Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Y. Shen
Request for Comments:
8679 M. Jeyananth
Category: Standards Track Juniper Networks
ISSN: 2070-1721 B. Decraene
Orange
H. Gredler
RtBrick Inc.
C. Michel
Deutsche Telekom
H. Chen
Futurewei
December 2019
MPLS Egress Protection Framework
Abstract
This document specifies a fast reroute framework for protecting IP/
MPLS services and MPLS transport tunnels against egress node and
egress link failures. For each type of egress failure, it defines
the roles of Point of Local Repair (PLR), protector, and backup
egress router and the procedures of establishing a bypass tunnel from
a PLR to a protector. It describes the behaviors of these routers in
handling an egress failure, including local repair on the PLR and
context-based forwarding on the protector. The framework can be used
to develop egress protection mechanisms to reduce traffic loss before
global repair reacts to an egress failure and control-plane protocols
converge on the topology changes due to the egress failure.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in
Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8679.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(
https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Specification of Requirements
3. Terminology
4. Requirements
5. Egress Node Protection
5.1. Reference Topology
5.2. Egress Node Failure and Detection
5.3. Protector and PLR
5.4. Protected Egress
5.5. Egress-Protected Tunnel and Service
5.6. Egress-Protection Bypass Tunnel
5.7. Context ID, Context Label, and Context-Based Forwarding
5.8. Advertisement and Path Resolution for Context ID
5.9. Egress-Protection Bypass Tunnel Establishment
5.10. Local Repair on PLR
5.11. Service Label Distribution from Egress Router to Protector
5.12. Centralized Protector Mode
6. Egress Link Protection
7. Global Repair
8. Operational Considerations
9. General Context-Based Forwarding
10. Example: Layer 3 VPN Egress Protection
10.1. Egress Node Protection
10.2. Egress Link Protection
10.3. Global Repair
10.4. Other Modes of VPN Label Allocation
11. IANA Considerations
12. Security Considerations
13. References
13.1. Normative References
13.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
In MPLS networks, Label Switched Paths (LSPs) are widely used as
transport tunnels to carry IP and MPLS services across MPLS domains.
Examples of MPLS services are Layer 2 VPNs, Layer 3 VPNs,
hierarchical LSPs, and others. In general, a tunnel may carry
multiple services of one or multiple types, if the tunnel satisfies
both individual and aggregate requirements (e.g., Class of Service
(CoS) and QoS) of these services. The egress router of the tunnel
hosts the service instances of the services. An MPLS service
instance forwards service packets via an egress link to the service
destination, based on a service label. An IP service instance does
the same, based on an IP service address. The egress link is often
called a Provider Edge - Customer Edge (PE-CE) link or Attachment
Circuit (AC).
Today, local-repair-based fast reroute mechanisms (see [
RFC4090],
[
RFC5286], [
RFC7490], and [
RFC7812]) have been widely deployed to
protect MPLS tunnels against transit link/node failures, with traffic
restoration time in the order of tens of milliseconds. Local repair
refers to the scenario where the router upstream to an anticipated
failure, a.k.a., PLR, pre-establishes a bypass tunnel to the router
downstream of the failure, a.k.a., Merge Point (MP), pre-installs the
forwarding state of the bypass tunnel in the data plane, and uses a
rapid mechanism (e.g., link-layer Operations, Administration, and
Maintenance (OAM), Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), and
others) to locally detect the failure in the data plane. When the
failure occurs, the PLR reroutes traffic through the bypass tunnel to
the MP, allowing the traffic to continue to flow to the tunnel's
egress router.
This document specifies a fast reroute framework for egress node and
egress link protection. Similar to transit link/node protection,
this framework also relies on a PLR to perform local failure
detection and local repair. In egress node protection, the PLR is
the penultimate hop router of a tunnel. In egress link protection,
the PLR is the egress router of the tunnel. The framework further
uses a so-called "protector" to serve as the tail end of a bypass
tunnel. The protector is a router that hosts "protection service
instances" and has its own connectivity or paths to service
destinations. When a PLR does local repair, the protector performs
"context label switching" for rerouted MPLS service packets and
"context IP forwarding" for rerouted IP service packets, to allow the
service packets to continue to reach the service destinations.
This framework considers an egress node failure as a failure of a
tunnel and a failure of all the services carried by the tunnel as
service packets that can no longer reach the service instances on the
egress router. Therefore, the framework addresses egress node
protection at both the tunnel level and service level,
simultaneously. Likewise, the framework considers an egress link
failure as a failure of all the services traversing the link and
addresses egress link protection at the service level.
This framework requires that the destination (a CE or site) of a
service
MUST be dual-homed or have dual paths to an MPLS network, via
two MPLS edge routers. One of the routers is the egress router of
the service's transport tunnel, and the other is a backup egress
router that hosts a "backup service instance". In the "co-located"
protector mode in this document, the backup egress router serves as
the protector; hence, the backup service instance acts as the
protection service instance. In the "centralized" protector mode
(
Section 5.12), the protector and the backup egress router are
decoupled, and the protection service instance and the backup service
instance are hosted separately by the two routers.
The framework is described by mainly referring to point-to-point
(P2P) tunnels. However, it is equally applicable to point-to-
multipoint (P2MP), multipoint-to-point (MP2P), and multipoint-to-
multipoint (MP2MP) tunnels, as the sub-LSPs of these tunnels can be
viewed as P2P tunnels.
The framework is a multi-service and multi-transport framework. It
assumes a generic model where each service is comprised of a common
set of components, including a service instance, a service label, a
service label distribution protocol, and an MPLS transport tunnel.
The framework also assumes that the service label is downstream
assigned, i.e., assigned by an egress router. Therefore, the
framework is generally applicable to most existing and future
services. However, there are services with certain modes, where a
protector is unable to pre-establish the forwarding state for egress
protection, or a PLR is not allowed to reroute traffic to other
routers in order to avoid traffic duplication, e.g., the broadcast,
multicast, and unknown unicast traffic in Virtual Private LAN Service
(VPLS) and Ethernet VPN (EVPN). These cases are left for future
study. Services that use upstream-assigned service labels are also
out of scope of this document and left for future study.
The framework does not require extensions for the existing signaling
and label distribution protocols (e.g., RSVP, LDP, BGP, etc.) of MPLS
tunnels. It assumes that transport tunnels and bypass tunnels are to
be established by using the generic procedures provided by the
protocols. On the other hand, it does not preclude extensions to the
protocols that may facilitate the procedures. One example of such
extension is [
RFC8400]. The framework does see the need for
extensions of IGPs and service label distribution protocols in some
procedures, particularly for supporting protection establishment and
context label switching. This document provides guidelines for these
extensions, but it leaves the specific details to separate documents.
The framework is intended to complement control-plane convergence and
global repair. Control-plane convergence relies on control protocols
to react on the topology changes due to a failure. Global repair
relies on an ingress router to remotely detect a failure and switch
traffic to an alternative path. An example of global repair is the
BGP prefix independent convergence mechanism [BGP-PIC] for BGP-
established services. Compared with these mechanisms, this framework
is considered faster in traffic restoration, due to the nature of
local failure detection and local repair. It is
RECOMMENDED that the
framework be used in conjunction with control-plane convergence or
global repair, in order to take the advantages of both approaches.
That is, the framework provides fast and temporary repair, while
control-plane convergence or global repair provides ultimate and
permanent repair.
2. Specification of Requirements
The key words "
MUST", "
MUST NOT", "
REQUIRED", "
SHALL", "
SHALL NOT",
"
SHOULD", "
SHOULD NOT", "
RECOMMENDED", "
NOT RECOMMENDED", "
MAY", and
"
OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [
RFC2119] [
RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology
Egress router:
A router at the egress endpoint of a tunnel. It hosts service
instances for all the services carried by the tunnel and has
connectivity with the destinations of the services.
Egress node failure:
A failure of an egress router.
Egress link failure:
A failure of the egress link (e.g., PE-CE link, attachment
circuit) of a service.
Egress failure:
An egress node failure or an egress link failure.
Egress-protected tunnel:
A tunnel whose egress router is protected by a mechanism according
to this framework. The egress router is hence called a protected
egress router.
Egress-protected service:
An IP or MPLS service that is carried by an egress-protected
tunnel and hence protected by a mechanism according to this
framework.
Backup egress router:
Given an egress-protected tunnel and its egress router, this is
another router that has connectivity with all or a subset of the
destinations of the egress-protected services carried by the
egress-protected tunnel.
Backup service instance:
A service instance that is hosted by a backup egress router and
corresponds to an egress-protected service on a protected egress
router.
Protector:
A role acted by a router as an alternate of a protected egress
router, to handle service packets in the event of an egress
failure. A protector may be physically co-located with or
decoupled from a backup egress router, depending on the co-located
or centralized protector mode.
Protection service instance:
A service instance hosted by a protector that corresponds to the
service instance of an egress-protected service on a protected
egress router. A protection service instance is a backup service
instance, if the protector is co-located with a backup egress
router.
PLR:
A router at the point of local repair. In egress node protection,
it is the penultimate hop router on an egress-protected tunnel.
In egress link protection, it is the egress router of the egress-
protected tunnel.
Protected egress {E, P}:
A virtual node consisting of an ordered pair of egress router E
and protector P. It serves as the virtual destination of an
egress-protected tunnel and as the virtual location of the egress-
protected services carried by the tunnel.
Context identifier (ID):
A globally unique IP address assigned to a protected egress {E,
P}.
Context label:
A non-reserved label assigned to a context ID by a protector.
Egress-protection bypass tunnel:
A tunnel used to reroute service packets around an egress failure.
Co-located protector mode:
The scenario where a protector and a backup egress router are co-
located as one router; hence, each backup service instance serves
as a protection service instance.
Centralized protector mode:
The scenario where a protector is a dedicated router and is
decoupled from backup egress routers.
Context label switching:
Label switching performed by a protector in the label space of an
egress router indicated by a context label.
Context IP forwarding:
IP forwarding performed by a protector in the IP address space of
an egress router indicated by a context label.
4. Requirements
This document considers the following as the design requirements of
this egress protection framework.
* The framework must support P2P tunnels. It should equally support
P2MP, MP2P, and MP2MP tunnels, by treating each sub-LSP as a P2P
tunnel.
* The framework must support multi-service and multi-transport
networks. It must accommodate existing and future signaling and
label-distribution protocols of tunnels and bypass tunnels,
including RSVP, LDP, BGP, IGP, Segment Routing, and others. It
must also accommodate existing and future IP/MPLS services,
including Layer 2 VPNs, Layer 3 VPNs, hierarchical LSP, and
others. It
MUST provide a general solution for networks where
different types of services and tunnels co-exist.
* The framework must consider minimizing disruption during
deployment. It should only involve routers close to the egress
and be transparent to ingress routers and other transit routers.
* In egress node protection, for scalability and performance
reasons, a PLR must be agnostic to services and service labels.
It must maintain bypass tunnels and bypass forwarding state on a
per-transport-tunnel basis rather than on a per-service-
destination or per-service-label basis. It should also support
bypass tunnel sharing between transport tunnels.
* A PLR must be able to use its local visibility or information of
routing or TE topology to compute or resolve a path for a bypass
tunnel.
* A protector must be able to perform context label switching for
rerouted MPLS service packets, based on a service label(s)
assigned by an egress router. It must be able to perform context
IP forwarding for rerouted IP service packets, in the public or
private IP address space used by an egress router.
* The framework must be able to work seamlessly with transit link/
node protection mechanisms to achieve end-to-end coverage.
* The framework must be able to work in conjunction with global
repair and control-plane convergence.
5. Egress Node Protection
5.1. Reference Topology
This document refers to the following topology when describing the
procedures of egress node protection.
services 1, ..., N
=====================================> tunnel
I ------ R1 ------- PLR --------------- E ----
ingress penultimate hop egress \
| . (primary \
| . service \
| . instances ) \
| . \
| . \ service
| . destinations
| . / (CEs, sites)
| . /
| . bypass /
| . tunnel /
| . /
| ............... /
R2 --------------- P ----
protector
(protection
service
instances)
Figure 1
5.2. Egress Node Failure and Detection
An egress node failure refers to the failure of an MPLS tunnel's
egress router. At the service level, it is also a service instance
failure for each IP/MPLS service carried by the tunnel.
An egress node failure can be detected by an adjacent router (i.e.,
PLR in this framework) through a node liveness detection mechanism or
a mechanism based on a collective failure of all the links to that
node. The mechanisms
MUST be reasonably fast, i.e., faster than
control-plane failure detection and remote failure detection.
Otherwise, local repair will not be able to provide much benefit
compared to control-plane convergence or global repair. In general,
the speed, accuracy, and reliability of a failure detection mechanism
are the key factors to decide its applicability in egress node
protection. This document provides the following guidelines for
network operators to choose a proper type of protection on a PLR.
* If the PLR has a mechanism to detect and differentiate a link
failure (of the link between the PLR and the egress node) and an
egress node failure, it
SHOULD set up both link protection and
egress node protection and trigger one and only one protection
upon a corresponding failure.
* If the PLR has a fast mechanism to detect a link failure and an
egress node failure, but it cannot distinguish them, or if the PLR
has a fast mechanism to detect a link failure only, but not an
egress node failure, the PLR has two options:
1. It
MAY set up link protection only and leave the egress node
failure to be handled by global repair and control-plane
convergence.
2. It
MAY set up egress node protection only and treat a link
failure as a trigger for the egress node protection. The
assumption is that treating a link failure as an egress node
failure
MUST NOT have a negative impact on services.
Otherwise, it
SHOULD adopt the previous option.
5.3. Protector and PLR
A router is assigned to the "protector" role to protect a tunnel and
the services carried by the tunnel against an egress node failure.
The protector is responsible for hosting a protection service
instance for each protected service, serving as the tail end of a
bypass tunnel, and performing context label switching and/or context
IP forwarding for rerouted service packets.
A tunnel is protected by only one protector. Multiple tunnels to a
given egress router may be protected by a common protector or
different protectors. A protector may protect multiple tunnels with
a common egress router or different egress routers.
For each tunnel, its penultimate hop router acts as a PLR. The PLR
pre-establishes a bypass tunnel to the protector and pre-installs
bypass forwarding state in the data plane. Upon detection of an
egress node failure, the PLR reroutes all the service packets
received on the tunnel through the bypass tunnel to the protector.
For MPLS service packets, the PLR keeps service labels intact in the
packets. In turn, the protector forwards the service packets towards
the ultimate service destinations. Specifically, it performs context
label switching for MPLS service packets, based on the service labels
assigned by the protected egress router; it performs context IP
forwarding for IP service packets, based on their destination
addresses.
The protector
MUST have its own connectivity with each service
destination, via a direct link or a multi-hop path, which
MUST NOT traverse the protected egress router or be affected by the egress
node failure. This also means that each service destination
MUST be
dual-homed or have dual paths to the egress router and a backup
egress router that may serve as the protector. Each protection
service instance on the protector relies on such connectivity to set
up forwarding state for context label switching and context IP
forwarding.
5.4. Protected Egress
This document introduces the notion of "protected egress" as a
virtual node consisting of the egress router E of a tunnel and a
protector P. It is denoted by an ordered pair of {E, P}, indicating
the primary-and-protector relationship between the two routers. It
serves as the virtual destination of the tunnel and the virtual
location of service instances for the services carried by the tunnel.
The tunnel and services are considered as being "associated" with the
protected egress {E, P}.
A given egress router E may be the tail end of multiple tunnels. In
general, the tunnels may be protected by multiple protectors, e.g.,
P1, P2, and so on, with each Pi protecting a subset of the tunnels.
Thus, these routers form multiple protected egresses, i.e., {E, P1},
{E, P2}, and so on. Each tunnel is associated with one and only one
protected egress {E, Pi}. All the services carried by the tunnel are
then automatically associated with the protected egress {E, Pi}.
Conversely, a service associated with a protected egress {E, Pi}
MUST be carried by a tunnel associated with the protected egress {E, Pi}.
This mapping
MUST be ensured by the ingress router of the tunnel and
the service (
Section 5.5).
The two routers X and Y may be protectors for each other. In this
case, they form two distinct protected egresses: {X, Y} and {Y, X}.
5.5. Egress-Protected Tunnel and Service
A tunnel, which is associated with a protected egress {E, P}, is
called an egress-protected tunnel. It is associated with one and
only one protected egress {E, P}. Multiple egress-protected tunnels
may be associated with a given protected egress {E, P}. In this
case, they share the common egress router and protector, but they may
or may not share a common ingress router or a common PLR (i.e.,
penultimate hop router).
An egress-protected tunnel is considered as logically "destined" for
its protected egress {E, P}. Its path
MUST be resolved and
established with E as the physical tail end.
A service, which is associated with a protected egress {E, P}, is
called an egress-protected service. Egress router E hosts the
primary instance of the service, and protector P hosts the protection
instance of the service.
An egress-protected service is associated with one and only one
protected egress {E, P}. Multiple egress-protected services may be
associated with a given protected egress {E, P}. In this case, these
services share the common egress router and protector, but they may
or may not be carried by a common egress-protected tunnel or a common
ingress router.
An egress-protected service
MUST be mapped to an egress-protected
tunnel by its ingress router, based on the common protected egress
{E, P} of the service and the tunnel. This is achieved by
introducing the notion of a "context ID" for a protected egress {E,
P}, as described in
Section 5.7.
5.6. Egress-Protection Bypass Tunnel
An egress-protected tunnel destined for a protected egress {E, P}
MUST have a bypass tunnel from its PLR to protector P. This bypass
tunnel is called an egress-protection bypass tunnel. The bypass
tunnel is considered as logically "destined" for the protected egress
{E, P}. Due to its bypass nature, it
MUST be established with P as
the physical tail end and E as the node to avoid. The bypass tunnel
MUST NOT be affected by the topology change caused by an egress node
failure; thus, it
MUST contain a property that protects it from this
scenario.
An egress-protection bypass tunnel is associated with one and only
one protected egress {E, P}. A PLR may share an egress-protection
bypass tunnel for multiple egress-protected tunnels associated with a
common protected egress {E, P}.
5.7. Context ID, Context Label, and Context-Based Forwarding
In this framework, a globally unique IPv4 or IPv6 address is assigned
as the identifier of the protected egress {E, P}. It is called a
"context ID" due to its specific usage in context label switching and
context IP forwarding on the protector. It is an IP address that is
logically owned by both the egress router and the protector. For the
egress router, it indicates the protector. For the protector, it
indicates the egress router, particularly the egress router's
forwarding context. For other routers in the network, it is an
address reachable via both the egress router and the protector
(
Section 5.8), similar to an anycast address.
The main purpose of a context ID is to coordinate the ingress router,
egress router, PLR, and protector to establish egress protection.
The procedures are described below, given an egress-protected service
associated with a protected egress {E, P} with a context ID.
* If the service is an MPLS service, when E distributes a service
label binding message to the ingress router, E attaches the
context ID to the message. If the service is an IP service, when
E advertises the service destination address to the ingress
router, E attaches the context ID to the advertisement message.
The service protocol chooses how the context ID is encoded in the
messages. A protocol extension of a "context ID" object may be
needed, if there is no existing mechanism for this purpose.
* The ingress router uses the service's context ID as the
destination to establish or resolve an egress-protected tunnel.
The ingress router then maps the service to the tunnel for
transportation. The semantics of the context ID is transparent to
the ingress router. The ingress router only treats the context ID
as an IP address of E, in the same manner as establishing or
resolving a regular transport tunnel.
* The context ID is conveyed to the PLR by the signaling protocol of
the egress-protected tunnel or learned by the PLR via an IGP
(i.e., OSPF or IS-IS) or a topology-driven label distribution
protocol (e.g., LDP). The PLR uses the context ID as the
destination to establish or resolve an egress-protection bypass
tunnel to P while avoiding E.
* P maintains a dedicated label space and a dedicated IP address
space for E. They are referred to as "E's label space" and "E's
IP address space", respectively. P uses the context ID to
identify the label space and IP address space.
* If the service is an MPLS service, E also distributes the service
label binding message to P. This is the same label binding
message that E advertises to the ingress router, which includes
the context ID. Based on the context ID, P installs the service
label in an MPLS forwarding table corresponding to E's label
space. If the service is an IP service, P installs an IP route in
an IP forwarding table corresponding to E's IP address space. In
either case, the protection service instance on P constructs the
forwarding state for the label route or IP route based on P's own
connectivity with the service's destination.
* P assigns a non-reserved label to the context ID. In the data
plane, this label represents the context ID and indicates E's
label space and IP address space. Therefore, it is called a
"context label".
* The PLR may establish the egress-protection bypass tunnel to P in
several manners. If the bypass tunnel is established by RSVP, the
PLR signals the bypass tunnel with the context ID as the
destination, and P binds the context label to the bypass tunnel.
If the bypass tunnel is established by LDP, P advertises the
context label for the context ID as an IP prefix Forwarding
Equivalence Class (FEC). If the bypass tunnel is established by
the PLR in a hierarchical manner, the PLR treats the context label
as a one-hop LSP over a regular bypass tunnel to P (e.g., a bypass
tunnel to P's loopback IP address). If the bypass tunnel is
constructed by using Segment Routing, the bypass tunnel is
represented by a stack of Segment Identifier (SID) labels with the
context label as the inner-most SID label (
Section 5.9). In any
case, the bypass tunnel is an ultimate hop-popping (UHP) tunnel
whose incoming label on P is the context label.
* During local repair, all the service packets received by P on the
bypass tunnel have the context label as the top label. P first
pops the context label. For an MPLS service packet, P looks up
the service label in E's label space indicated by the context
label. Such kind of forwarding is called context label switching.
For an IP service packet, P looks up the IP destination address in
E's IP address space indicated by the context label. Such kind of
forwarding is called context IP forwarding.
5.8. Advertisement and Path Resolution for Context ID
Path resolution and computation for a context ID are done on ingress
routers for egress-protected tunnels and on PLRs for egress-
protection bypass tunnels. Given a protected egress {E, P} and its
context ID, E and P
MUST coordinate on the reachability of the
context ID in the routing domain and the TE domain. The context ID
MUST be advertised in such a manner that all egress-protected tunnels
MUST have E as the tail end, and all egress-protection bypass tunnels
MUST have P as the tail end while avoiding E.
This document suggests three approaches:
1. The first approach is called "proxy mode". It requires E and
P, but not the PLR, to have the knowledge of the egress
protection schema. E and P advertise the context ID as a
virtual proxy node (i.e., a logical node) connected to the two
routers, with the link between the proxy node and E having
more preferable IGP and TE metrics than the link between the
proxy node and P. Therefore, all egress-protected tunnels
destined for the context ID will automatically follow the IGP
or TE paths to E. Each PLR will no longer view itself as a
penultimate hop but rather as two hops away from the proxy
node, via E. The PLR will be able to find a bypass path via P
to the proxy node, while the bypass tunnel is actually
terminated by P.
2. The second approach is called "alias mode". It requires P and
the PLR, but not E, to have the knowledge of the egress
protection schema. E simply advertises the context ID as an
IP address. P advertises the context ID and the context label
by using a "context ID label binding" advertisement. In both
the routing domain and TE domain, the context ID is only
reachable via E. Therefore, all egress-protected tunnels
destined for the context ID will have E as the tail end.
Based on the "context ID label binding" advertisement, the PLR
can establish an egress-protection bypass tunnel in several
manners (
Section 5.9). The "context ID label binding"
advertisement is defined as the IGP Mirroring Context segment
in [
RFC8402] and [
RFC8667]. These IGP extensions are generic
in nature and hence can be used for egress protection
purposes. It is
RECOMMENDED that a similar advertisement be
defined for OSPF as well.
3. The third approach is called "stub link mode". In this mode,
both E and P advertise the context ID as a link to a stub
network, essentially modeling the context ID as an anycast IP
address owned by the two routers. E, P, and the PLR do not
need to have the knowledge of the egress protection schema.
The correctness of the egress-protected tunnels and the bypass
tunnels relies on the path computations for the anycast IP
address performed by the ingress routers and PLR. Therefore,
care
MUST be taken for the applicability of this approach to a
network.
This framework considers the above approaches as technically equal
and the feasibility of each approach in a given network as dependent
on the topology, manageability, and available protocols of the
network. For a given context ID, all relevant routers, including the
primary PE, protector, and PLR,
MUST support and agree on the chosen
approach. The coordination between these routers can be achieved by
configuration.
In a scenario where an egress-protected tunnel is an inter-area or
inter-Autonomous-System (inter-AS) tunnel, its associated context ID
MUST be propagated by IGP or BGP from the original area or AS to the
area or AS of the ingress router. The propagation process of the
context ID
SHOULD be the same as that of an IP address in an inter-
area or inter-AS environment.
5.9. Egress-Protection Bypass Tunnel Establishment
A PLR
MUST know the context ID of a protected egress {E, P} in order
to establish an egress-protection bypass tunnel. The information is
obtained from the signaling or label distribution protocol of the
egress-protected tunnel. The PLR may or may not need to have the
knowledge of the egress-protection schema. All it does is set up a
bypass tunnel to a context ID while avoiding the next-hop router
(i.e., egress router). This is achievable by using a constraint-
based computation algorithm similar to those commonly used for
traffic engineering paths and Loop-Free Alternate (LFA) paths. Since
the context ID is advertised in the routing domain and in the TE
domain by IGP according to
Section 5.8, the PLR is able to resolve or
establish such a bypass path with the protector as the tail end. In
the case of proxy mode, the PLR may do so in the same manner as
transit node protection.
An egress-protection bypass tunnel may be established via several
methods:
1. It may be established by a signaling protocol (e.g., RSVP),
with the context ID as the destination. The protector binds
the context label to the bypass tunnel.
2. It may be formed by a topology-driven protocol (e.g., LDP with
various LFA mechanisms). The protector advertises the context
ID as an IP prefix FEC, with the context label bound to it.
3. It may be constructed as a hierarchical tunnel. When the
protector uses the alias mode (
Section 5.8), the PLR will have
the knowledge of the context ID, context label, and protector
(i.e., the advertiser). The PLR can then establish the bypass
tunnel in a hierarchical manner, with the context label as a
one-hop LSP over a regular bypass tunnel to the protector's IP
address (e.g., loopback address). This regular bypass tunnel
may be established by RSVP, LDP, Segment Routing, or another
protocol.
5.10. Local Repair on PLR
In this framework, a PLR is agnostic to services and service labels.
This obviates the need to maintain bypass forwarding state on a per-
service basis and allows bypass tunnel sharing between egress-
protected tunnels. The PLR may share an egress-protection bypass
tunnel for multiple egress-protected tunnels associated with a common
protected egress {E, P}. During local repair, the PLR reroutes all
service packets received on the egress-protected tunnels to the
egress-protection bypass tunnel. Service labels remain intact in
MPLS service packets.
Label operation performed by the PLR depends on the bypass tunnel's
characteristics. If the bypass tunnel is a single level tunnel, the
rerouting will involve swapping the incoming label of an egress-
protected tunnel to the outgoing label of the bypass tunnel. If the
bypass tunnel is a hierarchical tunnel, the rerouting will involve
swapping the incoming label of an egress-protected tunnel to a
context label and pushing the outgoing label of a regular bypass
tunnel. If the bypass tunnel is constructed by Segment Routing, the
rerouting will involve swapping the incoming label of an egress-
protected tunnel to a context label and pushing the stack of SID
labels of the bypass tunnel.
5.11. Service Label Distribution from Egress Router to Protector
When a protector receives a rerouted MPLS service packet, it performs
context label switching based on the packet's service label, which is
assigned by the corresponding egress router. In order to achieve
this, the protector
MUST maintain the labels of egress-protected
services in dedicated label spaces on a per-protected-egress {E, P}
basis, i.e., one label space for each egress router that it protects.
Also, there
MUST be a service label distribution protocol session
between each egress router and the protector. Through this protocol,
the protector learns the label binding of each egress-protected
service. This is the same label binding that the egress router
advertises to the service's ingress router, which includes a context
ID. The corresponding protection service instance on the protector
recognizes the service and resolves forwarding state based on its own
connectivity with the service's destination. It then installs the
service label with the forwarding state in the label space of the
egress router, which is indicated by the context ID (i.e., context
label).
Different service protocols may use different mechanisms for such
kind of label distribution. Specific extensions may be needed on a
per-protocol or per-service-type basis. The details of the
extensions should be specified in separate documents. As an example,
the LDP extensions for pseudowire services are specified in
[
RFC8104].
5.12. Centralized Protector Mode
In this framework, it is assumed that the service destination of an
egress-protected service
MUST be dual-homed to two edge routers of an
MPLS network. One of them is the protected egress router, and the
other is a backup egress router. So far in this document, the focus
of discussion has been on the scenario where a protector and a backup
egress router are co-located as one router. Therefore, the number of
protectors in a network is equal to the number of backup egress
routers. As another scenario, a network may assign a small number of
routers to serve as dedicated protectors, each protecting a subset of
egress routers. These protectors are called centralized protectors.
Topologically, a centralized protector may be decoupled from all
backup egress routers, or it may be co-located with one backup egress
router while decoupled from the other backup egress routers. The
procedures in this section assume that a protector and a backup
egress router are decoupled.
services 1, ..., N
=====================================> tunnel
I ------ R1 ------- PLR --------------- E ----
ingress penultimate hop egress \
| . (primary \
| . service \
| . instances) \
| . \
| . bypass \ service
R2 . tunnel destinations
| . / (CEs, sites)
| . /
| . /
| . /
| . tunnel /
| =============> /
P ---------------- E' ---
protector backup egress
(protection (backup
service service
instances) instances)
Figure 2
Like a co-located protector, a centralized protector hosts protection
service instances, receives rerouted service packets from PLRs, and
performs context label switching and/or context IP forwarding. For
each service, instead of sending service packets directly to the
service destination, the protector
MUST send them via another
transport tunnel to the corresponding backup service instance on a
backup egress router. The backup service instance in turn forwards
the service packets to the service destination. Specifically, if the
service is an MPLS service, the protector
MUST swap the service label
in each received service packet to the label of the backup service
advertised by the backup egress router, and then push the label (or
label stack) of the transport tunnel.
In order for a centralized protector to map an egress-protected MPLS
service to a service hosted on a backup egress router, there
MUST be
a service label distribution protocol session between the backup
egress router and the protector. Through this session, the backup
egress router advertises the service label of the backup service,
attached with the FEC of the egress-protected service and the context
ID of the protected egress {E, P}. Based on this information, the
protector associates the egress-protected service with the backup
service, resolves or establishes a transport tunnel to the backup
egress router, and sets up forwarding state for the label of the
egress-protected service in the label space of the egress router.
The service label that the backup egress router advertises to the
protector can be the same as the label that the backup egress router
advertises to the ingress router(s), if and only if the forwarding
state of the label does not direct service packets towards the
protected egress router. Otherwise, the label
MUST NOT be used for
egress protection, because it would create a loop for the service
packets. In this case, the backup egress router
MUST advertise a
unique service label for egress protection and set up the forwarding
state of the label to use the backup egress router's own connectivity
with the service destination.
6. Egress Link Protection
Egress link protection is achievable through procedures similar to
that of egress node protection. In normal situations, an egress
router forwards service packets to a service destination based on a
service label, whose forwarding state points to an egress link. In
egress link protection, the egress router acts as the PLR and
performs local failure detection and local repair. Specifically, the
egress router pre-establishes an egress-protection bypass tunnel to a
protector and sets up the bypass forwarding state for the service
label to point to the bypass tunnel. During local repair, the egress
router reroutes service packets via the bypass tunnel to the
protector. The protector in turn forwards the packets to the service
destination (in the co-located protector mode, as shown in Figure 3)
or forwards the packets to a backup egress router (in the centralized
protector mode, as shown in Figure 4).
service
=====================================> tunnel
I ------ R1 ------- R2 --------------- E ----
ingress | ............. egress \
| . PLR \
| . (primary \
| . service \
| . instance) \
| . \
| . bypass service
| . tunnel destination
| . / (CE, site)
| . /
| . /
| . /
| . /
| ............... /
R3 --------------- P ----
protector
(protection
service
instance)
Figure 3
service
=====================================> tunnel
I ------ R1 ------- R2 --------------- E ----
ingress | ............. egress \
| . PLR \
| . (primary \
| . service \
| . instance) \
| . \
| . bypass service
| . tunnel destination
| . / (CE, site)
| . /
| . /
| . /
| . tunnel /
| =============> /
R3 --------------- P ----
protector backup egress
(protection (backup
service service
instance) instance)
Figure 4
There are two approaches for setting up the bypass forwarding state
on the egress router, depending on whether the egress router knows
the service label allocated by the backup egress router. The
difference is that one approach requires the protector to perform
context label switching, and the other one does not. Both approaches
are equally supported by this framework.
1. The first approach applies when the egress router does not
know the service label allocated by the backup egress router.
In this case, the egress router sets up the bypass forwarding
state as a label push with the outgoing label of the egress-
protection bypass tunnel. Rerouted packets will have the
egress router's service label intact. Therefore, the
protector
MUST perform context label switching, and the bypass
tunnel
MUST be destined for the context ID of the protected
egress {E, P} and established as described in
Section 5.9.
This approach is consistent with egress node protection.
Hence, a protector can serve in egress node protection and
egress link protection in a consistent manner, and both the
co-located protector mode and the centralized protector mode
are supported (see Figures 3 and 4).
2. The second approach applies when the egress router knows the
service label allocated by the backup egress router, via a
label distribution protocol session. In this case, the backup
egress router serves as the protector for egress link
protection, regardless of the protector of egress node
protection, which will be the same router in the co-located
protector mode but a different router in the centralized
protector mode. The egress router sets up the bypass
forwarding state as a label swap from the incoming service
label to the service label of the backup egress router (i.e.,
protector), followed by a push with the outgoing label (or
label stack) of the egress link protection bypass tunnel. The
bypass tunnel is a regular tunnel destined for an IP address
of the protector, instead of the context ID of the protected
egress {E, P}. The protector simply forwards rerouted service
packets based on its own service label rather than performing
context label switching. In this approach, only the co-
located protector mode is applicable.
Note that for a bidirectional service, the physical link of an egress
link may carry service traffic bidirectionally. Therefore, an egress
link failure may simultaneously be an ingress link failure for the
traffic in the opposite direction. Protection for ingress link
failure
SHOULD be provided by a separate mechanism and hence is out
of the scope of this document.
7. Global Repair
This framework provides a fast but temporary repair for egress node
and egress link failures. For permanent repair, the services
affected by a failure
SHOULD be moved to an alternative tunnel, or
replaced by alternative services, which are fully functional. This
is referred to as global repair. Possible triggers of global repair
include control-plane notifications of tunnel status and service
status, end-to-end OAM and fault detection at the tunnel and service
level, and others. The alternative tunnel and services may be pre-
established in standby state or dynamically established as a result
of the triggers or network protocol convergence.
8. Operational Considerations
When a PLR performs local repair, the router
SHOULD generate an alert
for the event. The alert may be logged locally for tracking
purposes, or it may be sent to the operator at a management station.
The communication channel and protocol between the PLR and the
management station may vary depending on networks and are out of the
scope of this document.
9. General Context-Based Forwarding
So far, this document has been focusing on the cases where service
packets are MPLS or IP packets, and protectors perform context label
switching or context IP forwarding. Although this should cover most
common services, it is worth mentioning that the framework is also
applicable to services or sub-modes of services where service packets
are Layer 2 packets or encapsulated in non-IP and non-MPLS formats.
The only specific in these cases is that a protector
MUST perform
context-based forwarding based on the Layer 2 table or corresponding
lookup table, which is indicated by a context ID (i.e., context
label).
10. Example: Layer 3 VPN Egress Protection
This section shows an example of egress protection for Layer 3 IPv4
and IPv6 VPNs.
---------- R1 ----------- PE2 -
/ (PLR) (PLR) \
( ) / | | ( )
( ) / | | ( )
( site 1 )-- PE1 < | R3 ( site 2 )
( ) \ | | ( )
( ) \ | | ( )
\ | | /
---------- R2 ----------- PE3 -
(protector)
Figure 5
In this example, the core network is IPv4 and MPLS. Both of the IPv4
and IPv6 VPNs consist of sites 1 and 2. Site 1 is connected to PE1,
and site 2 is dual-homed to PE2 and PE3. Site 1 includes an IPv4
subnet 203.0.113.64/26 and an IPv6 subnet 2001:db8:1:1::/64. Site 2
includes an IPv4 subnet 203.0.113.128/26 and an IPv6 subnet
2001:db8:1:2::/64. PE2 is the primary PE for site 2, and PE3 is the
backup PE. Each of PE1, PE2, and PE3 hosts an IPv4 VPN instance and
an IPv6 VPN instance. The PEs use BGP to exchange VPN prefixes and
VPN labels between each other. In the core network, R1 and R2 are
transit routers, OSPF is used as the routing protocol, and RSVP-TE is
used as the tunnel signaling protocol.
Using the framework in this document, the network assigns PE3 to be
the protector of PE2 to protect the VPN traffic in the direction from
site 1 to site 2. This is the co-located protector mode. PE2 and
PE3 form a protected egress {PE2, PE3}. Context ID 198.51.100.1 is
assigned to the protected egress {PE2, PE3}. (If the core network is
IPv6, the context ID would be an IPv6 address.) The IPv4 and IPv6
VPN instances on PE3 serve as protection instances for the
corresponding VPN instances on PE2. On PE3, context label 100 is
assigned to the context ID, and a label table pe2.mpls is created to
represent PE2's label space. PE3 installs label 100 in its MPLS
forwarding table, with the next hop pointing to the label table
pe2.mpls. PE2 and PE3 are coordinated to use the proxy mode to
advertise the context ID in the routing domain and the TE domain.
PE2 uses the label allocation mode per Virtual Routing and Forwarding
(VRF) for both of its IPv4 and IPv6 VPN instances. It assigns label
9000 to the IPv4 VRF, and label 9001 to the IPv6 VRF. For the IPv4
prefix 203.0.113.128/26 in site 2, PE2 advertises it with label 9000
and NEXT_HOP 198.51.100.1 to PE1 and PE3 via BGP. Likewise, for the
IPv6 prefix 2001:db8:1:2::/64 in site 2, PE2 advertises it with label
9001 and NEXT_HOP 198.51.100.1 to PE1 and PE3 via BGP.
PE3 also uses per-VRF VPN label allocation mode for both of its IPv4
and IPv6 VPN instances. It assigns label 10000 to the IPv4 VRF and
label 10001 to the IPv6 VRF. For the prefix 203.0.113.128/26 in site
2, PE3 advertises it with label 10000 and NEXT_HOP as itself to PE1
and PE2 via BGP. For the IPv6 prefix 2001:db8:1:2::/64 in site 2,
PE3 advertises it with label 10001 and NEXT_HOP as itself to PE1 and
PE2 via BGP.
Upon receipt of the above BGP advertisements from PE2, PE1 uses the
context ID 198.51.100.1 as the destination to compute a path for an
egress-protected tunnel. The resultant path is PE1->R1->PE2. PE1
then uses RSVP to signal the tunnel, with the context ID 198.51.100.1
as the destination, with the "node protection desired" flag set in
the SESSION_ATTRIBUTE of the RSVP Path message. Once the tunnel
comes up, PE1 maps the VPN prefixes 203.0.113.128/26 and
2001:db8:1:2::/64 to the tunnel and installs a route for each prefix
in the corresponding IPv4 or IPv6 VRF. The next hop of route
203.0.113.128/26 is a push of the VPN label 9000, followed by a push
of the outgoing label of the egress-protected tunnel. The next hop
of route 2001:db8:1:2::/64 is a push of the VPN label 9001, followed
by a push of the outgoing label of the egress-protected tunnel.
Upon receipt of the above BGP advertisements from PE2, PE3 recognizes
the context ID 198.51.100.1 in the NEXT_HOP attribute and installs a
route for label 9000 and a route for label 9001 in the label table
pe2.mpls. PE3 sets the next hop of route 9000 to the IPv4 protection
VRF and the next hop of route 9001 to the IPv6 protection VRF. The
IPv4 protection VRF contains the routes to the IPv4 prefixes in site
2. The IPv6 protection VRF contains the routes to the IPv6 prefixes
in site 2. The next hops of these routes must be based on PE3's
connectivity with site 2, even if the connectivity may not have the
best metrics (e.g., Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED), local preference,
etc.) to be used in PE3's own VRF. The next hops must not use any
path traversing PE2. Note that the protection VRFs are a logical
concept, and they may simply be PE3's own VRFs if they satisfy the
requirement.
10.1. Egress Node Protection
R1, i.e., the penultimate hop router of the egress-protected tunnel,
serves as the PLR for egress node protection. Based on the "node
protection desired" flag and the destination address (i.e., context
ID 198.51.100.1) of the tunnel, R1 computes a bypass path to
198.51.100.1 while avoiding PE2. The resultant bypass path is
R1->R2->PE3. R1 then signals the path (i.e., egress-protection
bypass tunnel), with 198.51.100.1 as the destination.
Upon receipt of an RSVP Path message of the egress-protection bypass
tunnel, PE3 recognizes the context ID 198.51.100.1 as the destination
and responds with context label 100 in an RSVP Resv message.
After the egress-protection bypass tunnel comes up, R1 installs a
bypass next hop for the egress-protected tunnel. The bypass next hop
is a label swap from the incoming label of the egress-protected
tunnel to the outgoing label of the egress-protection bypass tunnel.
When R1 detects a failure of PE2, it will invoke the above bypass
next hop to reroute VPN packets. Each IPv4 VPN packet will have the
label of the bypass tunnel as outer label, and the IPv4 VPN label
9000 as inner label. Each IPv6 VPN packet will have the label of the
bypass tunnel as the outer label and the IPv6 VPN label 9001 as the
inner label. When the packets arrive at PE3, they will have the
context label 100 as the outer label and the VPN label 9000 or 9001
as the inner label. The context label will first be popped, and then
the VPN label will be looked up in the label table pe2.mpls. The
lookup will cause the VPN label to be popped and the IPv4 and IPv6
packets to be forwarded to site 2 based on the IPv4 and IPv6
protection VRFs, respectively.
10.2. Egress Link Protection
PE2 serves as the PLR for egress link protection. It has already
learned PE3's IPv4 VPN label 10000 and IPv6 VPN label 10001. Hence,
it uses approach (2) as described in
Section 6 to set up the bypass
forwarding state. It signals an egress-protection bypass tunnel to
PE3, by using the path PE2->R3->PE3, and PE3's IP address as the
destination. After the bypass tunnel comes up, PE2 installs a bypass
next hop for the IPv4 VPN label 9000 and a bypass next hop for the
IPv6 VPN label 9001. For label 9000, the bypass next hop is a label
swap to label 10000, followed by a label push with the outgoing label
of the bypass tunnel. For label 9001, the bypass next hop is a label
swap to label 10001, followed by a label push with the outgoing label
of the bypass tunnel.
When PE2 detects a failure of the egress link, it will invoke the
above bypass next hop to reroute VPN packets. Each IPv4 VPN packet
will have the label of the bypass tunnel as the outer label and label
10000 as the inner label. Each IPv6 VPN packet will have the label
of the bypass tunnel as the outer label and label 10001 as the inner
label. When the packets arrive at PE3, the VPN label 10000 or 10001
will be popped, and the exposed IPv4 and IPv6 packets will be
forwarded based on PE3's IPv4 and IPv6 VRFs, respectively.
10.3. Global Repair
Eventually, global repair will take effect, as control-plane
protocols converge on the new topology. PE1 will choose PE3 as a new
entrance to site 2. Before that happens, the VPN traffic has been
protected by the above local repair.
10.4. Other Modes of VPN Label Allocation
It is also possible that PE2 may use per-route or per-interface VPN
label allocation mode. In either case, PE3 will have multiple VPN
label routes in the pe2.mpls table, corresponding to the VPN labels
advertised by PE2. PE3 forwards rerouted packets by popping a VPN
label and performing an IP lookup in the corresponding protection
VRF. PE3's forwarding behavior is consistent with the above case
where PE2 uses per-VRF VPN label allocation mode. PE3 does not need
to know PE2's VPN label allocation mode or construct a specific next
hop for each VPN label route in the pe2.mpls table.
11. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
12. Security Considerations
The framework in this document involves rerouting traffic around an
egress node or link failure, via a bypass path from a PLR to a
protector, and ultimately to a backup egress router. The forwarding
performed by the routers in the data plane is anticipated, as part of
the planning of egress protection.
Control-plane protocols
MAY be used to facilitate the provisioning of
the egress protection on the routers. In particular, the framework
requires a service label distribution protocol between an egress
router and a protector over a secure session. The security
properties of this provisioning and label distribution depend
entirely on the underlying protocol chosen to implement these
activities. Their associated security considerations apply. This
framework introduces no new security requirements or guarantees
relative to these activities.
Also, the PLR, protector, and backup egress router are located close
to the protected egress router, which is normally in the same
administrative domain. If they are not in the same administrative
domain, a certain level of trust
MUST be established between them in
order for the protocols to run securely across the domain boundary.
The basis of this trust is the security model of the protocols (as
described above), and further security considerations for inter-
domain scenarios should be addressed by the protocols as a common
requirement.
Security attacks may sometimes come from a customer domain. Such
attacks are not introduced by the framework in this document and may
occur regardless of the existence of egress protection. In one
possible case, the egress link between an egress router and a CE
could become a point of attack. An attacker that gains control of
the CE might use it to simulate link failures and trigger constant
and cascading activities in the network. If egress link protection
is in place, egress link protection activities may also be triggered.
As a general solution to defeat the attack, a damping mechanism
SHOULD be used by the egress router to promptly suppress the services
associated with the link or CE. The egress router would stop
advertising the services, essentially detaching them from the network
and eliminating the effect of the simulated link failures.
From the above perspectives, this framework does not introduce any
new security threat to networks.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[
RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[
RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14,
RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8174,
May 2017, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[
RFC8402] Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Ginsberg, L.,
Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment
Routing Architecture",
RFC 8402, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8402,
July 2018, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402>.
[
RFC8667] Previdi, S., Ginsberg, L., Filsfils, C., Bashandy, A.,
Gredler, H., and B. Decraene, "IS-IS Extensions for
Segment Routing",
RFC 8667, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8667, December
2019, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8667>.
13.2. Informative References
[BGP-PIC] Bashandy, A., Filsfils, C., and P. Mohapatra, "BGP Prefix
Independent Convergence", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-pic-10, 2 October 2019,
<
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-pic-10>.
[
RFC4090] Pan, P., Ed., Swallow, G., Ed., and A. Atlas, Ed., "Fast
Reroute Extensions to RSVP-TE for LSP Tunnels",
RFC 4090,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC4090, May 2005,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4090>.
[
RFC5286] Atlas, A., Ed. and A. Zinin, Ed., "Basic Specification for
IP Fast Reroute: Loop-Free Alternates",
RFC 5286,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC5286, September 2008,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5286>.
[
RFC7490] Bryant, S., Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Shand, M., and N.
So, "Remote Loop-Free Alternate (LFA) Fast Reroute (FRR)",
RFC 7490, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7490, April 2015,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7490>.
[
RFC7812] Atlas, A., Bowers, C., and G. Enyedi, "An Architecture for
IP/LDP Fast Reroute Using Maximally Redundant Trees (MRT-
FRR)",
RFC 7812, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7812, June 2016,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7812>.
[
RFC8104] Shen, Y., Aggarwal, R., Henderickx, W., and Y. Jiang,
"Pseudowire (PW) Endpoint Fast Failure Protection",
RFC 8104, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8104, March 2017,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8104>.
[
RFC8400] Chen, H., Liu, A., Saad, T., Xu, F., and L. Huang,
"Extensions to RSVP-TE for Label Switched Path (LSP)
Egress Protection",
RFC 8400, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8400, June
2018, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8400>.
Acknowledgements
This document leverages work done by Yakov Rekhter, Kevin Wang, and
Zhaohui Zhang on MPLS egress protection. Thanks to Alexander
Vainshtein, Rolf Winter, Lizhong Jin, Krzysztof Szarkowicz, Roman
Danyliw, and Yuanlong Jiang for their valuable comments that helped
to shape this document and improve its clarity.
Authors' Addresses
Yimin Shen
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive
Westford, MA 01886
United States of America
Phone: +1 978 589 0722
Email: yshen@juniper.net
Minto Jeyananth
Juniper Networks
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
Phone: +1 408 936 7563
Email: minto@juniper.net
Bruno Decraene
Orange
Email: bruno.decraene@orange.com
Hannes Gredler
RtBrick Inc.
Email: hannes@rtbrick.com
Carsten Michel
Deutsche Telekom
Email: c.michel@telekom.de
Huaimo Chen
Futurewei
Boston, MA
United States of America