RFC 8897

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                             D. Ma
Request for Comments: 8897                                          ZDNS
Category: Informational                                          S. Kent
ISSN: 2070-1721                                              Independent
                                                          September 2020

   Requirements for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Relying


   This document provides a single reference point for requirements for
   Relying Party (RP) software for use in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI).  It cites requirements that appear in several
   RPKI RFCs, making it easier for implementers to become aware of these
   requirements.  Over time, this RFC will be updated to reflect changes
   to the requirements and guidance specified in the RFCs discussed

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Fetching and Caching RPKI Repository Objects
     2.1.  TAL Configuration and Processing
     2.2.  Locating RPKI Objects Using Authority and Subject
           Information Extensions
     2.3.  Dealing with Key Rollover
     2.4.  Dealing with Algorithm Transition
     2.5.  Strategies for Efficient Cache Maintenance
   3.  Certificate and CRL Processing
     3.1.  Verifying Resource Certificate and Syntax
     3.2.  Certificate Path Validation
     3.3.  CRL Processing
   4.  Processing RPKI Repository Signed Objects
     4.1.  Basic Signed Object Syntax Checks
     4.2.  Syntax and Validation for Each Type of Signed Object
       4.2.1.  Manifest
       4.2.2.  ROA
       4.2.3.  Ghostbusters
       4.2.4.  Verifying BGPsec Router Certificate
     4.3.  How to Make Use of Manifest Data
     4.4.  What To Do with Ghostbusters Information
   5.  Distributing Validated Cache
   6.  Local Control
   7.  Security Considerations
   8.  IANA Considerations
   9.  References
     9.1.  Normative References
     9.2.  Informative References

   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   RPKI Relying Party (RP) software is used by network operators and
   others to acquire and verify Internet Number Resource (INR) data
   stored in the RPKI repository system.  RPKI data, when verified,
   allows an RP to verify assertions about which Autonomous Systems
   (ASes) are authorized to originate routes for IP address prefixes.
   RPKI data also establishes a binding between public keys and BGP
   routers and indicates the AS numbers that each router is authorized
   to represent.

   The essential requirements imposed on RP software to support secure
   Internet routing [RFC6480] are scattered throughout numerous
   protocol-specific RFCs and Best Current Practice RFCs.  The following
   RFCs define these requirements:

      RFC 6481 (Repository Structure)
      RFC 6482 (ROA format)
      RFC 6486 (Manifests)
      RFC 6487 (Certificate and CRL profile)
      RFC 6488 (RPKI Signed Objects)
      RFC 6489 (Key Rollover)
      RFC 6810 (RPKI to Router Protocol)
      RFC 6916 (Algorithm Agility)
      RFC 7935 (Algorithms)
      RFC 8209 (Router Certificates)
      RFC 8210 (RPKI to Router Protocol, Version 1)
      RFC 8360 (Certificate Validation Procedure)
      RFC 8630 (Trust Anchor Locator)

   The distribution of RPKI RP requirements across these 13 documents
   makes it hard for an implementer to be confident that he/she has
   addressed all of these requirements.  Additionally, good software
   engineering practice may call for segmenting the RP system into
   components with orthogonal functionalities so that those components
   may be distributed.  A taxonomy of the collected RP software
   requirements can help clarify the role of the RP.

   To consolidate RP software requirements in one document, with
   pointers to all the relevant RFCs, this document outlines a set of
   baseline requirements imposed on RPs and provides a single reference
   point for requirements for RP software for use in the RPKI.  The
   requirements are organized into four groups:

   *  Fetching and Caching RPKI Repository Objects

   *  Processing Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)

   *  Processing RPKI Repository Signed Objects

   *  Distributing Validated Cache of the RPKI Data

   This document will be updated to reflect new or changed requirements
   as these RFCs are updated or additional RFCs are written.

2.  Fetching and Caching RPKI Repository Objects

   RP software uses synchronization mechanisms supported by targeted
   repositories (e.g., [rsync] or RRDP [RFC8182]) to download RPKI
   signed objects from the repository system in order to update a local
   cache.  These mechanisms download only those objects that have been
   added or replaced with new versions since the time when the RP most
   recently checked the repository.  RP software validates the RPKI data
   and uses it to generate authenticated data identifying which ASes are
   authorized to originate routes for address prefixes and which routers
   are authorized to sign BGP updates on behalf of specified ASes.

2.1.  TAL Configuration and Processing

   In the RPKI, each RP chooses a set of trust anchors (TAs).
   Consistent with the extant INR allocation hierarchy, the IANA and/or
   the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) are obvious candidates
   to be default TAs for the RP.

   An RP does not retrieve TAs directly.  A set of Trust Anchor Locators
   (TALs) is used by RP software to retrieve and verify the authenticity
   of each TA.

   TAL configuration and processing are specified in Section 3 of

2.2.  Locating RPKI Objects Using Authority and Subject Information

   The RPKI repository system is a distributed one, consisting of
   multiple repository instances.  Each repository instance contains one
   or more repository publication points.  RP software discovers
   publication points using the Subject Information Access (SIA) and the
   Authority Information Access (AIA) extensions from (validated)

   Section 5 of [RFC6481] specifies how RP software locates all RPKI
   objects by using the SIA and AIA extensions.  Detailed specifications
   of SIA and AIA extensions in a resource certificate are described in
   Sections 4.8.8 and 4.8.7 of [RFC6487], respectively.

2.3.  Dealing with Key Rollover

   RP software takes the key rollover period into account with regard to
   its frequency of synchronization with the RPKI repository system.

   RP software requirements for dealing with key rollover are described
   in Section 3 of [RFC6489] and Section 3 of [RFC8634].

2.4.  Dealing with Algorithm Transition

   The set of cryptographic algorithms used with the RPKI is expected to
   change over time.  Each RP is expected to be aware of the milestones
   established for the algorithm transition and what actions are
   required at every juncture.

   RP software requirements for dealing with algorithm transition are
   specified in Section 4 of [RFC6916].

2.5.  Strategies for Efficient Cache Maintenance

   Each RP is expected to maintain a local cache of RPKI objects.  The
   cache needs to be brought up to date and made consistent with the
   repository publication point data as frequently as allowed by
   repository publication points and by locally selected RP processing

   The last paragraph of Section 5 of [RFC6481] provides guidance for
   maintenance of a local cache.

3.  Certificate and CRL Processing

   The RPKI makes use of X.509 certificates and CRLs, but it profiles
   the standard formats described in [RFC6487].  The major change to the
   profile established in [RFC5280] is the mandatory use of a new
   extension in RPKI certificates, defined in [RFC3779].

3.1.  Verifying Resource Certificate and Syntax

   Certificates in the RPKI are called resource certificates, and they
   are required to conform to the profile described in [RFC6487].  An RP
   is required to verify that a resource certificate adheres to the
   profile established by Section 4 of [RFC6487].  This means that all
   extensions mandated by Section 4.8 of [RFC6487] must be present and
   the value of each extension must be within the range specified by
   [RFC6487].  Moreover, any extension excluded by Section 4.8 of
   [RFC6487] must be omitted.

   Section 7.1 of [RFC6487] specifies the procedure that RP software
   follows when verifying extensions described in [RFC3779].

3.2.  Certificate Path Validation

   Initially, the INRs in the issuer's certificate are required to
   encompass the INRs in the subject's certificate.  This is one of the
   necessary principles of certificate path validation in addition to
   cryptographic verification (i.e., verification of the signature on
   each certificate using the public key of the parent certificate).

   Section 7.2 of [RFC6487] specifies the procedure that RP software
   should follow to perform certificate path validation.

   Certification Authorities (CAs) that want to reduce aspects of
   operational fragility will migrate to the new OIDs [RFC8360],
   informing RP software to use an alternative RPKI validation
   algorithm.  An RP is expected to support the amended procedure to
   handle accidental overclaiming, which is described in Section 4 of

3.3.  CRL Processing

   The CRL processing requirements imposed on CAs and RPs are described
   in Section 5 of [RFC6487].  CRLs in the RPKI are tightly constrained;
   only the AuthorityKeyIdentifier (Section 4.8.3 of [RFC6487]) and
   CRLNumber (Section 5.2.3 of [RFC5280]) extensions are allowed, and
   they are required to be present.  No other CRL extensions are
   allowed, and no CRLEntry extensions are permitted.  RP software is
   required to verify that these constraints have been met.  Each CRL in
   the RPKI must be verified using the public key from the certificate
   of the CA that issued the CRL.

   In the RPKI, RPs are expected to pay extra attention when dealing
   with a CRL that is not consistent with the manifest associated with
   the publication point associated with the CRL.

   Processing of a CRL that is not consistent with a manifest is a
   matter of local policy, as described in the fifth paragraph of
   Section 6.6 of [RFC6486].

4.  Processing RPKI Repository Signed Objects

4.1.  Basic Signed Object Syntax Checks

   Before an RP can use a signed object from the RPKI repository, RP
   software is required to check the signed-object syntax.

   Section 3 of [RFC6488] lists all the steps that RP software is
   required to execute in order to validate the top-level syntax of a
   repository signed object.

   Note that these checks are necessary but not sufficient.  Additional
   validation checks must be performed based on the specific type of
   signed object, as described in Section 4.2.

4.2.  Syntax and Validation for Each Type of Signed Object

4.2.1.  Manifest

   To determine whether a manifest is valid, RP software is required to
   perform manifest-specific checks in addition to the generic signed-
   object checks specified in [RFC6488].

   Specific checks for a manifest are described in Section 4 of
   [RFC6486].  If any of these checks fail, indicating that the manifest
   is invalid, then the manifest will be discarded, and RP software will
   act as though no manifest were present.

4.2.2.  ROA

   To validate a Route Origin Authorization (ROA), RP software is
   required to perform all the checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as
   additional, ROA-specific validation steps.  The IP Address Delegation
   extension [RFC3779] present in the end-entity (EE) certificate
   (contained within the ROA) must encompass each of the IP address
   prefix(es) in the ROA.

   More details for ROA validation are specified in Section 4 of

4.2.3.  Ghostbusters

   The Ghostbusters Record is optional; a publication point in the RPKI
   can have zero or more associated Ghostbusters Records.  If a CA has
   at least one Ghostbusters Record, RP software is required to verify
   that this Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax of signed
   objects defined in [RFC6488].

   The payload of this signed object is a (severely) profiled vCard.  RP
   software is required to verify that the payload of Ghostbusters
   conforms to format as profiled in [RFC6493].

4.2.4.  Verifying BGPsec Router Certificate

   A BGPsec Router Certificate is a resource certificate, so it is
   required to comply with [RFC6487].  Additionally, the certificate
   must contain an AS Identifier Delegation extension (Section 4.8.11 of
   [RFC6487]) and must not contain an IP Address Delegation extension
   (Section 4.8.10 of [RFC6487]).  The validation procedure used for
   BGPsec Router Certificates is analogous to the validation procedure
   described in Section 7 of [RFC6487], but it uses the constraints
   defined in Section 3 of [RFC8209].

   Note that the cryptographic algorithms used by BGPsec routers are
   found in [RFC8608].  Currently, the algorithms specified in [RFC8608]
   and [RFC7935] are different.  BGPsec RP software will need to support
   algorithms that are used to validate BGPsec signatures as well as the
   algorithms that are needed to validate signatures on BGPsec
   certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI CRLs.

4.3.  How to Make Use of Manifest Data

   For a given publication point, RP software ought to perform tests, as
   specified in Section 6.1 of [RFC6486], to determine the state of the
   manifest at the publication point.  A manifest can be classified as
   either valid or invalid, and a valid manifest is either current or
   stale.  An RP decides how to make use of a manifest based on its
   state, according to local (RP) policy.

   If there are valid objects in a publication point that are not
   present on a manifest, [RFC6486] does not mandate specific RP
   behavior with respect to such objects.

   In the absence of a manifest, an RP is expected to accept all valid
   signed objects present in the publication point (see Section 6.2 of
   [RFC6486]).  If a manifest is stale or invalid and an RP has no way
   to acquire a more recent valid manifest, the RP is expected to
   contact the repository manager via Ghostbusters Records and
   thereafter make decisions according to local (RP) policy (see
   Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of [RFC6486]).

4.4.  What To Do with Ghostbusters Information

   RP software may encounter a stale manifest or CRL, or an expired CA
   certificate or ROA at a publication point.  An RP is expected to use
   the information from the Ghostbusters Records to contact the
   maintainer of the publication point where any stale/expired objects
   were encountered.  The intent here is to encourage the relevant CA
   and/or repository manager to update the stale or expired objects.

5.  Distributing Validated Cache

   On a periodic basis, BGP speakers within an AS request updated
   validated origin AS data and router/ASN data from the (local)
   validated cache of RPKI data.  The RP may either transfer the
   validated data to the BGP speakers directly, or it may transfer the
   validated data to a cache server that is responsible for provisioning
   such data to BGP speakers.  The specifications of the protocol
   designed to deliver validated cache data to a BGP Speaker are
   provided in [RFC6810] and [RFC8210].

6.  Local Control

   ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the RPKI
   data in the form of local filters and additions.  For instance, a
   network operator might wish to make use of a local override
   capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211].  The
   mechanisms developed to provide this capability to network operators
   are called Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with
   the RPKI (SLURM).  If an ISP wants to implement SLURM, its RP system
   can follow the instruction specified in [RFC8416].

7.  Security Considerations

   This document does not introduce any new security considerations; it
   is a resource for implementers.  The RP links the RPKI provisioning
   side and the routing system, establishing a verified, local view of
   global RPKI data to BGP speakers.  The security of the RP is critical
   for exchanging BGP messages.  Each RP implementation is expected to
   offer cache backup management to facilitate recovery from outages.
   RP software should also support secure transport (e.g., IPsec
   [RFC4301]) that can protect validated cache delivery in an unsafe
   environment.  This document highlights many validation actions
   applied to RPKI signed objects, an essential element of secure
   operation of RPKI security.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,

   [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,

   [RFC6489]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification
              Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6489, February 2012,

   [RFC6493]  Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, DOI 10.17487/RFC6493,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493>.

   [RFC6810]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,

   [RFC6916]  Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
              Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.

   [RFC7935]  Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
              Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
              August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.

   [RFC8209]  Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
              BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
              and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,

   [RFC8210]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
              RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,

   [RFC8360]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Martinez, C., Bruijnzeels, T.,
              Newton, A., and D. Shaw, "Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered", RFC 8360,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8360, April 2018,

   [RFC8608]  Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
              Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8608,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8608, June 2019,

   [RFC8630]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and T.
              Bruijnzeels, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Trust Anchor Locator", RFC 8630, DOI 10.17487/RFC8630,
              August 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8630>.

   [RFC8634]  Weis, B., Gagliano, R., and K. Patel, "BGPsec Router
              Certificate Rollover", BCP 224, RFC 8634,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8634, August 2019,

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC8182]  Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
              "The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017,

   [RFC8211]  Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
              Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
              Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,

   [RFC8416]  Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
              Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
              (SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018,

   [rsync]    "rsync", <http://rsync.samba.org/>.


   The authors thank David Mandelberg, Wei Wang, Tim Bruijnzeels, George
   Michaelson, and Oleg Muravskiy for their review, feedback, and
   editorial assistance in preparing this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Di Ma
   4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
   Beijing, 100190

   Email: madi@zdns.cn

   Stephen Kent

   Email: kent@alum.mit.edu