
5.11.2. Generated Factors .................................94
5.11.3. Encrypting the Key ................................94
5.11.4. Encrypting the Content ............................94
5.11.5. Output Results ....................................95
5.12. Protecting Content Only ..................................97
5.12.1. Input Factors .....................................97
5.12.2. Generated Factors .................................98
5.12.3. Encrypting the Key ................................98
5.12.4. Encrypting the Content ............................98
5.12.5. Output Results ....................................99
5.13. Encrypting to Multiple Recipients .......................101
5.13.1. Input Factors ....................................101
5.13.2. Generated Factors ................................101
5.13.3. Encrypting the Key to the First Recipient ........102
5.13.4. Encrypting the Key to the Second Recipient .......103
5.13.5. Encrypting the Key to the Third Recipient ........105
5.13.6. Encrypting the Content ...........................106
5.13.7. Output Results ...................................108
6. Nesting Signatures and Encryption .............................110
6.1. Signing Input Factors ....................................110
6.2. Signing Operation ........................................112
6.3. Signing Output ...........................................112
6.4. Encryption Input Factors .................................113
6.5. Encryption Generated Factors .............................113
6.6. Encrypting the Key .......................................114
6.7. Encrypting the Content ...................................114
6.8. Encryption Output ........................................115
7. Security Considerations .......................................119
8. References ....................................................119
8.1. Normative References .....................................119
8.2. Informative References ...................................120
Acknowledgements .................................................120
Author's Address .................................................120
1. Introduction The JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) technologies -- JSON
Web Signature [JWS], JSON Web Encryption [JWE], JSON Web Key [JWK],
and JSON Web Algorithms [JWA] -- can be used collectively to encrypt
and/or sign content using a variety of algorithms. While the full
set of permutations is extremely large, and might be daunting to
some, it is expected that most applications will only use a small set
of algorithms to meet their needs.
This document provides a number of examples of signing or encrypting
content using JOSE. While not exhaustive, it does compile a
representative sampling of JOSE features. As much as possible, the
same signature payload or encryption plaintext content is used to
illustrate differences in various signing and encryption results.
This document also provides a number of example JWK objects. These
examples illustrate the distinguishing properties of various key
types and emphasize important characteristics. Most of the JWK
examples are then used in the signature or encryption examples that
follow.
All of the examples contained herein are available in a machine-
readable format at <
https://github.com/ietf-jose/cookbook >.
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document This document separates data that are expected to be input to an
implementation of JOSE from data that are expected to be generated by
an implementation of JOSE. Each example, wherever possible, provides
enough information both to replicate the results of this document and
to validate the results by running its inverse operation (e.g.,
signature results can be validated by performing the JWS verify).
However, some algorithms inherently use random data; therefore,
computations employing them cannot be exactly replicated. Such cases
are explicitly stated in the relevant sections.
All instances of binary octet strings are represented using base64url
[
RFC4648 ] encoding.
Wherever possible and unless otherwise noted, the examples include
the JWS or JWE Compact Serialization, general JWS or JWE JSON
Serialization, and flattened JWS or JWE JSON Serialization.
All of the examples in this document have whitespace added to improve
formatting and readability. Except for JWE Plaintext or JWS Payload
content, whitespace is not part of the cryptographic operations nor
the exchange results.
Unless otherwise noted, the JWE Plaintext or JWS Payload content does
include " " (U+0020 SPACE) characters. Line breaks (U+000A LINE
FEED) replace some " " (U+0020 SPACE) characters to improve
readability but are not present in the JWE Plaintext or JWS Payload.
2. Terminology This document inherits terminology regarding JSON Web Signature (JWS)
technology from [JWS], terminology regarding JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) technology from [JWE], terminology regarding JSON Web Key (JWK)
technology from [JWK], and terminology regarding algorithms from
[JWA].
3. JSON Web Key Examples The following sections demonstrate how to represent various JWK and
JWK Set objects.
3.1. EC Public Key This example illustrates an Elliptic Curve (EC) public key. This
example is the public key corresponding to the private key in
Figure 2.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
{
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"use": "sig",
"crv": "P-521",
"x": "AHKZLLOsCOzz5cY97ewNUajB957y-C-U88c3v13nmGZx6sYl_oJXu9
A5RkTKqjqvjyekWF-7ytDyRXYgCF5cj0Kt",
"y": "AdymlHvOiLxXkEhayXQnNCvDX4h9htZaCJN34kfmC6pV5OhQHiraVy
SsUdaQkAgDPrwQrJmbnX9cwlGfP-HqHZR1"
}
Figure 1: Elliptic Curve P-521 Public Key
The field "kty" value of "EC" identifies this as an Elliptic Curve
key. The field "crv" identifies the curve, which is curve P-521 for
this example. The values of the fields "x" and "y" are the
base64url-encoded X and Y coordinates (respectively).
The values of the fields "x" and "y" decoded are the octets necessary
to represent each full coordinate to the order of the curve. For a
key over curve P-521, the values of the fields "x" and "y" are
exactly 66 octets in length when decoded, padded with leading zero
(0x00) octets to reach the expected length.
3.2. EC Private Key This example illustrates an Elliptic Curve private key. This example
is the private key corresponding to the public key in Figure 1.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
{
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"use": "sig",
"crv": "P-521",
"x": "AHKZLLOsCOzz5cY97ewNUajB957y-C-U88c3v13nmGZx6sYl_oJXu9
A5RkTKqjqvjyekWF-7ytDyRXYgCF5cj0Kt",
"y": "AdymlHvOiLxXkEhayXQnNCvDX4h9htZaCJN34kfmC6pV5OhQHiraVy
SsUdaQkAgDPrwQrJmbnX9cwlGfP-HqHZR1",
"d": "AAhRON2r9cqXX1hg-RoI6R1tX5p2rUAYdmpHZoC1XNM56KtscrX6zb
KipQrCW9CGZH3T4ubpnoTKLDYJ_fF3_rJt"
}
Figure 2: Elliptic Curve P-521 Private Key
The field "kty" value of "EC" identifies this as an Elliptic Curve
key. The field "crv" identifies the curve, which is curve P-521
(also known as SECG curve secp521r1) for this example. The values of
the fields "x" and "y" are the base64url-encoded X and Y coordinates
(respectively). The field "d" value is the base64url-encoded private
key.
The values of the fields "d", "x", and "y" decoded are the octets
necessary to represent the private key or each full coordinate
(respectively) to the order of the curve. For a key over curve
P-521, the values of the "d", "x", and "y" fields are each exactly 66
octets in length when decoded, padded with leading zero (0x00) octets
to reach the expected length.
3.3. RSA Public Key This example illustrates an RSA public key. This example is the
public key corresponding to the private key in Figure 4.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
{
"kty": "RSA",
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"use": "sig",
"n": "n4EPtAOCc9AlkeQHPzHStgAbgs7bTZLwUBZdR8_KuKPEHLd4rHVTeT
-O-XV2jRojdNhxJWTDvNd7nqQ0VEiZQHz_AJmSCpMaJMRBSFKrKb2wqV
wGU_NsYOYL-QtiWN2lbzcEe6XC0dApr5ydQLrHqkHHig3RBordaZ6Aj-
oBHqFEHYpPe7Tpe-OfVfHd1E6cS6M1FZcD1NNLYD5lFHpPI9bTwJlsde
3uhGqC0ZCuEHg8lhzwOHrtIQbS0FVbb9k3-tVTU4fg_3L_vniUFAKwuC
LqKnS2BYwdq_mzSnbLY7h_qixoR7jig3__kRhuaxwUkRz5iaiQkqgc5g
HdrNP5zw",
"e": "AQAB"
}
Figure 3: RSA 2048-Bit Public Key
The field "kty" value of "RSA" identifies this as an RSA key. The
fields "n" and "e" values are the modulus and (public) exponent
(respectively) using the minimum octets necessary.
For a 2048-bit key, the field "n" value is 256 octets in length when
decoded.
3.4. RSA Private Key This example illustrates an RSA private key. This example is the
private key corresponding to the public key in Figure 3.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
The field "kty" value of "RSA" identifies this as an RSA key. The
fields "n" and "e" values are the base64url-encoded modulus and
(public) exponent (respectively) using the minimum number of octets
necessary. The field "d" value is the base64url-encoded private
exponent using the minimum number of octets necessary. The fields
"p", "q", "dp", "dq", and "qi" are the base64url-encoded additional
private information using the minimum number of octets necessary.
For a 2048-bit key, the field "n" is 256 octets in length when
decoded, and the field "d" is not longer than 256 octets in length
when decoded.
3.5. Symmetric Key (MAC Computation) This example illustrates a symmetric key used for computing Message
Authentication Codes (MACs).
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037",
"use": "sig",
"alg": "HS256",
"k": "hJtXIZ2uSN5kbQfbtTNWbpdmhkV8FJG-Onbc6mxCcYg"
}
Figure 5: HMAC SHA-256 Symmetric Key
The field "kty" value of "oct" identifies this as a symmetric key.
The field "k" value is the symmetric key.
When used for the signing algorithm "HS256" (HMAC-SHA256), the field
"k" value is 32 octets (or more) in length when decoded, padded with
leading zero (0x00) octets to reach the minimum expected length.
3.6. Symmetric Key (Encryption) This example illustrates a symmetric key used for encryption.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "1e571774-2e08-40da-8308-e8d68773842d",
"use": "enc",
"alg": "A256GCM",
"k": "AAPapAv4LbFbiVawEjagUBluYqN5rhna-8nuldDvOx8"
}
Figure 6: AES 256-Bit Symmetric Encryption Key
The field "kty" value of "oct" identifies this as a symmetric key.
The field "k" value is the symmetric key.
For the content encryption algorithm "A256GCM", the field "k" value
is exactly 32 octets in length when decoded, padded with leading zero
(0x00) octets to reach the expected length.
4. JSON Web Signature Examples The following sections demonstrate how to generate various JWS
objects.
All of the signature examples use the following payload content (an
abridged quote from "The Fellowship of the Ring" [LOTR-FELLOWSHIP]),
serialized as UTF-8. The payload is presented here as a series of
quoted strings that are concatenated to produce the JWS Payload. The
sequence "\xe2\x80\x99" is substituted for (U+2019 RIGHT SINGLE
QUOTATION MARK), and quotation marks (U+0022 QUOTATION MARK) are
added for readability but are not present in the JWS Payload.
"It\xe2\x80\x99s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your "
"door. You step onto the road, and if you don't keep your feet, "
"there\xe2\x80\x99s no knowing where you might be swept off "
"to."
Figure 7: Payload Content Plaintext
The payload -- with the sequence "\xe2\x80\x99" replaced with (U+2019
RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK) and quotations marks (U+0022 QUOTATION
MARK) are removed -- is encoded as UTF-8 and then as base64url
[
RFC4648 ]:
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 8: Payload Content, base64url-encoded
4.1. RSA v1.5 Signature This example illustrates signing content using the "RS256" (RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256) algorithm.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.1.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 4.
o "alg" parameter of "RS256".
4.1.2. Signing Operation The following is generated to complete the signing operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 9,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 10.
{
"alg": "RS256",
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
}
Figure 9: JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
Figure 10: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 10) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in
Section 5.1 of [JWS] to produce the JWS
Signing Input (Figure 11).
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 11: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 11) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 12).
MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHoxnW2e5CZ5NlKtainoFmK
ZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII7PNDi84wnB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4J
IwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0RnltuYv746iYTh_qHRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8w
W1Kt9eRo4QPocSadnHXFxnt8Is9UzpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluP
xUAhb6L2aXic1U12podGU0KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJushZ41Axf_f
cIe8u9ipH84ogoree7vjbU5y18kDquDg
Figure 12: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
4.1.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Protected Header (Figure 9)
o Payload content (Figure 8)
o Signature (Figure 12)
The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbn
NAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9",
"signature": "MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHoxnW2
e5CZ5NlKtainoFmKZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII7PNDi84w
nB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4JIwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0RnltuYv746iYTh_q
HRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8wW1Kt9eRo4QPocSadnHXFxnt8Is9U
zpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluPxUAhb6L2aXic1U12podGU0
KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJushZ41Axf_fcIe8u9ipH84ogore
e7vjbU5y18kDquDg"
}
Figure 15: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization
4.2. RSA-PSS Signature This example illustrates signing content using the "PS384" (RSASSA-
PSS with SHA-384) algorithm.
Note that RSASSA-PSS uses random data to generate the signature; it
might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this
section.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.2.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 4.
o "alg" parameter of "PS384".
4.2.2. Signing Operation The following is generated to complete the signing operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 16,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 17.
{
"alg": "PS384",
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
}
Figure 16: JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
Figure 17: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 17) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 18).
eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 18: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 18) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 19).
cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2I
pN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXU
vdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz28zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRX
e8P_ijQ7p8Vdz0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT
0qI0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uTOcbH510a
6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw
Figure 19: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
4.2.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Protected Header (Figure 17)
o Payload content (Figure 8)
o Signature (Figure 19)
The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
.
cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2I
pN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXU
vdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz28zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRX
e8P_ijQ7p8Vdz0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT
0qI0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uTOcbH510a
6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw
Figure 20: JWS Compact Serialization
4.3. ECDSA Signature This example illustrates signing content using the "ES512" (Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-521 and SHA-
512) algorithm.
Note that ECDSA uses random data to generate the signature; it might
not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.3.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o EC private key on the curve P-521; this example uses the key from
Figure 2.
o "alg" parameter of "ES512".
4.3.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before beginning the signature process:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 23,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 24.
{
"alg": "ES512",
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
}
Figure 23: JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
Figure 24: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 24) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 25).
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 25: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 25) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 26).
AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvb
u9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kv
AD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2
Figure 26: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
4.3.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Protected Header (Figure 24)
o Payload content (Figure 8)
o Signature (Figure 26)
The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
hhbXBsZSJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
.
AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvb
u9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kv
AD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2
Figure 27: JWS Compact Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"signatures": [
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2
dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9",
"signature": "AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNl
aAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvbu9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mt
PBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kvAD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBp
HABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2"
}
]
}
Figure 28: General JWS JSON Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbn
NAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9",
"signature": "AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP
2kqaluUIIUnC9qvbu9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sD
DyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kvAD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sF
Y8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2"
}
Figure 29: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization
4.4. HMAC-SHA2 Integrity Protection This example illustrates integrity protecting content using the
"HS256" (HMAC-SHA-256) algorithm.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.4.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o HMAC symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 5.
o "alg" parameter of "HS256".
4.4.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the signing operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 30,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 31.
{
"alg": "HS256",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
}
Figure 30: JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
Figure 31: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 31) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 32).
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 32: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 32) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 33).
s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0
Figure 33: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
4.4.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Protected Header (Figure 31)
o Payload content (Figure 8)
o Signature (Figure 33)
The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
.
s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0
Figure 34: JWS Compact Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"signatures": [
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT
RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
"signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p
0"
}
]
}
Figure 35: General JWS JSON Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOW
ItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
"signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0"
}
Figure 36: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization
4.5. Signature with Detached Content This example illustrates a signature with detached content. This
example is identical to other examples in
Section 4 , except the
resulting JWS objects do not include the JWS Payload field. Instead,
the application is expected to locate it elsewhere. For example, the
signature might be in a metadata section, with the payload being the
content.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.5.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from
Figure 5.
o Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256".
4.5.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the signing operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 37,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 38.
{
"alg": "HS256",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
}
Figure 37: JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
Figure 38: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 38) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 39).
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 39: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 39) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 40).
s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0
Figure 40: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
4.5.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Protected Header (Figure 38)
o Signature (Figure 40)
The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
.
.
s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0
Figure 41: General JWS JSON Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"signatures": [
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT
RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
"signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p
0"
}
]
}
Figure 42: General JWS JSON Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOW
ItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
"signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0"
}
Figure 43: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization
4.6. Protecting Specific Header Fields This example illustrates a signature where only certain Header
Parameters are protected. Since this example contains both
unprotected and protected Header Parameters, only the general JWS
JSON Serialization and flattened JWS JSON Serialization are possible.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.6.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from
Figure 5.
o Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256".
4.6.2. Signing Operation The following are generated before completing the signing operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 44,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 45.
o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 46.
{
"alg": "HS256"
}
Figure 44: JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
Figure 45: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
{
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
}
Figure 46: JWS Unprotected Header JSON
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 45) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 47).
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 47: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 47) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 48).
bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr20
Figure 48: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
4.6.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Protected Header (Figure 45)
o JWS Unprotected Header (Figure 46)
o Payload content (Figure 8)
o Signature (Figure 48)
The JWS Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not
support this use case.
The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"signatures": [
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
},
"signature": "bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr2
0"
}
]
}
Figure 49: General JWS JSON Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
},
"signature": "bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr20"
}
Figure 50: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization
4.7. Protecting Content Only This example illustrates a signature where none of the Header
Parameters are protected. Since this example contains only
unprotected Header Parameters, only the general JWS JSON
Serialization and flattened JWS JSON Serialization are possible.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.7.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from
Figure 5.
o Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256".
4.7.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the signing operation:
o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 51.
{
"alg": "HS256",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
}
Figure 51: JWS Unprotected Header JSON
The empty string (as there is no JWS Protected Header) and JWS
Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the
JWS Signing Input (Figure 52).
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 52: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 52) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 53).
xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZuk
Figure 53: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
4.7.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Unprotected Header (Figure 51)
o Payload content (Figure 8)
o Signature (Figure 53)
The JWS Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not
support this use case.
The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"signatures": [
{
"header": {
"alg": "HS256",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
},
"signature": "xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZu
k"
}
]
}
Figure 54: General JWS JSON Serialization
The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization:
{
"payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
ZiB0by4",
"header": {
"alg": "HS256",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
},
"signature": "xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZuk"
}
Figure 55: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization
4.8. Multiple Signatures This example illustrates multiple signatures applied to the same
payload. Since this example contains more than one signature, only
the JSON General Serialization is possible.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
4.8.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 8.
o Signing keys; this example uses the following:
* RSA private key from Figure 4 for the first signature
* EC private key from Figure 2 for the second signature
* AES symmetric key from Figure 5 for the third signature
o Signing algorithms; this example uses the following:
* "RS256" for the first signature
* "ES512" for the second signature
* "HS256" for the third signature
4.8.2. First Signing Operation The following are generated before completing the first signing
operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 56,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 57.
o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 58.
{
"alg": "RS256"
}
Figure 56: Signature #1 JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
Figure 57: Signature #1 JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
{
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
}
Figure 58: Signature #1 JWS Unprotected Header JSON
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 57) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 59).
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 59: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 59) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 60).
MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5NvyG53uoimic1tcMdSg-qpt
rzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFcryNFiHkSw129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTC
glNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc-1RlpO2HibUYyXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjy
tKSeAMbhMBdMma622_BG5t4sdbuCHtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqB
BCXbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGoOSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK64jU6_TPt
QHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-083B745_AfYOnlC9w
Figure 60: JWS Signature #1, base64url-encoded
The following is the assembled first signature serialized as JSON:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
},
"signature": "MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5NvyG53u
oimic1tcMdSg-qptrzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFcryNFiHkS
w129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTCglNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc-1RlpO2HibUY
yXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjytKSeAMbhMBdMma622_BG5t4sdbuC
HtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqBBCXbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGo
OSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK64jU6_TPtQHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-0
83B745_AfYOnlC9w"
}
Figure 61: Signature #1 JSON
4.8.3. Second Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the second signing
operation:
o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 62.
{
"alg": "ES512",
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
}
Figure 62: Signature #2 JWS Unprotected Header JSON
4.8.4. Third Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the third signing
operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 66,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 67.
{
"alg": "HS256",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
}
Figure 66: Signature #3 JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
Figure 67: Signature #3 JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
The JWS Protected Header (Figure 67) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are
combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 68).
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
.
SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
Figure 68: JWS Signing Input
Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input
(Figure 68) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 69).
s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0
Figure 69: JWS Signature #3, base64url-encoded
The following is the assembled third signature serialized as JSON:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOW
ItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
"signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0"
}
Figure 70: Signature #3 JSON
4.8.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o Payload content (Figure 8)
o Signature #1 JSON (Figure 61)
o Signature #2 JSON (Figure 65)
o Signature #3 JSON (Figure 70)
The JWS Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not
support this use case; the flattened JWS JSON Serialization is not
presented because there is more than one signature.
5. JSON Web Encryption Examples The following sections demonstrate how to generate various JWE
objects.
All of the encryption examples (unless otherwise noted) use the
following Plaintext content (an abridged quote from "The Fellowship
of the Ring" [LOTR-FELLOWSHIP]), serialized as UTF-8. The Plaintext
is presented here as a series of quoted strings that are concatenated
to produce the JWE Plaintext. The sequence "\xe2\x80\x93" is
substituted for (U+2013 EN DASH), and quotation marks (U+0022
QUOTATION MARK) are added for readability but are not present in the
JWE Plaintext.
"You can trust us to stick with you through thick and "
"thin\xe2\x80\x93to the bitter end. And you can trust us to "
"keep any secret of yours\xe2\x80\x93closer than you keep it "
"yourself. But you cannot trust us to let you face trouble "
"alone, and go off without a word. We are your friends, Frodo."
Figure 72: Plaintext Content
5.1. Key Encryption Using RSA v1.5 and AES-HMAC-SHA2 This example illustrates encrypting content using the "RSA1_5"
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) key encryption algorithm and the "A128CBC-HS256"
(AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm.
Note that RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 uses random data to generate the
ciphertext; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results
in this section.
Note that only the RSA public key is necessary to perform the
encryption. However, the example includes the RSA private key to
allow readers to validate the output.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.1.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 73.
(NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public
parameters "e" and "n" are necessary for the encryption operation.)
5.1.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 74.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 75.
3qyTVhIWt5juqZUCpfRqpvauwB956MEJL2Rt-8qXKSo
Figure 74: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA
Figure 75: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.1.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 74) with
the RSA key (Figure 73) results in the following Encrypted Key:
laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePF
vG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2G
Xfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcG
TSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8Vl
zNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOh
MBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw
Figure 76: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.1.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the Plaintext:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 77,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 78.
{
"alg": "RSA1_5",
"kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
}
Figure 77: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLm
V4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
Figure 78: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext
(Figure 72) using the following:
o CEK (Figure 74);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 75); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 77) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 79.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 80.
0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_r
aa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wnI3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8O
WzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZV
yeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtmRdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0
zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0yKVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2
O6_7uInMGhFeX4ctHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VW
i7lzA6BP430m
Figure 79: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg
Figure 80: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.1.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 78)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 76)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 75)
o Ciphertext (Figure 79)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 80)
The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLm
V4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
.
laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePF
vG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2G
Xfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcG
TSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8Vl
zNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOh
MBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw
.
bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA
.
0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_r
aa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wnI3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8O
WzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZV
yeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtmRdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0
zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0yKVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2
O6_7uInMGhFeX4ctHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VW
i7lzA6BP430m
.
kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg
Figure 81: JWE Compact Serialization
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW
5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In
0",
"encrypted_key": "laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJ
Buuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePFvG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON39
5H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2GXfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ
1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcGTSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQX
oZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8VlzNmoxaGMny3YnGir5W
f6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOhMBs9M8XL223F
g47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw",
"iv": "bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA",
"ciphertext": "0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62
JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_raa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wn
I3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8OWzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc
2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZVyeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtm
RdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0y
KVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2O6_7uInMGhFeX4c
tHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VWi7lzA6BP4
30m",
"tag": "kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg"
}
Figure 83: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.2. Key Encryption Using RSA-OAEP with AES-GCM This example illustrates encrypting content using the "RSA-OAEP"
(RSAES-OAEP) key encryption algorithm and the "A256GCM" (AES-GCM)
content encryption algorithm.
Note that RSAES-OAEP uses random data to generate the ciphertext; it
might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this
section.
Note that only the RSA public key is necessary to perform the
encryption. However, the example includes the RSA private key to
allow readers to validate the output.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.2.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the Plaintext from Figure 72.
o RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 84.
o "alg" parameter of "RSA-OAEP".
o "enc" parameter of "A256GCM".
{
"kty": "RSA",
"kid": "samwise.gamgee@hobbiton.example",
"use": "enc",
"n": "wbdxI55VaanZXPY29Lg5hdmv2XhvqAhoxUkanfzf2-5zVUxa6prHRr
I4pP1AhoqJRlZfYtWWd5mmHRG2pAHIlh0ySJ9wi0BioZBl1XP2e-C-Fy
XJGcTy0HdKQWlrfhTm42EW7Vv04r4gfao6uxjLGwfpGrZLarohiWCPnk
Nrg71S2CuNZSQBIPGjXfkmIy2tl_VWgGnL22GplyXj5YlBLdxXp3XeSt
sqo571utNfoUTU8E4qdzJ3U1DItoVkPGsMwlmmnJiwA7sXRItBCivR4M
5qnZtdw-7v4WuR4779ubDuJ5nalMv2S66-RPcnFAzWSKxtBDnFJJDGIU
e7Tzizjg1nms0Xq_yPub_UOlWn0ec85FCft1hACpWG8schrOBeNqHBOD
FskYpUc2LC5JA2TaPF2dA67dg1TTsC_FupfQ2kNGcE1LgprxKHcVWYQb
86B-HozjHZcqtauBzFNV5tbTuB-TpkcvJfNcFLlH3b8mb-H_ox35FjqB
SAjLKyoeqfKTpVjvXhd09knwgJf6VKq6UC418_TOljMVfFTWXUxlnfhO
OnzW6HSSzD1c9WrCuVzsUMv54szidQ9wf1cYWf3g5qFDxDQKis99gcDa
iCAwM3yEBIzuNeeCa5dartHDb1xEB_HcHSeYbghbMjGfasvKn0aZRsnT
yC0xhWBlsolZE",
"e": "AQAB",
"alg": "RSA-OAEP",
"d": "n7fzJc3_WG59VEOBTkayzuSMM780OJQuZjN_KbH8lOZG25ZoA7T4Bx
cc0xQn5oZE5uSCIwg91oCt0JvxPcpmqzaJZg1nirjcWZ-oBtVk7gCAWq
-B3qhfF3izlbkosrzjHajIcY33HBhsy4_WerrXg4MDNE4HYojy68TcxT
2LYQRxUOCf5TtJXvM8olexlSGtVnQnDRutxEUCwiewfmmrfveEogLx9E
A-KMgAjTiISXxqIXQhWUQX1G7v_mV_Hr2YuImYcNcHkRvp9E7ook0876
DhkO8v4UOZLwA1OlUX98mkoqwc58A_Y2lBYbVx1_s5lpPsEqbbH-nqIj
h1fL0gdNfihLxnclWtW7pCztLnImZAyeCWAG7ZIfv-Rn9fLIv9jZ6r7r
-MSH9sqbuziHN2grGjD_jfRluMHa0l84fFKl6bcqN1JWxPVhzNZo01yD
F-1LiQnqUYSepPf6X3a2SOdkqBRiquE6EvLuSYIDpJq3jDIsgoL8Mo1L
oomgiJxUwL_GWEOGu28gplyzm-9Q0U0nyhEf1uhSR8aJAQWAiFImWH5W
_IQT9I7-yrindr_2fWQ_i1UgMsGzA7aOGzZfPljRy6z-tY_KuBG00-28
S_aWvjyUc-Alp8AUyKjBZ-7CWH32fGWK48j1t-zomrwjL_mnhsPbGs0c
9WsWgRzI-K8gE",
"p": "7_2v3OQZzlPFcHyYfLABQ3XP85Es4hCdwCkbDeltaUXgVy9l9etKgh
vM4hRkOvbb01kYVuLFmxIkCDtpi-zLCYAdXKrAK3PtSbtzld_XZ9nlsY
a_QZWpXB_IrtFjVfdKUdMz94pHUhFGFj7nr6NNxfpiHSHWFE1zD_AC3m
Y46J961Y2LRnreVwAGNw53p07Db8yD_92pDa97vqcZOdgtybH9q6uma-
RFNhO1AoiJhYZj69hjmMRXx-x56HO9cnXNbmzNSCFCKnQmn4GQLmRj9s
fbZRqL94bbtE4_e0Zrpo8RNo8vxRLqQNwIy85fc6BRgBJomt8QdQvIgP
gWCv5HoQ",
"q": "zqOHk1P6WN_rHuM7ZF1cXH0x6RuOHq67WuHiSknqQeefGBA9PWs6Zy
KQCO-O6mKXtcgE8_Q_hA2kMRcKOcvHil1hqMCNSXlflM7WPRPZu2qCDc
qssd_uMbP-DqYthH_EzwL9KnYoH7JQFxxmcv5An8oXUtTwk4knKjkIYG
RuUwfQTus0w1NfjFAyxOOiAQ37ussIcE6C6ZSsM3n41UlbJ7TCqewzVJ
aPJN5cxjySPZPD3Vp01a9YgAD6a3IIaKJdIxJS1ImnfPevSJQBE79-EX
e2kSwVgOzvt-gsmM29QQ8veHy4uAqca5dZzMs7hkkHtw1z0jHV90epQJ
JlXXnH8Q",
"dp": "19oDkBh1AXelMIxQFm2zZTqUhAzCIr4xNIGEPNoDt1jK83_FJA-xn
x5kA7-1erdHdms_Ef67HsONNv5A60JaR7w8LHnDiBGnjdaUmmuO8XAxQ
J_ia5mxjxNjS6E2yD44USo2JmHvzeeNczq25elqbTPLhUpGo1IZuG72F
ZQ5gTjXoTXC2-xtCDEUZfaUNh4IeAipfLugbpe0JAFlFfrTDAMUFpC3i
XjxqzbEanflwPvj6V9iDSgjj8SozSM0dLtxvu0LIeIQAeEgT_yXcrKGm
pKdSO08kLBx8VUjkbv_3Pn20Gyu2YEuwpFlM_H1NikuxJNKFGmnAq9Lc
nwwT0jvoQ",
"dq": "S6p59KrlmzGzaQYQM3o0XfHCGvfqHLYjCO557HYQf72O9kLMCfd_1
VBEqeD-1jjwELKDjck8kOBl5UvohK1oDfSP1DleAy-cnmL29DqWmhgwM
1ip0CCNmkmsmDSlqkUXDi6sAaZuntyukyflI-qSQ3C_BafPyFaKrt1fg
dyEwYa08pESKwwWisy7KnmoUvaJ3SaHmohFS78TJ25cfc10wZ9hQNOrI
ChZlkiOdFCtxDqdmCqNacnhgE3bZQjGp3n83ODSz9zwJcSUvODlXBPc2
AycH6Ci5yjbxt4Ppox_5pjm6xnQkiPgj01GpsUssMmBN7iHVsrE7N2iz
nBNCeOUIQ",
"qi": "FZhClBMywVVjnuUud-05qd5CYU0dK79akAgy9oX6RX6I3IIIPckCc
iRrokxglZn-omAY5CnCe4KdrnjFOT5YUZE7G_Pg44XgCXaarLQf4hl80
oPEf6-jJ5Iy6wPRx7G2e8qLxnh9cOdf-kRqgOS3F48Ucvw3ma5V6KGMw
QqWFeV31XtZ8l5cVI-I3NzBS7qltpUVgz2Ju021eyc7IlqgzR98qKONl
27DuEES0aK0WE97jnsyO27Yp88Wa2RiBrEocM89QZI1seJiGDizHRUP4
UZxw9zsXww46wy0P6f9grnYp7t8LkyDDk8eoI4KX6SNMNVcyVS9IWjlq
8EzqZEKIA"
}
Figure 84: RSA 4096-Bit Key
(NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public
parameters "e" and "n" are necessary for the encryption operation.)
5.2.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 85.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 86.
mYMfsggkTAm0TbvtlFh2hyoXnbEzJQjMxmgLN3d8xXA
Figure 85: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
-nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9
Figure 86: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.2.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 85) with
the RSA key (Figure 84) produces the following Encrypted Key:
rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNuh7lCiud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQi
beYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-BbtsTBqC2UsPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyu
cvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4v1zx2k7O1D89mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58
-Aad3FzMuo3Fn9buEP2yXakLXYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8Bpx
KdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJEBz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1asnuHtVMt2pK
IIfux5BC6huIvmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7
pZfPYDSXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQ
fOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKhjYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO2AWBe3
8UjQb0lvXn1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G7S2rscw5lQQU
06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDPTr6Cbo8aKaOnx6ASE5
Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ69xDEdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDR
s
Figure 87: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.2.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the Plaintext:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 88,
encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 89.
{
"alg": "RSA-OAEP",
"kid": "samwise.gamgee@hobbiton.example",
"enc": "A256GCM"
}
Figure 88: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG
9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0
Figure 89: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
(Figure 72) with the following:
o CEK (Figure 85);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 86); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 89) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 90.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 91.
o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgR
L-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYxrXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEw
P7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lhhNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8
iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML
7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7aCflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSV
maPpOslY2n525DxDfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw
Figure 90: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA
Figure 91: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.2.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 89)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 87)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 86)
o Ciphertext (Figure 90)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 91)
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2
FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0",
"encrypted_key": "rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNuh7lC
iud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQibeYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-BbtsTBqC2U
sPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyucvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4v1zx2k7O1D89
mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58-Aad3FzMuo3Fn9buEP2yXakL
XYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8BpxKdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJE
Bz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1asnuHtVMt2pKIIfux5BC6huI
vmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7pZfPYD
SXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQ
fOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKhjYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO
2AWBe38UjQb0lvXn1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G
7S2rscw5lQQU06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDP
Tr6Cbo8aKaOnx6ASE5Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ
69xDEdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDRs",
"iv": "-nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9",
"ciphertext": "o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6
UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgRL-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYx
rXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEwP7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lh
hNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz
6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7a
CflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSVmaPpOslY2n525Dx
DfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw",
"tag": "UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA"
}
Figure 94: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.3. Key Wrap Using PBES2-AES-KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 The example illustrates encrypting content using the
"PBES2-HS512+A256KW" (PBES2 Password-based Encryption using HMAC-
SHA-512 and AES-256-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm with the
"A128CBC-HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption
algorithm.
A common use of password-based encryption is the import/export of
keys. Therefore, this example uses a JWK Set for the Plaintext
content instead of the Plaintext from Figure 72.
Note that if password-based encryption is used for multiple
recipients, it is expected that each recipient use different values
for the PBES2 parameters "p2s" and "p2c".
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.3.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the Plaintext from Figure 95
(NOTE: All whitespace was added for readability).
o Password; this example uses the password from Figure 96 -- with
the sequence "\xe2\x80\x93" replaced with (U+2013 EN DASH).
o "alg" parameter of "PBES2-HS512+A256KW".
o "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256".
{
"keys": [
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a",
"use": "enc",
"alg": "A128GCM",
"k": "XctOhJAkA-pD9Lh7ZgW_2A"
},
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
"use": "enc",
"alg": "A128KW",
"k": "GZy6sIZ6wl9NJOKB-jnmVQ"
},
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
"use": "enc",
"alg": "A256GCMKW",
"k": "qC57l_uxcm7Nm3K-ct4GFjx8tM1U8CZ0NLBvdQstiS8"
}
]
}
Figure 95: Plaintext Content
entrap_o\xe2\x80\x93peter_long\xe2\x80\x93credit_tun
Figure 96: Password
5.3.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 97.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 98.
uwsjJXaBK407Qaf0_zpcpmr1Cs0CC50hIUEyGNEt3m0
Figure 97: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ
Figure 98: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.3.3. Encrypting the Key The following are generated before encrypting the CEK:
o Salt input; this example uses the salt input from Figure 99.
o Iteration count; this example uses the iteration count 8192.
8Q1SzinasR3xchYz6ZZcHA
Figure 99: Salt Input, base64url-encoded
Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 97) with
the following:
o Password (Figure 96);
o Salt input (Figure 99), encoded as an octet string; and
o Iteration count (8192)
produces the following Encrypted Key:
d3qNhUWfqheyPp4H8sjOWsDYajoej4c5Je6rlUtFPWdgtURtmeDV1g
Figure 100: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.3.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 101, encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce
Figure 102.
{
"alg": "PBES2-HS512+A256KW",
"p2s": "8Q1SzinasR3xchYz6ZZcHA",
"p2c": 8192,
"cty": "jwk-set+json",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
}
Figure 101: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzUxMitBMjU2S1ciLCJwMnMiOiI4UTFTemluYXNSM3
hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOiJqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJl
bmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
Figure 102: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
(Figure 95) with the following:
o CEK (Figure 97);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 98); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 102) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 103.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 104.
23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IR
sfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpDjEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6l
TF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb
6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz424givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL
_SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKd
PQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrok
AKYPqmXUeRdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N-
zl5tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdTw8V
3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p
Figure 103: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
0HlwodAhOCILG5SQ2LQ9dg
Figure 104: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.3.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 102)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 100)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 98)
o Ciphertext (Figure 103)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 104)
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzUxMitBMjU2S1ciLCJwMnMiOi
I4UTFTemluYXNSM3hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOi
Jqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
"encrypted_key": "d3qNhUWfqheyPp4H8sjOWsDYajoej4c5Je6rlUtFPW
dgtURtmeDV1g",
"iv": "VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ",
"ciphertext": "23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2
nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IRsfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpD
jEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6lTF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_
hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz42
4givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL_SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ
7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKdPQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru
5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrokAKYPqmXUe
RdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N-zl5
tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdT
w8V3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p",
"tag": "0HlwodAhOCILG5SQ2LQ9dg"
}
Figure 107: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.4. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping Using ECDH-ES and AES-KeyWrap with This example illustrates encrypting content using the "ECDH-
ES+A128KW" (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral-Static with AES-
128-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM)
content encryption algorithm.
Note that only the EC public key is necessary to perform the key
agreement. However, the example includes the EC private key to allow
readers to validate the output.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.4.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o EC public key; this example uses the public key from Figure 108.
o "alg" parameter of "ECDH-ES+A128KW".
o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM".
{
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
"use": "enc",
"crv": "P-384",
"x": "YU4rRUzdmVqmRtWOs2OpDE_T5fsNIodcG8G5FWPrTPMyxpzsSOGaQL
pe2FpxBmu2",
"y": "A8-yxCHxkfBz3hKZfI1jUYMjUhsEveZ9THuwFjH2sCNdtksRJU7D5-
SkgaFL1ETP",
"d": "iTx2pk7wW-GqJkHcEkFQb2EFyYcO7RugmaW3mRrQVAOUiPommT0Idn
YK2xDlZh-j"
}
Figure 108: Elliptic Curve P-384 Key, in JWK Format
(NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public
parameters "crv", "x", and "y" are necessary for the encryption
operation.)
5.4.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 109.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 110.
Nou2ueKlP70ZXDbq9UrRwg
Figure 109: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_
Figure 110: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.4.3. Encrypting the Key To encrypt the Content Encryption Key, the following is generated:
o Ephemeral EC private key on the same curve as the EC public key;
this example uses the private key from Figure 111.
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"x": "uBo4kHPw6kbjx5l0xowrd_oYzBmaz-GKFZu4xAFFkbYiWgutEK6iuE
DsQ6wNdNg3",
"y": "sp3p5SGhZVC2faXumI-e9JU2Mo8KpoYrFDr5yPNVtW4PgEwZOyQTA-
JdaY8tb7E0",
"d": "D5H4Y_5PSKZvhfVFbcCYJOtcGZygRgfZkpsBr59Icmmhe9sW6nkZ8W
fwhinUfWJg"
}
Figure 111: Ephemeral Elliptic Curve P-384 Key, in JWK Format
Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 109)
with the following:
o The static Elliptic Curve public key (Figure 108); and
o The ephemeral Elliptic Curve private key (Figure 111)
produces the following JWE Encrypted Key:
0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2
Figure 112: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.4.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 113, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 114.
{
"alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
"kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
"epk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"x": "uBo4kHPw6kbjx5l0xowrd_oYzBmaz-GKFZu4xAFFkbYiWgutEK6i
uEDsQ6wNdNg3",
"y": "sp3p5SGhZVC2faXumI-e9JU2Mo8KpoYrFDr5yPNVtW4PgEwZOyQT
A-JdaY8tb7E0"
},
"enc": "A128GCM"
}
Figure 113: JWE Protected Header JSON
5.4.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 114)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 112)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 110)
o Ciphertext (Figure 115)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 116)
The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcmVncmluLnRvb2tAdH
Vja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAt
Mzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bDB4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NH
hBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUTZ3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMy
ZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWT
h0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
.
0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2
.
mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_
.
tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cP
WJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzsXaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0
IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkc
Y9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93YcdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w0
3XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkUZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu
07WNhjzJEPc4jVntRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ
.
WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg
Figure 117: JWE Compact Serialization
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcm
VncmluLnRvb2tAdHVja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdH
kiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bD
B4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NHhBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUT
Z3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMyZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3
BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWTh0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbm
MiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
"encrypted_key": "0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2",
"iv": "mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_",
"ciphertext": "tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz
5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cPWJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzs
XaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05
jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkcY9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93Y
cdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w03XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkU
ZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu07WNhjzJEPc4jVn
tRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ",
"tag": "WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg"
}
Figure 119: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.5. Key Agreement Using ECDH-ES with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 This example illustrates encrypting content using the "ECDH-ES"
(Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral-Static) key agreement
algorithm and the "A128CBC-HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content
encryption algorithm.
Note that only the EC public key is necessary to perform the key
agreement. However, the example includes the EC private key to allow
readers to validate the output.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.5.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o EC public key; this example uses the public key from Figure 120.
o "alg" parameter of "ECDH-ES".
o "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256".
{
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example",
"use": "enc",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "Ze2loSV3wrroKUN_4zhwGhCqo3Xhu1td4QjeQ5wIVR0",
"y": "HlLtdXARY_f55A3fnzQbPcm6hgr34Mp8p-nuzQCE0Zw",
"d": "r_kHyZ-a06rmxM3yESK84r1otSg-aQcVStkRhA-iCM8"
}
Figure 120: Elliptic Curve P-256 Key
(NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public
parameters "crv", "x", and "y" are necessary for the encryption
operation.)
5.5.2. Generated Factors The following is generated before encrypting:
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 121.
yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg
Figure 121: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
NOTE: The Content Encryption Key (CEK) is not randomly generated;
instead, it is determined using ECDH-ES key agreement.
5.5.3. Key Agreement The following is generated to agree on a CEK:
o Ephemeral private key; this example uses the private key from
Figure 122.
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "mPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqVsP1rXWQu_vwVOHHtNkdYoA",
"y": "8BQAsImGeAS46fyWw5MhYfGTT0IjBpFw2SS34Dv4Irs",
"d": "AtH35vJsQ9SGjYfOsjUxYXQKrPH3FjZHmEtSKoSN8cM"
}
Figure 122: Ephemeral Private Key, in JWK Format
Performing the ECDH operation using the static EC public key
(Figure 120) over the ephemeral private key (Figure 122) produces the
following CEK:
hzHdlfQIAEehb8Hrd_mFRhKsKLEzPfshfXs9l6areCc
Figure 123: Agreed-to Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
5.5.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 124, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 125.
{
"alg": "ECDH-ES",
"kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example",
"epk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "mPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqVsP1rXWQu_vwVOHHtNkdYoA",
"y": "8BQAsImGeAS46fyWw5MhYfGTT0IjBpFw2SS34Dv4Irs"
},
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
}
Figure 124: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYnJhbmR5YnVja0BidW
NrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYi
LCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqanFWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZF
lvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUzQ2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0
RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ
Figure 125: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext
(Figure 72) using the following:
o CEK (Figure 123);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 121); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 125) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 126.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 127.
BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4OPKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9
IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEsDIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_e
vAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolqZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7-
IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl24j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI
-sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIAfsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7
MsFfI_K767G9C9Azp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ61
95_JGG2m9Csg
Figure 126: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg
Figure 127: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.5.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 114)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 110)
o Ciphertext (Figure 115)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 116)
5.6. Direct Encryption Using AES-GCM This example illustrates encrypting content using a previously
exchanged key directly and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM) content encryption
algorithm.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.6.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 130.
o "alg" parameter of "dir".
o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM".
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a",
"use": "enc",
"alg": "A128GCM",
"k": "XctOhJAkA-pD9Lh7ZgW_2A"
}
Figure 130: AES 128-Bit Key, in JWK Format
5.6.2. Generated Factors The following is generated before encrypting:
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 131.
refa467QzzKx6QAB
Figure 131: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.6.3. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 132, encoded as base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce Figure 133.
{
"alg": "dir",
"kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a",
"enc": "A128GCM"
}
Figure 132: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLTQ1Y2YtODY3Mi02MT
diNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
Figure 133: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the encryption operation on the Plaintext (Figure 72)
using the following:
o CEK (Figure 130);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 131); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 133) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 134.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 135.
JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJoBcW29rHP8yZOZG7Y
hLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zM
DB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdcqMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_
BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5
g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb15wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSIn
ZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp
Figure 134: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ
Figure 135: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.6.4. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 133)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 131)
o Ciphertext (Figure 134)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 135)
Only the general JWE JSON Serialization is presented because the
flattened JWE JSON Serialization is identical.
The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLTQ1Y2YtODY3Mi02MT
diNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
.
.
refa467QzzKx6QAB
.
JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJoBcW29rHP8yZOZG7Y
hLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zM
DB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdcqMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_
BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5
g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb15wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSIn
ZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp
.
vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ
Figure 136: JWE Compact Serialization
The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLT
Q1Y2YtODY3Mi02MTdiNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
"iv": "refa467QzzKx6QAB",
"ciphertext": "JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJ
oBcW29rHP8yZOZG7YhLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9
HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zMDB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdc
qMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8
ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb1
5wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSInZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_
aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp",
"tag": "vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ"
}
Figure 137: General JWE JSON Serialization
5.7. Key Wrap Using AES-GCM KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 This example illustrates encrypting content using the "A256GCMKW"
(AES-256-GCM-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm with the "A128CBC-
HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.7.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o AES symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 138.
o "alg" parameter of "A256GCMKW".
o "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256".
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
"use": "enc",
"alg": "A256GCMKW",
"k": "qC57l_uxcm7Nm3K-ct4GFjx8tM1U8CZ0NLBvdQstiS8"
}
Figure 138: AES 256-Bit Key
5.7.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 139.
o Initialization Vector for content encryption; this example uses
the Initialization Vector from Figure 140.
UWxARpat23nL9ReIj4WG3D1ee9I4r-Mv5QLuFXdy_rE
Figure 139: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ
Figure 140: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.7.3. Encrypting the Key The following is generated before encrypting the CEK:
o Initialization Vector for key wrapping; this example uses the
Initialization Vector from Figure 141.
KkYT0GX_2jHlfqN_
Figure 141: Initialization Vector for Key Wrapping, base64url-encoded
Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 139)
with the following:
o AES symmetric key (Figure 138);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 141); and
o The empty string as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Encrypted Key from Figure 142.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 143.
lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNok
Figure 142: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
kfPduVQ3T3H6vnewt--ksw
Figure 143: Authentication Tag from Key Wrapping, base64url-encoded
5.7.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 144, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 145.
{
"alg": "A256GCMKW",
"kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
"tag": "kfPduVQ3T3H6vnewt--ksw",
"iv": "KkYT0GX_2jHlfqN_",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
}
Figure 144: JWE Protected Header JSON
5.7.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 145)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 142)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 140)
o Ciphertext (Figure 146)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 147)
The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYj
IwNS0yYjRkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdVZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3
IiwiaXYiOiJLa1lUMEdYXzJqSGxmcU5fIiwiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1Ni
J9
.
lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNok
.
gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ
.
Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8EqoDZHyFKFBupS8iaE
eVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyWtZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCz
LjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQHLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFq
hpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfDgymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hde
b6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0Jtj
xAj4UPI61oONK7zzFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR
1B-gxpNk3xWU
.
DKW7jrb4WaRSNfbXVPlT5g
Figure 148: JWE Compact Serialization
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJpdiI6IktrWVQwR1hfMm
pIbGZxTl8iLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYjIwNS0yYj
RkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdVZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3Ii
wiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1NiJ9",
"encrypted_key": "lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNo
k",
"iv": "gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ",
"ciphertext": "Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8E
qoDZHyFKFBupS8iaEeVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyW
tZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCzLjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQ
HLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFqhpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfD
gymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hdeb6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec
4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0JtjxAj4UPI61oONK7z
zFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR1B-gxpNk3
xWU",
"tag": "NvBveHr_vonkvflfnUrmBQ"
}
Figure 150: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.8. Key Wrap Using AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM The following example illustrates content encryption using the
"A128KW" (AES-128-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM"
(AES-128-GCM) content encryption algorithm.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.8.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o AES symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 151.
o "alg" parameter of "A128KW".
o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM".
{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
"use": "enc",
"alg": "A128KW",
"k": "GZy6sIZ6wl9NJOKB-jnmVQ"
}
Figure 151: AES 128-Bit Key
5.8.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key; this example uses
the key from Figure 152.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 153.
aY5_Ghmk9KxWPBLu_glx1w
Figure 152: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo
Figure 153: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.8.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 152)
with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following
Encrypted Key:
CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx
Figure 154: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.8.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 155, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 156.
5.8.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 156)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 154)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 153)
o Ciphertext (Figure 157)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 158)
The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization:
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
.
CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx
.
Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo
.
AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1bTdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD6
1A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGkd3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfe
F0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiYSoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8RE
wOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-p
uQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvETUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRa
a8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMvEmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF
.
ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw
Figure 159: JWE Compact Serialization
5.9. Compressed Content This example illustrates encrypting content that is first compressed.
It reuses the AES symmetric key, key encryption algorithm, and
content encryption algorithm from
Section 5.8 .
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
5.9.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
Figure 151.
o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".
o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".
o "zip" parameter of "DEF".
5.9.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o Compressed Plaintext from the original Plaintext content;
compressing Figure 72 using the DEFLATE [
RFC1951 ] algorithm
produces the compressed Plaintext from Figure 162.
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 163.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 164.
bY_BDcIwDEVX-QNU3QEOrIA4pqlDokYxchxVvbEDGzIJbioOSJwc-f___HPjBu
8KVFpVtAplVE1-wZo0YjNZo3C7R5v72pV5f5X382VWjYQpqZKAyjziZOr2B7kQ
PSy6oZIXUnDYbVKN4jNXi2u0yB7t1qSHTjmMODf9QgvrDzfTIQXnyQRuUya4zI
WG3vTOdir0v7BRHFYWq3k1k1A_gSDJqtcBF-GZxw8
Figure 162: Compressed Plaintext, base64url-encoded
hC-MpLZSuwWv8sexS6ydfw
Figure 163: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl
Figure 164: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.9.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 163)
with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following
Encrypted Key:
5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi
Figure 165: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.9.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 166, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 167.
{
"alg": "A128KW",
"kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
"enc": "A128GCM",
"zip": "DEF"
}
Figure 166: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwiemlwIjoiREVGIn0
Figure 167: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation over the compressed
Plaintext (Figure 162, encoded as an octet string) with the
following:
o CEK (Figure 163);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 164); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 167) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 168.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 169.
HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6VB8hry57tDZ61jXyez
SPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWGml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0
m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDHj0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBK
hpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxExCpG3mK420TjOw
Figure 168: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA
Figure 169: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.9.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 167)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 165)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 164)
o Ciphertext (Figure 168)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 169)
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz
MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIi
wiemlwIjoiREVGIn0",
"encrypted_key": "5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi",
"iv": "p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl",
"ciphertext": "HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6V
B8hry57tDZ61jXyezSPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWG
ml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDH
j0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBKhpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxE
xCpG3mK420TjOw",
"tag": "VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA"
}
Figure 172: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.10. Including Additional Authenticated Data This example illustrates encrypting content that includes additional
authenticated data. As this example includes an additional top-level
property not present in the JWE Compact Serialization, only the
flattened JWE JSON Serialization and general JWE JSON Serialization
are possible.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
Figure 151.
o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".
o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".
o Additional Authenticated Data; this example uses a vCard [
RFC7095 ]
from Figure 173, serialized to UTF-8.
[
"vcard",
[
[ "version", {}, "text", "4.0" ],
[ "fn", {}, "text", "Meriadoc Brandybuck" ],
[ "n", {},
"text", [
"Brandybuck", "Meriadoc", "Mr.", ""
]
],
[ "bday", {}, "text", "TA 2982" ],
[ "gender", {}, "text", "M" ]
]
]
Figure 173: Additional Authenticated Data, in JSON Format
NOTE: Whitespace between JSON values was added for readability.
5.10.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 174.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 175.
o Encoded Additional Authenticated Data (AAD); this example uses the
Additional Authenticated Data from Figure 173, encoded to
base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 176.
75m1ALsYv10pZTKPWrsqdg
Figure 174: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
veCx9ece2orS7c_N
Figure 175: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
WyJ2Y2FyZCIsW1sidmVyc2lvbiIse30sInRleHQiLCI0LjAiXSxbImZuIix7fS
widGV4dCIsIk1lcmlhZG9jIEJyYW5keWJ1Y2siXSxbIm4iLHt9LCJ0ZXh0Iixb
IkJyYW5keWJ1Y2siLCJNZXJpYWRvYyIsIk1yLiIsIiJdXSxbImJkYXkiLHt9LC
J0ZXh0IiwiVEEgMjk4MiJdLFsiZ2VuZGVyIix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk0iXV1d
Figure 176: Additional Authenticated Data, base64url-encoded
5.10.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 174)
with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following
Encrypted Key:
4YiiQ_ZzH76TaIkJmYfRFgOV9MIpnx4X
Figure 177: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.10.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 178, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 179.
{
"alg": "A128KW",
"kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
"enc": "A128GCM"
}
Figure 178: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
Figure 179: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext with
the following:
o CEK (Figure 174);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 175); and
o Concatenation of the JWE Protected Header (Figure 179), ".", and
the base64url [
RFC4648 ] encoding of Figure 173 as authenticated
data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 180.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 181.
Z_3cbr0k3bVM6N3oSNmHz7Lyf3iPppGf3Pj17wNZqteJ0Ui8p74SchQP8xygM1
oFRWCNzeIa6s6BcEtp8qEFiqTUEyiNkOWDNoF14T_4NFqF-p2Mx8zkbKxI7oPK
8KNarFbyxIDvICNqBLba-v3uzXBdB89fzOI-Lv4PjOFAQGHrgv1rjXAmKbgkft
9cB4WeyZw8MldbBhc-V_KWZslrsLNygon_JJWd_ek6LQn5NRehvApqf9ZrxB4a
q3FXBxOxCys35PhCdaggy2kfUfl2OkwKnWUbgXVD1C6HxLIlqHhCwXDG59weHr
RDQeHyMRoBljoV3X_bUTJDnKBFOod7nLz-cj48JMx3SnCZTpbQAkFV
Figure 180: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
vOaH_Rajnpy_3hOtqvZHRA
Figure 181: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.10.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 179)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 177)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 175)
o Additional Authenticated Data (Figure 176)
o Ciphertext (Figure 180)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 181)
The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not
support this use case.
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz
MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn
0",
"encrypted_key": "4YiiQ_ZzH76TaIkJmYfRFgOV9MIpnx4X",
"aad": "WyJ2Y2FyZCIsW1sidmVyc2lvbiIse30sInRleHQiLCI0LjAiXSxb
ImZuIix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk1lcmlhZG9jIEJyYW5keWJ1Y2siXSxbIm4i
LHt9LCJ0ZXh0IixbIkJyYW5keWJ1Y2siLCJNZXJpYWRvYyIsIk1yLiIs
IiJdXSxbImJkYXkiLHt9LCJ0ZXh0IiwiVEEgMjk4MiJdLFsiZ2VuZGVy
Iix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk0iXV1d",
"iv": "veCx9ece2orS7c_N",
"ciphertext": "Z_3cbr0k3bVM6N3oSNmHz7Lyf3iPppGf3Pj17wNZqteJ0
Ui8p74SchQP8xygM1oFRWCNzeIa6s6BcEtp8qEFiqTUEyiNkOWDNoF14
T_4NFqF-p2Mx8zkbKxI7oPK8KNarFbyxIDvICNqBLba-v3uzXBdB89fz
OI-Lv4PjOFAQGHrgv1rjXAmKbgkft9cB4WeyZw8MldbBhc-V_KWZslrs
LNygon_JJWd_ek6LQn5NRehvApqf9ZrxB4aq3FXBxOxCys35PhCdaggy
2kfUfl2OkwKnWUbgXVD1C6HxLIlqHhCwXDG59weHrRDQeHyMRoBljoV3
X_bUTJDnKBFOod7nLz-cj48JMx3SnCZTpbQAkFV",
"tag": "vOaH_Rajnpy_3hOtqvZHRA"
}
Figure 183: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.11. Protecting Specific Header Fields This example illustrates encrypting content where only certain JOSE
Header Parameters are protected. As this example includes parameters
in the JWE Shared Unprotected Header, only the general JWE JSON
Serialization and flattened JWE JSON Serialization are possible.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
Figure 151.
o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".
o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".
5.11.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 184.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 185.
WDgEptBmQs9ouUvArz6x6g
Figure 184: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
WgEJsDS9bkoXQ3nR
Figure 185: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.11.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 184)
with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following
Encrypted Key:
jJIcM9J-hbx3wnqhf5FlkEYos0sHsF0H
Figure 186: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.11.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 187, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 188.
{
"enc": "A128GCM"
}
Figure 187: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
Figure 188: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext with
the following:
o CEK (Figure 184);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 185); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 188) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 189.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 190.
lIbCyRmRJxnB2yLQOTqjCDKV3H30ossOw3uD9DPsqLL2DM3swKkjOwQyZtWsFL
YMj5YeLht_StAn21tHmQJuuNt64T8D4t6C7kC9OCCJ1IHAolUv4MyOt80MoPb8
fZYbNKqplzYJgIL58g8N2v46OgyG637d6uuKPwhAnTGm_zWhqc_srOvgiLkzyF
XPq1hBAURbc3-8BqeRb48iR1-_5g5UjWVD3lgiLCN_P7AW8mIiFvUNXBPJK3nO
WL4teUPS8yHLbWeL83olU4UAgL48x-8dDkH23JykibVSQju-f7e-1xreHWXzWL
Hs1NqBbre0dEwK3HX_xM0LjUz77Krppgegoutpf5qaKg3l-_xMINmf
Figure 189: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
fNYLqpUe84KD45lvDiaBAQ
Figure 190: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.11.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Shared Unprotected Header (Figure 191)
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 188)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 186)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 185)
o Ciphertext (Figure 189)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 190)
The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not
support this use case.
The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization:
{
"protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
"unprotected": {
"alg": "A128KW",
"kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8"
},
"encrypted_key": "jJIcM9J-hbx3wnqhf5FlkEYos0sHsF0H",
"iv": "WgEJsDS9bkoXQ3nR",
"ciphertext": "lIbCyRmRJxnB2yLQOTqjCDKV3H30ossOw3uD9DPsqLL2D
M3swKkjOwQyZtWsFLYMj5YeLht_StAn21tHmQJuuNt64T8D4t6C7kC9O
CCJ1IHAolUv4MyOt80MoPb8fZYbNKqplzYJgIL58g8N2v46OgyG637d6
uuKPwhAnTGm_zWhqc_srOvgiLkzyFXPq1hBAURbc3-8BqeRb48iR1-_5
g5UjWVD3lgiLCN_P7AW8mIiFvUNXBPJK3nOWL4teUPS8yHLbWeL83olU
4UAgL48x-8dDkH23JykibVSQju-f7e-1xreHWXzWLHs1NqBbre0dEwK3
HX_xM0LjUz77Krppgegoutpf5qaKg3l-_xMINmf",
"tag": "fNYLqpUe84KD45lvDiaBAQ"
}
Figure 193: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization
5.12. Protecting Content Only This example illustrates encrypting content where none of the JOSE
header parameters are protected. As this example includes parameters
only in the JWE Shared Unprotected Header, only the flattened JWE
JSON Serialization and general JWE JSON Serialization are possible.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72.
o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
Figure 151.
o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".
o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".
5.12.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key; this example the
key from Figure 194.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 195.
KBooAFl30QPV3vkcZlXnzQ
Figure 194: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
YihBoVOGsR1l7jCD
Figure 195: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.12.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 194)
with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following
Encrypted Key:
244YHfO_W7RMpQW81UjQrZcq5LSyqiPv
Figure 196: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
5.12.4. Encrypting the Content Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
(Figure 72) using the following:
o CEK (Figure 194);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 195); and
o Empty string as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 197.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 198.
qtPIMMaOBRgASL10dNQhOa7Gqrk7Eal1vwht7R4TT1uq-arsVCPaIeFwQfzrSS
6oEUWbBtxEasE0vC6r7sphyVziMCVJEuRJyoAHFSP3eqQPb4Ic1SDSqyXjw_L3
svybhHYUGyQuTmUQEDjgjJfBOifwHIsDsRPeBz1NomqeifVPq5GTCWFo5k_MNI
QURR2Wj0AHC2k7JZfu2iWjUHLF8ExFZLZ4nlmsvJu_mvifMYiikfNfsZAudISO
a6O73yPZtL04k_1FI7WDfrb2w7OqKLWDXzlpcxohPVOLQwpA3mFNRKdY-bQz4Z
4KX9lfz1cne31N4-8BKmojpw-OdQjKdLOGkC445Fb_K1tlDQXw2sBF
Figure 197: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
e2m0Vm7JvjK2VpCKXS-kyg
Figure 198: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
5.12.5. Output Results The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not
support this use case.
The following JWE Shared Unprotected Header is generated before
assembling the output results:
{
"alg": "A128KW",
"kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
"enc": "A128GCM"
}
Figure 199: JWE Shared Unprotected Header JSON
The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Shared Unprotected Header (Figure 199)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 196)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 195)
o Ciphertext (Figure 197)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 198)
5.13. Encrypting to Multiple Recipients This example illustrates encryption content for multiple recipients.
As this example has multiple recipients, only the general JWE JSON
Serialization is possible.
Note that RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 uses random data to generate the
ciphertext; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results
in this section.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the Plaintext from Figure 72.
o Recipient keys; this example uses the following:
* The RSA public key from Figure 73 for the first recipient.
* The EC public key from Figure 108 for the second recipient.
* The AES symmetric key from Figure 138 for the third recipient.
o Key encryption algorithms; this example uses the following:
* "RSA1_5" for the first recipient.
* "ECDH-ES+A256KW" for the second recipient.
* "A256GCMKW" for the third recipient.
o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128CBC-HS256".
5.13.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 202.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 203.
zXayeJ4gvm8NJr3IUInyokTUO-LbQNKEhe_zWlYbdpQ
Figure 202: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
VgEIHY20EnzUtZFl2RpB1g
Figure 203: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
5.13.3. Encrypting the Key to the First Recipient Performing the "RSA1_5" key encryption operation over the CEK
(Figure 202) with the first recipient's RSA key (Figure 73) produces
the following Encrypted Key:
dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zjwj4w6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUA
OcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa-vhW6me4bWrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIa
KMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076DFthg2_AV0_tSiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-w
qjw0-b-S1laS11QVbuP78dQ7Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbeYS
rRicJK5xodvWgkpIdkMHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n5trGuExtp_-d
bHcGlihqc_wGgho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ
Figure 204: Recipient #1 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
The following is generated after encrypting the CEK for the first
recipient:
o Recipient JWE Unprotected Header from Figure 205.
{
"alg": "RSA1_5",
"kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
}
Figure 205: Recipient #1 JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header JSON
The following is the assembled first recipient JSON:
{
"encrypted_key": "dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zjwj4w
6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUAOcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa-vhW6me4b
WrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIaKMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076DFthg2_AV0_t
SiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-wqjw0-b-S1laS11QVbuP78dQ7
Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbeYSrRicJK5xodvWgkpIdk
MHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n5trGuExtp_-dbHcGlihqc_wG
gho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ",
"header": {
"alg": "RSA1_5",
"kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
}
}
Figure 206: Recipient #1 JSON
5.13.4. Encrypting the Key to the Second Recipient The following is generated before encrypting the CEK for the second
recipient:
o Ephemeral EC private key on the same curve as the EC public key;
this example uses the private key from Figure 207.
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xAn2Dt
MRb25Ma2CX",
"y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pOMbw9
1fzZ84pbfm",
"d": "1DKHfTv-PiifVw2VBHM_ZiVcwOMxkOyANS_lQHJcrDxVY3jhVCvZPw
MxJKIE793C"
}
Figure 207: Ephemeral Private Key for Recipient #2, in JWK Format
The following is the assembled second recipient JSON:
{
"encrypted_key": "ExInT0io9BqBMYF6-maw5tZlgoZXThD1zWKsHixJuw
_elY4gSSId_w",
"header": {
"alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW",
"kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
"epk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xA
n2DtMRb25Ma2CX",
"y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pO
Mbw91fzZ84pbfm"
}
}
}
Figure 210: Recipient #2 JSON
5.13.5. Encrypting the Key to the Third Recipient The following is generated before encrypting the CEK for the third
recipient:
o Initialization Vector for key wrapping; this example uses the
Initialization Vector from Figure 211.
AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn
Figure 211: Recipient #2 Initialization Vector for Key Wrapping,
base64url-encoded
Performing the "A256GCMKW" key encryption operation over the CEK
(Figure 202) with the following:
o AES symmetric key (Figure 138); and
o Initialization Vector (Figure 211)
produces the following:
o Encrypted Key from Figure 212.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 213.
a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-WyTpS1E
Figure 212: Recipient #3 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw
Figure 213: Recipient #3 Authentication Tag from Key Wrapping,
base64url-encoded
The following is generated after encrypting the CEK for the third
recipient:
o Recipient JWE Unprotected Header; this example uses the header
from Figure 214.
{
"alg": "A256GCMKW",
"kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
"tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw",
"iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn"
}
Figure 214: Recipient #3 JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header JSON
The following is the assembled third recipient JSON:
{
"encrypted_key": "a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-WyTpS1
E",
"header": {
"alg": "A256GCMKW",
"kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
"tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw",
"iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn"
}
}
Figure 215: Recipient #3 JSON
5.13.6. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 216, encoded to base64url [
RFC4648 ] as Figure 217.
The following is generated after encrypting the Plaintext:
o JWE Shared Unprotected Header parameters; this example uses the
header from Figure 220.
{
"cty": "text/plain"
}
Figure 220: JWE Shared Unprotected Header JSON
5.13.7. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o Recipient #1 JSON (Figure 206)
o Recipient #2 JSON (Figure 210)
o Recipient #3 JSON (Figure 215)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 203)
o Ciphertext (Figure 218)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 219)
The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not
support this use case; the flattened JWE JSON Serialization is not
presented because there is more than one recipient.
"iv": "VgEIHY20EnzUtZFl2RpB1g",
"ciphertext": "ajm2Q-OpPXCr7-MHXicknb1lsxLdXxK_yLds0KuhJzfWK
04SjdxQeSw2L9mu3a_k1C55kCQ_3xlkcVKC5yr__Is48VOoK0k63_QRM
9tBURMFqLByJ8vOYQX0oJW4VUHJLmGhF-tVQWB7Kz8mr8zeE7txF0MSa
P6ga7-siYxStR7_G07Thd1jh-zGT0wxM5g-VRORtq0K6AXpLlwEqRp7p
kt2zRM0ZAXqSpe1O6FJ7FHLDyEFnD-zDIZukLpCbzhzMDLLw2-8I14FQ
rgi-iEuzHgIJFIJn2wh9Tj0cg_kOZy9BqMRZbmYXMY9YQjorZ_P_JYG3
ARAIF3OjDNqpdYe-K_5Q5crGJSDNyij_ygEiItR5jssQVH2ofDQdLCht
azE",
"tag": "BESYyFN7T09KY7i8zKs5_g"
}
Figure 221: General JWE JSON Serialization
6. Nesting Signatures and Encryption This example illustrates nesting a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure
within a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure. The signature uses the
"PS256" (RSASSA-PSS) algorithm; the encryption uses the "RSA-OAEP"
(RSAES-OAEP) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM)
content encryption algorithm.
Note that RSASSA-PSS uses random data to generate the signature, and
RSAES-OAEP uses random data to generate the ciphertext; it might not
be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section.
Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in
Section 1.1 .
6.1. Signing Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:
o Payload content; this example uses the JSON Web Token [JWT]
content from Figure 222, encoded as base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce
Figure 223.
o RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 224.
o "alg" parameter of "PS256".
{
"iss": "hobbiton.example",
"exp": 1300819380,
"
http://example.com/is_root": true
}
Figure 222: Payload Content, in JSON Format
6.2. Signing Operation The following is generated to complete the signing operation:
o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 225, encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce
Figure 226.
{
"alg": "PS256",
"typ": "JWT"
}
Figure 225: JWS Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9
Figure 226: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the signature operation over the combined JWS Protected
Header (Figure 226) and payload content (Figure 222) produces the
following signature:
dPpMqwRZxFYi1UfcDAaf8M99o7kwUWtiXZ-ByvVuJih4MhJ_aZqciprz0OWaIA
kIvn1qskChirjKvY9ESZNUCP4JjvfyPS-nqjJxYoA5ztWOyFk2cZNIPXjcJXSQ
wXPO9tEe-v4VSqgD0aKHqPxYog4N6Cz1lKph1U1sYDSI67_bLL7elg_vkjfMp5
_W5l5LuUYGMeh6hxQIaIUXf9EwV2JmvTMuZ-vBOWy0Sniy1EFo72CRTvmtrIf5
AROo5MNliY3KtUxeP-SOmD-LEYwW9SlkohYzMVAZDDOrVbv7KVRHpeYNaK75KE
QqdCEEkS_rskZS-Qtt_nlegTWh1mEYaA
Figure 227: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded
6.3. Signing Output The following compose the resulting JWS object:
o JWS Protected Header (Figure 226)
o Payload content (Figure 223)
o Signature (Figure 227)
The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization (which
is the plaintext input to the following encryption operation):
eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJob2JiaXRvbi5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXhwIjoxMzAwODE5MzgwLCJodH
RwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vaXNfcm9vdCI6dHJ1ZX0
.
dPpMqwRZxFYi1UfcDAaf8M99o7kwUWtiXZ-ByvVuJih4MhJ_aZqciprz0OWaIA
kIvn1qskChirjKvY9ESZNUCP4JjvfyPS-nqjJxYoA5ztWOyFk2cZNIPXjcJXSQ
wXPO9tEe-v4VSqgD0aKHqPxYog4N6Cz1lKph1U1sYDSI67_bLL7elg_vkjfMp5
_W5l5LuUYGMeh6hxQIaIUXf9EwV2JmvTMuZ-vBOWy0Sniy1EFo72CRTvmtrIf5
AROo5MNliY3KtUxeP-SOmD-LEYwW9SlkohYzMVAZDDOrVbv7KVRHpeYNaK75KE
QqdCEEkS_rskZS-Qtt_nlegTWh1mEYaA
Figure 228: JWS Compact Serialization
6.4. Encryption Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:
o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 228.
o RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 84.
o "alg" parameter of "RSA-OAEP".
o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM".
6.5. Encryption Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting:
o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
example uses the key from Figure 229.
o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector
from Figure 230.
0RHSNYwN-6-2QBGsYTZLSQ
Figure 229: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded
GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA
Figure 230: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded
6.6. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 229)
with the RSA key (Figure 84) produces the following Encrypted Key:
a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVhjurCyrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4
E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVOGrG-bi13mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4g
zMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV7A9matpgevAJWrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21
O0ul4YxSHV-ByK1kyeetRp_fuYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e5I
R7nany-25_UmC2urosNkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5o6yV64x6yzDU
F_5JCIdl-Qv6H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBqXxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-I
apSjVFnMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXMuinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZ
a38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jltmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3kJusAa
mBKOYwfk7JhLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15qJIEXNJtqnblp
ymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TXuPC8yDDhi1smxS_X_x
pkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX2Fo_GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO
0
Figure 231: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded
6.7. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the Plaintext:
o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from
Figure 232, encoded using base64url [
RFC4648 ] to produce
Figure 233.
{
"alg": "RSA-OAEP",
"cty": "JWT",
"enc": "A128GCM"
}
Figure 232: JWE Protected Header JSON
eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ
Figure 233: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded
Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
(Figure 228) with the following:
o CEK (Figure 229);
o Initialization Vector (Figure 230); and
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 233) as authenticated data
produces the following:
o Ciphertext from Figure 234.
o Authentication Tag from Figure 235.
SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBNgCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2Q
kxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAvVLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLX
qZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7HsQePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZ
TNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fuzvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9C
hMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJwr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEa
ulV18l4Fg9tLejdkAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2
zI3Q_1sYjKUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUr
lx4gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gYjLf
hn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5XmnwZMyNc
9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMxtlMizR88NKU1WkB
siXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM
Figure 234: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded
KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw
Figure 235: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded
6.8. Encryption Output The following compose the resulting JWE object:
o JWE Protected Header (Figure 233)
o Encrypted Key (Figure 231)
o Initialization Vector (Figure 230)
o Ciphertext (Figure 234)
o Authentication Tag (Figure 235)
7. Security Considerations This document is designed to provide examples for developers to use
in checking their implementations. As such, it does not follow some
of the security considerations and recommendations in the core
documents (i.e., [JWS], [JWE], [JWK], and [JWA]). For instance:
o it does not always generate a new CEK value for every encrypted
example;
o it does not always generate a new Initialization Vector (IV) value
for every encrypted example; and
o it does not always generate a new ephemeral key for every
ephemeral key example.
For each example, data that is expected to be generated for each
signing or encryption operation is isolated to sections titled
"Generated Factors".
8. References
8.1. Normative References [JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)",
RFC 7518 ,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC7518 , May 2015,
<
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518 >.
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516 , DOI 10.17487/
RFC7516 , May 2015,
<
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516 >.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
RFC 7517 ,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC7517 , May 2015,
<
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517 >.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)",
RFC 7515 , DOI 10.17487/
RFC7515 , May
2015, <
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515 >.
[
RFC4648 ] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings",
RFC 4648 , DOI 10.17487/
RFC4648 , October 2006,
<
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648 >.
8.2. Informative References [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)",
RFC 7519 , DOI 10.17487/
RFC7519 , May 2015,
<
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519 >.
[LOTR-FELLOWSHIP]
Tolkien, J., "The Fellowship of the Ring", HarperCollins
Publishers, ePub Edition, ISBN 9780061952838, March 2009.
[
RFC1951 ] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification
version 1.3",
RFC 1951 , DOI 10.17487/
RFC1951 , May 1996,
<
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1951 >.
[
RFC7095 ] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard",
RFC 7095 ,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC7095 , January 2014,
<
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7095 >.
Acknowledgements Most of the examples herein use quotes and character names found in
the novel "The Fellowship of the Ring" [LOTR-FELLOWSHIP], written by
J. R. R. Tolkien.
Thanks to Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Mike Jones, and Jim Schaad
for their input and review of the text. Thanks to Brian Campbell for
verifying the Compact Serialization examples.
Author's Address Matthew Miller
Cisco Systems, Inc.
EMail: mamille2@cisco.com