Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Filsfils, Ed.
Request for Comments:
8986 P. Camarillo, Ed.
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc.
ISSN: 2070-1721 J. Leddy
Akamai Technologies
D. Voyer
Bell Canada
S. Matsushima
SoftBank
Z. Li
Huawei Technologies
February 2021
Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Network Programming
Abstract
The Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Network Programming framework
enables a network operator or an application to specify a packet
processing program by encoding a sequence of instructions in the IPv6
packet header.
Each instruction is implemented on one or several nodes in the
network and identified by an SRv6 Segment Identifier in the packet.
This document defines the SRv6 Network Programming concept and
specifies the base set of SRv6 behaviors that enables the creation of
interoperable overlays with underlay optimization.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in
Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8986.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(
https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
2.1. Requirements Language
3. SRv6 SID
3.1. SID Format
3.2. SID Allocation within an SR Domain
3.3. SID Reachability
4. SR Endpoint Behaviors
4.1. End: Endpoint
4.1.1. Upper-Layer Header
4.2. End.X: L3 Cross-Connect
4.3. End.T: Specific IPv6 Table Lookup
4.4. End.DX6: Decapsulation and IPv6 Cross-Connect
4.5. End.DX4: Decapsulation and IPv4 Cross-Connect
4.6. End.DT6: Decapsulation and Specific IPv6 Table Lookup
4.7. End.DT4: Decapsulation and Specific IPv4 Table Lookup
4.8. End.DT46: Decapsulation and Specific IP Table Lookup
4.9. End.DX2: Decapsulation and L2 Cross-Connect
4.10. End.DX2V: Decapsulation and VLAN L2 Table Lookup
4.11. End.DT2U: Decapsulation and Unicast MAC L2 Table Lookup
4.12. End.DT2M: Decapsulation and L2 Table Flooding
4.13. End.B6.Encaps: Endpoint Bound to an SRv6 Policy with
Encapsulation
4.14. End.B6.Encaps.Red: End.B6.Encaps with Reduced SRH
4.15. End.BM: Endpoint Bound to an SR-MPLS Policy
4.16. Flavors
4.16.1. PSP: Penultimate Segment Pop of the SRH
4.16.2. USP: Ultimate Segment Pop of the SRH
4.16.3. USD: Ultimate Segment Decapsulation
5. SR Policy Headend Behaviors
5.1. H.Encaps: SR Headend with Encapsulation in an SR Policy
5.2. H.Encaps.Red: H.Encaps with Reduced Encapsulation
5.3. H.Encaps.L2: H.Encaps Applied to Received L2 Frames
5.4. H.Encaps.L2.Red: H.Encaps.Red Applied to Received L2 Frames
6. Counters
7. Flow-Based Hash Computation
8. Control Plane
8.1. IGP
8.2. BGP-LS
8.3. BGP IP/VPN/EVPN
8.4. Summary
9. Security Considerations
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. Ethernet Next Header Type
10.2. SRv6 Endpoint Behaviors Registry
10.2.1. Registration Procedures
10.2.2. Initial Registrations
11. References
11.1. Normative References
11.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Contributors
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Segment Routing [
RFC8402] leverages the source routing paradigm. An
ingress node steers a packet through an ordered list of instructions,
called "segments". Each one of these instructions represents a
function to be called at a specific location in the network. A
function is locally defined on the node where it is executed and may
range from simply moving forward in the segment list to any complex
user-defined behavior. Network Programming combines Segment Routing
functions, both simple and complex, to achieve a networking objective
that goes beyond mere packet routing.
This document defines the SRv6 Network Programming concept and
specifies the main Segment Routing behaviors to enable the creation
of interoperable overlays with underlay optimization.
[SRV6-NET-PGM-ILLUST] illustrates the concepts defined in this
document.
Familiarity with the Segment Routing Header [
RFC8754] is expected.
2. Terminology
The following terms used within this document are defined in
[
RFC8402]: Segment Routing (SR), SR Domain, Segment ID (SID), SRv6,
SRv6 SID, SR Policy, Prefix-SID, and Adj-SID.
The following terms used within this document are defined in
[
RFC8754]: Segment Routing Header (SRH), SR source node, transit
node, SR Segment Endpoint Node, Reduced SRH, Segments Left, and Last
Entry.
The following terms are used in this document as defined below:
FIB: Forwarding Information Base. A FIB lookup is a lookup in the
forwarding table.
SA: Source Address
DA: Destination Address
L3: Layer 3
L2: Layer 2
MAC: Media Access Control
EVPN: Ethernet VPN
ESI: Ethernet Segment Identifier
Per-CE VPN label: A single label for each attachment circuit that is
shared by all routes with the same "outgoing attachment circuit"
(Section 4.3.2 of [
RFC4364])
Per-VRF VPN label: A single label for the entire VPN Routing and
Forwarding (VRF) table that is shared by all routes from that VRF
(Section 4.3.2 of [
RFC4364])
SL: The Segments Left field of the SRH
SRv6 SID function: The function part of the SID is an opaque
identification of a local behavior bound to the SID. It is
formally defined in
Section 3.1 of this document.
SRv6 Endpoint behavior: A packet processing behavior executed at an
SRv6 Segment Endpoint Node.
Section 4 of this document defines
SRv6 Endpoint behaviors related to traffic-engineering and overlay
use cases. Other behaviors (e.g., service programming) are
outside the scope of this document.
An SR Policy is resolved to a SID list. A SID list is represented as
<S1, S2, S3> where S1 is the first SID to visit, S2 is the second SID
to visit, and S3 is the last SID to visit along the SR path.
(SA,DA) (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents an IPv6 packet with:
* Source Address (SA), Destination Address (DA), and next header
(SRH).
* SRH with SID list <S1, S2, S3> with Segments Left = SL.
Note the difference between the <> and () symbols: <S1, S2, S3>
represents a SID list where S1 is the first SID and S3 is the last
SID to traverse. (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents the same SID list
but encoded in the SRH format where the rightmost SID in the SRH
is the first SID and the leftmost SID in the SRH is the last SID.
When referring to an SR Policy in a high-level use case, it is
simpler to use the <S1, S2, S3> notation. When referring to an
illustration of the detailed packet behavior, the (S3, S2, S1; SL)
notation is more convenient.
* The payload of the packet is omitted.
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "
MUST", "
MUST NOT", "
REQUIRED", "
SHALL", "
SHALL NOT",
"
SHOULD", "
SHOULD NOT", "
RECOMMENDED", "
NOT RECOMMENDED", "
MAY", and
"
OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [
RFC2119] [
RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. SRv6 SID
[
RFC8402] defines an SRv6 Segment Identifier as an IPv6 address
explicitly associated with the segment.
When an SRv6 SID is in the Destination Address field of an IPv6
header of a packet, it is routed through transit nodes in an IPv6
network as an IPv6 address.
Its processing is defined in
Section 4.3 of [
RFC8754] and reproduced
here as a reminder:
| Without constraining the details of an implementation, the SR
| segment endpoint node creates Forwarding Information Base (FIB)
| entries for its local SIDs.
|
| When an SRv6-capable node receives an IPv6 packet, it performs a
| longest-prefix-match lookup on the packet's destination address.
| This lookup can return any of the following:
| * A FIB entry that represents a locally instantiated SRv6 SID
|
| * A FIB entry that represents a local interface, not locally
| instantiated as an SRv6 SID
|
| * A FIB entry that represents a nonlocal route
|
| * No Match
Section 4 of this document defines a new set of SRv6 SID behaviors in
addition to that defined in Section 4.3.1 of [
RFC8754].
3.1. SID Format
This document defines an SRv6 SID as consisting of LOC:FUNCT:ARG,
where a locator (LOC) is encoded in the L most significant bits of
the SID, followed by F bits of function (FUNCT) and A bits of
arguments (ARG). L, the locator length, is flexible, and an operator
is free to use the locator length of their choice. F and A may be
any value as long as L+F+A <= 128. When L+F+A is less than 128, then
the remaining bits of the SID
MUST be zero.
A locator may be represented as B:N where B is the SRv6 SID block
(IPv6 prefix allocated for SRv6 SIDs by the operator) and N is the
identifier of the parent node instantiating the SID.
When the LOC part of the SRv6 SIDs is routable, it leads to the node,
which instantiates the SID.
The FUNCT is an opaque identification of a local behavior bound to
the SID.
The term "function" refers to the bit string in the SRv6 SID. The
term "behavior" identifies the behavior bound to the SID. Some
behaviors are defined in
Section 4 of this document.
An SRv6 Endpoint behavior may require additional information for its
processing (e.g., related to the flow or service). This information
may be encoded in the ARG bits of the SID.
In such a case, the semantics and format of the ARG bits are defined
as part of the SRv6 Endpoint behavior specification.
The ARG value of a routed SID
SHOULD remain constant among packets in
a given flow. Varying ARG values among packets in a flow may result
in different ECMP hashing and cause reordering.
3.2. SID Allocation within an SR Domain
Locators are assigned consistent with IPv6 infrastructure allocation.
For example, a network operator may:
* Assign block B::/48 to the SR domain
* Assign a unique B:N::/64 block to each SRv6-enabled node in the
domain
As an example, one mobile service provider has commercially deployed
SRv6 across more than 1000 commercial routers and 1800 whitebox
routers. All these devices are enabled for SRv6 and advertise SRv6
SIDs. The provider historically deployed IPv6 and assigned
infrastructure addresses from the Unique Local Address (ULA) space
[
RFC4193]. They specifically allocated three /48 prefixes (Country
X, Country Y, Country Z) to support their SRv6 infrastructure. From
those /48 prefixes, each router was assigned a /64 prefix from which
all SIDs of that router are allocated.
In another example, a large mobile and fixed-line service provider
has commercially deployed SRv6 in their country-wide network. This
provider is assigned a /20 prefix by a Regional Internet Registry
(RIR). They sub-allocated a few /48 prefixes to their infrastructure
to deploy SRv6. Each router is assigned a /64 prefix from which all
SIDs of that router are allocated.
IPv6 address consumption in both these examples is minimal,
representing less than one billionth and one millionth of the
available address space, respectively.
A service provider receiving the current minimum allocation of a /32
prefix from an RIR may assign a /48 prefix to their infrastructure
deploying SRv6 and subsequently allocate /64 prefixes for SIDs at
each SRv6 node. The /48 assignment is one sixty-five thousandth
(1/2^16) of the usable IPv6 address space available for assignment by
the provider.
When an operator instantiates a SID at a node, they specify a SID
value B:N:FUNCT and the behavior bound to the SID using one of the
SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoints of the registry defined in this
document (see Table 6).
The node advertises the SID, B:N:FUNCT, in the control plane (see
Section 8) together with the SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint
identifying the behavior of the SID.
An SR source node cannot infer the behavior by examination of the
FUNCT value of a SID.
Therefore, the SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint is advertised along
with the SID in the control plane.
An SR source node uses the SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint to map
the received SID (B:N:FUNCT) to a behavior.
An SR source node selects a desired behavior at an advertising node
by selecting the SID (B:N:FUNCT) advertised with the desired
behavior.
As an example:
* A network operator may assign an SRv6 SID block 2001:db8:bbbb::/48
from their in-house operation block for their SRv6 infrastructure.
* A network operator may assign an SRv6 Locator 2001:db8:bbbb:3::/64
to one particular router, for example Router 3, in their SR
Domain.
* At Router 3, within the locator 2001:db8:bbbb:3::/64, the network
operator or the router performs dynamic assignment for:
- Function 0x0100 associated with the behavior End.X (Endpoint
with L3 cross-connect) between router 3 and its connected
neighbor router (e.g., Router 4). This function is encoded as
a 16-bit value and has no arguments (F=16, A=0).
This SID is advertised in the control plane as
2001:db8:bbbb:3:100:: with an SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint
value of 5.
- Function 0x0101 associated with the behavior End.X (Endpoint
with L3 cross-connect) between router 3 and its connected
neighbor router (e.g., Router 2). This function is encoded as
a 16-bit value and has no arguments (F=16, A=0).
This SID is advertised in the control plane as
2001:db8:bbbb:3:101:: with an SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint
value of 5.
These examples do not preclude any other IPv6 addressing allocation
scheme.
3.3. SID Reachability
Most often, the node N would advertise IPv6 prefix(es) matching the
LOC parts covering its SIDs or shorter-mask prefix. The distribution
of these advertisements and calculation of their reachability are
specific to the routing protocol and are outside of the scope of this
document.
An SRv6 SID is said to be routed if its SID belongs to an IPv6 prefix
advertised via a routing protocol. An SRv6 SID that does not fulfill
this condition is non-routed.
Let's provide a classic illustration:
Node N is configured explicitly with two SIDs: 2001:db8:b:1:100:: and
2001:db8:b:2:101::.
The network learns about a path to 2001:db8:b:1::/64 via the IGP;
hence, a packet destined to 2001:db8:b:1:100:: would be routed up to
N. The network does not learn about a path to 2001:db8:b:2::/64 via
the IGP; hence, a packet destined to 2001:db8:b:2:101:: would not be
routed up to N.
A packet could be steered through a non-routed SID 2001:db8:b:2:101::
by using a SID list <...,2001:db8:b:1:100::,2001:db8:b:2:101::,...>
where the non-routed SID is preceded by a routed SID to the same
node. A packet could also be steered to a node instantiating a non-
routed SID by preceding it in the SID list with an Adj-SID to that
node. Routed and non-routed SRv6 SIDs are the SRv6 instantiation of
global and local segments, respectively [
RFC8402].
4. SR Endpoint Behaviors
The following is a set of well-known behaviors that can be associated
with a SID.
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End | Endpoint |
| | |
| | The SRv6 instantiation of a Prefix-SID |
| | [
RFC8402] |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.X | Endpoint with L3 cross-connect |
| | |
| | The SRv6 instantiation of an Adj-SID |
| | [
RFC8402] |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.T | Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DX6 | Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross- |
| | connect |
| | |
| | e.g., IPv6-L3VPN (equivalent to per-CE VPN |
| | label) |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DX4 | Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross- |
| | connect |
| | |
| | e.g., IPv4-L3VPN (equivalent to per-CE VPN |
| | label) |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DT6 | Endpoint with decapsulation and specific |
| | IPv6 table lookup |
| | |
| | e.g., IPv6-L3VPN (equivalent to per-VRF VPN |
| | label) |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DT4 | Endpoint with decapsulation and specific |
| | IPv4 table lookup |
| | |
| | e.g., IPv4-L3VPN (equivalent to per-VRF VPN |
| | label) |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DT46 | Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IP |
| | table lookup |
| | |
| | e.g., IP-L3VPN (equivalent to per-VRF VPN |
| | label) |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DX2 | Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 cross- |
| | connect |
| | |
| | e.g., L2VPN use case |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DX2V | Endpoint with decapsulation and VLAN L2 |
| | table lookup |
| | |
| | e.g., EVPN Flexible Cross-connect use case |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DT2U | Endpoint with decapsulation and unicast MAC |
| | L2 table lookup |
| | |
| | e.g., EVPN Bridging Unicast use case |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.DT2M | Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 table |
| | flooding |
| | |
| | e.g., EVPN Bridging Broadcast, Unknown |
| | Unicast, and Multicast (BUM) use case with |
| | Ethernet Segment Identifier (ESI) filtering |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.B6.Encaps | Endpoint bound to an SRv6 Policy with |
| | encapsulation |
| | |
| | SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.B6.Encaps.Red | End.B6.Encaps with reduced SRH |
| | |
| | SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| End.BM | Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy |
| | |
| | SRv6 instantiation of an SR-MPLS Binding |
| | SID |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Endpoint Behaviors
The list is not exhaustive. In practice, any behavior can be
attached to a local SID; for example, a node N can bind a SID to a
local Virtual Machine (VM) or container that can apply any complex
processing on the packet, provided there is an SRv6 Endpoint Behavior
codepoint allocated for the processing.
When an SRv6-capable node (N) receives an IPv6 packet whose
destination address matches a FIB entry that represents a locally
instantiated SRv6 SID (S), the IPv6 header chain is processed as
defined in
Section 4 of [
RFC8200]. For SRv6 SIDs associated with an
Endpoint behavior defined in this document, the SRH and Upper-Layer
header are processed as defined in the following subsections.
The pseudocode describing these behaviors details local processing at
a node. An implementation of the pseudocode is compliant as long as
the externally observable wire protocol is as described by the
pseudocode.
Section 4.16 defines flavors of some of these behaviors.
Section 10.2 of this document defines the IANA registry used to
maintain all these behaviors as well as future ones defined in other
documents.
4.1. End: Endpoint
The Endpoint behavior ("End" for short) is the most basic behavior.
It is the instantiation of a Prefix-SID [
RFC8402].
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End SID,
N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left == 0) {
S03. Stop processing the SRH, and proceed to process the next
header in the packet, whose type is identified by
the Next Header field in the routing header.
S04. }
S05. If (IPv6 Hop Limit <= 1) {
S06. Send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Hop limit exceeded in transit),
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S07. }
S08. max_LE = (Hdr Ext Len / 2) - 1
S09. If ((Last Entry > max_LE) or (Segments Left > Last Entry+1)) {
S10. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S11. }
S12. Decrement IPv6 Hop Limit by 1
S13. Decrement Segments Left by 1
S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment List[Segments Left]
S15. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S16. }
| Note:
|
| The End behavior operates on the same FIB table (i.e.,
| identified by VRF or L3 relay ID) associated to the packet.
| Hence, the FIB lookup on line S15 is done in the same FIB table
| as the ingress interface.
4.1.1. Upper-Layer Header
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type is allowed by local configuration) {
S02. Proceed to process the Upper-Layer header
S03. } Else {
S04. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 4 (SR Upper-layer Header Error)
and Pointer set to the offset of the Upper-Layer header,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S05 }
Allowing the processing of specific Upper-Layer header types is
useful for Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM). As an
example, an operator might permit pinging of SIDs. To do this, they
may enable local configuration to allow Upper-Layer header type 58
(ICMPv6).
It is
RECOMMENDED that an implementation of local configuration only
allows Upper-Layer header processing of types that do not result in
the packet being forwarded (e.g., ICMPv6).
4.2. End.X: L3 Cross-Connect
The "Endpoint with L3 cross-connect" behavior ("End.X" for short) is
a variant of the End behavior.
It is the SRv6 instantiation of an Adj-SID [
RFC8402], and its main
use is for traffic-engineering policies.
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with a set, J, of one
or more L3 adjacencies.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.X SID,
the line S15 from the End processing is replaced by the following:
S15. Submit the packet to the IPv6 module for transmission
to the new destination via a member of J
| Note:
|
| S15. If the set J contains several L3 adjacencies, then one
| element of the set is selected based on a hash of the packet's
| header (see
Section 7).
If a node N has 30 outgoing interfaces to 30 neighbors, usually the
operator would explicitly instantiate 30 End.X SIDs at N: one per L3
adjacency to a neighbor. Potentially, more End.X could be explicitly
defined (groups of L3 adjacencies to the same neighbor or to
different neighbors).
Note that if N has an outgoing interface bundle I to a neighbor Q
made of 10 member links, N might allocate up to 11 End.X local SIDs:
one for the bundle itself and then up to one for each L2 member link.
The flows steered using the End.X SID corresponding to the bundle
itself get load-balanced across the member links via hashing while
the flows steered using the End.X SID corresponding to a member link
get steered over that specific member link alone.
When the End.X behavior is associated with a BGP Next-Hop, it is the
SRv6 instantiation of the BGP peering segments [
RFC8402].
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.X SID, process the packet as per
Section 4.1.1.
4.3. End.T: Specific IPv6 Table Lookup
The "Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup" behavior ("End.T" for
short) is a variant of the End behavior.
The End.T behavior is used for multi-table operation in the core.
For this reason, an instance of the End.T behavior is associated with
an IPv6 FIB table T.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.T SID,
the line S15 from the End processing is replaced by the following:
S15.1. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T
S15.2. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.T SID, process the packet as per
Section 4.1.1.
4.4. End.DX6: Decapsulation and IPv6 Cross-Connect
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross-connect" behavior
("End.DX6" for short) is a variant of the End.X behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX6 behavior is the L3VPNv6 use
case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress
Provider Edge (PE) is not required. This is equivalent to the per-CE
VPN label in MPLS [
RFC4364].
The End.DX6 SID
MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and it is
associated with one or more L3 IPv6 adjacencies J.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX6 SID,
N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left != 0) {
S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S04. }
S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet
S06. }
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.DX6 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Forward the exposed IPv6 packet to the L3 adjacency J
S04. } Else {
S05. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S06. }
| Note:
|
| S01. "41" refers to "IPv6 encapsulation" as defined in the IANA
| "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry.
|
| S03. If the End.DX6 SID is bound to an array of L3
| adjacencies, then one entry of the array is selected based on
| the hash of the packet's header (see
Section 7).
4.5. End.DX4: Decapsulation and IPv4 Cross-Connect
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross-connect" behavior
("End.DX4" for short) is a variant of the End.X behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX4 behavior is the L3VPNv4 use
case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE
is not required. This is equivalent to the per-CE VPN label in MPLS
[
RFC4364].
The End.DX4 SID
MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and it is
associated with one or more L3 IPv4 adjacencies J.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX4 SID,
N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left != 0) {
S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S04. }
S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet
S06. }
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.DX4 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Forward the exposed IPv4 packet to the L3 adjacency J
S04. } Else {
S05. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S06. }
| Note:
|
| S01. "4" refers to "IPv4 encapsulation" as defined in the IANA
| "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry.
|
| S03. If the End.DX4 SID is bound to an array of L3
| adjacencies, then one entry of the array is selected based on
| the hash of the packet's header (see
Section 7).
4.6. End.DT6: Decapsulation and Specific IPv6 Table Lookup
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv6 table lookup"
behavior ("End.DT6" for short) is a variant of the End.T behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT6 behavior is the L3VPNv6 use
case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE
is required. This is equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS
[
RFC4364].
Note that an End.DT6 may be defined for the main IPv6 table, in which
case an End.DT6 supports the equivalent of an IPv6-in-IPv6
decapsulation (without VPN/tenant implication).
The End.DT6 SID
MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and a SID
instance is associated with an IPv6 FIB table T.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT6 SID,
N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left != 0) {
S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S04. }
S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet
S06. }
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.DT6 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T
S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S05. } Else {
S06. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S07. }
4.7. End.DT4: Decapsulation and Specific IPv4 Table Lookup
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv4 table lookup"
behavior ("End.DT4" for short) is a variant of the End.T behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT4 behavior is the L3VPNv4 use
case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE
is required. This is equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS
[
RFC4364].
Note that an End.DT4 may be defined for the main IPv4 table, in which
case an End.DT4 supports the equivalent of an IPv4-in-IPv6
decapsulation (without VPN/tenant implication).
The End.DT4 SID
MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and a SID
instance is associated with an IPv4 FIB table T.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT4 SID,
N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left != 0) {
S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S04. }
S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet
S06. }
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.DT4 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T
S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S05. } Else {
S06. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S07. }
4.8. End.DT46: Decapsulation and Specific IP Table Lookup
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IP table lookup"
behavior ("End.DT46" for short) is a variant of the End.DT4 and
End.DT6 behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT46 behavior is the L3VPN use
case where a FIB lookup in a specific IP tenant table at the egress
PE is required. This is equivalent to the single per-VRF VPN label
(for IPv4 and IPv6) in MPLS [
RFC4364].
Note that an End.DT46 may be defined for the main IP table, in which
case an End.DT46 supports the equivalent of an IP-in-IPv6
decapsulation (without VPN/tenant implication).
The End.DT46 SID
MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and a SID
instance is associated with an IPv4 FIB table T4 and an IPv6 FIB
table T6.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT46 SID,
N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left != 0) {
S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S04. }
S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet
S06. }
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.DT46 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T4
S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S05. } Else if (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) {
S06. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S07. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T6
S08. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S09. } Else {
S10. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S11. }
4.9. End.DX2: Decapsulation and L2 Cross-Connect
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 cross-connect" behavior
("End.DX2" for short) is a variant of the Endpoint behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX2 behavior is the L2VPN
[
RFC4664] / EVPN Virtual Private Wire Service (VPWS) [
RFC7432]
[
RFC8214] use case.
The End.DX2 SID
MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and it is
associated with one outgoing interface I.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX2 SID,
N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left != 0) {
S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S04. }
S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet
S06. }
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.DX2 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 143(Ethernet) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Forward the Ethernet frame to the OIF I
S04. } Else {
S05. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S06. }
| Note:
|
| S01. IANA has allocated value "143" for "Ethernet"
| [IEEE.802.3_2018] in the "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers"
| registry (see
Section 10.1).
|
| S03. An End.DX2 behavior could be customized to expect a
| specific IEEE header (e.g., VLAN tag) and rewrite the egress
| IEEE header before forwarding on the outgoing interface.
Note that an End.DX2 SID may also be associated with a bundle of
outgoing interfaces.
4.10. End.DX2V: Decapsulation and VLAN L2 Table Lookup
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and VLAN L2 table lookup" behavior
("End.DX2V" for short) is a variant of the End.DX2 behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX2V behavior is the EVPN Flexible
Cross-connect use case. The End.DX2V behavior is used to perform a
lookup of the Ethernet frame VLANs in a particular L2 table. Any SID
instance of this behavior is associated with an L2 table T.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.DX2
SID, the processing is identical to the End.DX2 behavior except for
the Upper-Layer header processing, which is modified as follows:
S03. Look up the exposed VLANs in L2 table T, and forward
via the matched table entry.
| Note:
|
| S03. An End.DX2V behavior could be customized to expect a
| specific VLAN format and rewrite the egress VLAN header before
| forwarding on the outgoing interface.
4.11. End.DT2U: Decapsulation and Unicast MAC L2 Table Lookup
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and unicast MAC L2 table lookup"
behavior ("End.DT2U" for short) is a variant of the End behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT2U behavior is the EVPN Bridging
Unicast [
RFC7432]. Any SID instance of the End.DT2U behavior is
associated with an L2 table T.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.DT2U
SID, the processing is identical to the End.DX2 behavior except for
the Upper-Layer header processing, which is as follows:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 143(Ethernet) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Learn the exposed MAC Source Address in L2 table T
S04. Look up the exposed MAC Destination Address in L2 table T
S05. If (matched entry in T) {
S06. Forward via the matched table T entry
S07. } Else {
S08. Forward via all L2 OIFs in table T
S09. }
S10. } Else {
S11. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S12. }
| Note:
|
| S01. IANA has allocated value "143" for "Ethernet" in the
| "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry (see
|
Section 10.1).
|
| S03. In EVPN [
RFC7432], the learning of the exposed MAC Source
| Address is done via the control plane. In L2VPN Virtual
| Private LAN Service (VPLS) [
RFC4761] [
RFC4762], reachability is
| obtained by standard learning bridge functions in the data
| plane.
4.12. End.DT2M: Decapsulation and L2 Table Flooding
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 table flooding" behavior
("End.DT2M" for short) is a variant of the End.DT2U behavior.
Two of the applications of the End.DT2M behavior are the EVPN
Bridging of Broadcast, Unknown Unicast, and Multicast (BUM) traffic
with Ethernet Segment Identifier (ESI) filtering [
RFC7432] and the
EVPN Ethernet-Tree (E-Tree) [
RFC8317] use cases.
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with an L2 table T.
The behavior also takes an argument: "Arg.FE2". This argument
provides a local mapping to ESI for split-horizon filtering of the
received traffic to exclude a specific OIF (or set of OIFs) from L2
table T flooding. The allocation of the argument values is local to
the SR Segment Endpoint Node instantiating this behavior, and the
signaling of the argument to other nodes for the EVPN functionality
occurs via the control plane.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.DT2M
SID, the processing is identical to the End.DX2 behavior except for
the Upper-Layer header processing, which is as follows:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 143(Ethernet) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Learn the exposed MAC Source Address in L2 table T
S04. Forward via all L2 OIFs excluding those associated with the
identifier Arg.FE2
S05. } Else {
S06. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S07. }
| Note:
|
| S01. IANA has allocated value "143" for "Ethernet" in the
| "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry (see
|
Section 10.1).
|
| S03. In EVPN [
RFC7432], the learning of the exposed MAC Source
| Address is done via the control plane. In L2VPN VPLS [
RFC4761]
| [
RFC4762], reachability is obtained by standard learning bridge
| functions in the data plane.
4.13. End.B6.Encaps: Endpoint Bound to an SRv6 Policy with
Encapsulation
This is a variation of the End behavior.
One of its applications is to express scalable traffic-engineering
policies across multiple domains. It is one of the SRv6
instantiations of a Binding SID [
RFC8402].
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with an SR Policy B
and a source address A.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local
End.B6.Encaps SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left == 0) {
S03. Stop processing the SRH, and proceed to process the next
header in the packet, whose type is identified by
the Next Header field in the routing header.
S04. }
S05. If (IPv6 Hop Limit <= 1) {
S06. Send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Hop limit exceeded in transit),
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S07. }
S08. max_LE = (Hdr Ext Len / 2) - 1
S09. If ((Last Entry > max_LE) or (Segments Left > Last Entry+1)) {
S10. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S11. }
S12. Decrement IPv6 Hop Limit by 1
S13. Decrement Segments Left by 1
S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment List[Segments Left]
S15. Push a new IPv6 header with its own SRH containing B
S16. Set the outer IPv6 SA to A
S17. Set the outer IPv6 DA to the first SID of B
S18. Set the outer Payload Length, Traffic Class, Flow Label,
Hop Limit, and Next Header fields
S19. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S20. }
| Note:
|
| S15. The SRH
MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy B only
| contains one SID and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or
| TLV.
|
| S18. The Payload Length, Traffic Class, Hop Limit, and Next
| Header fields are set as per [
RFC2473]. The Flow Label is
| computed as per [
RFC6437].
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.B6.Encaps SID, process the
packet as per
Section 4.1.1.
4.14. End.B6.Encaps.Red: End.B6.Encaps with Reduced SRH
This is an optimization of the End.B6.Encaps behavior.
End.B6.Encaps.Red reduces the size of the SRH by one SID by excluding
the first SID in the SRH of the new IPv6 header. Thus, the first
segment is only placed in the IPv6 Destination Address of the new
IPv6 header, and the packet is forwarded according to it.
The SRH Last Entry field is set as defined in
Section 4.1.1 of
[
RFC8754].
The SRH
MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one SID and
there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
4.15. End.BM: Endpoint Bound to an SR-MPLS Policy
The "Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy" behavior ("End.BM" for
short) is a variant of the End behavior.
The End.BM behavior is required to express scalable traffic-
engineering policies across multiple domains where some domains
support the MPLS instantiation of Segment Routing. This is an SRv6
instantiation of an SR-MPLS Binding SID [
RFC8402].
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with an SR-MPLS
Policy B.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.BM
SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed {
S02. If (Segments Left == 0) {
S03. Stop processing the SRH, and proceed to process the next
header in the packet, whose type is identified by
the Next Header field in the routing header.
S04. }
S05. If (IPv6 Hop Limit <= 1) {
S06. Send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Hop limit exceeded in transit),
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S07. }
S08. max_LE = (Hdr Ext Len / 2) - 1
S09. If ((Last Entry > max_LE) or (Segments Left > Last Entry+1)) {
S10. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address
with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered)
and Pointer set to the Segments Left field,
interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet.
S11. }
S12. Decrement IPv6 Hop Limit by 1
S13. Decrement Segments Left by 1
S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment List[Segments Left]
S15. Push the MPLS label stack for B
S16. Submit the packet to the MPLS engine for transmission
S17. }
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB
entry locally instantiated as an End.BM SID, process the packet as
per
Section 4.1.1.
The Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) of the SRH, Ultimate Segment Pop
(USP) of the SRH, and Ultimate Segment Decapsulation (USD) flavors
are variants of the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors. The End, End.X,
and End.T behaviors can support these flavors either individually or
in combinations.
4.16.1. PSP: Penultimate Segment Pop of the SRH
SR Segment Endpoint Nodes advertise the SIDs instantiated on them via
control-plane protocols as described in
Section 8. Different
behavior IDs are allocated for flavored and unflavored SIDs (see
Table 6).
An SR Segment Endpoint Node that offers both PSP- and non-PSP-
flavored behavior advertises them as two different SIDs.
The SR Segment Endpoint Node only advertises the PSP flavor if the
operator enables this capability at the node.
The PSP operation is deterministically controlled by the SR source
node.
A PSP-flavored SID is used by the SR source node when it needs to
instruct the penultimate SR Segment Endpoint Node listed in the SRH
to remove the SRH from the IPv6 header.
SR Segment Endpoint Nodes receive the IPv6 packet with the
Destination Address field of the IPv6 header equal to its SID
address.
A penultimate SR Segment Endpoint Node is one that, as part of the
SID processing, copies the last SID from the SRH into the IPv6
Destination Address and decrements the Segments Left value from one
to zero.
The PSP operation only takes place at a penultimate SR Segment
Endpoint Node and does not happen at any transit node. When a SID of
PSP flavor is processed at a non-penultimate SR Segment Endpoint
Node, the PSP behavior is not performed as described in the
pseudocode below since Segments Left would not be zero.
The SRH processing of the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors are
modified: after the instruction "S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment
List[Segments Left]" is executed, the following instructions must be
executed as well:
S14.1. If (Segments Left == 0) {
S14.2. Update the Next Header field in the preceding header to
the Next Header value from the SRH
S14.3. Decrease the IPv6 header Payload Length by
8*(Hdr Ext Len+1)
S14.4. Remove the SRH from the IPv6 extension header chain
S14.5. }
The usage of PSP does not increase the MTU of the IPv6 packet and
hence does not have any impact on the Path MTU (PMTU) discovery
mechanism.
As a reminder,
Section 5 of [
RFC8754] defines the SR Deployment Model
within the SR Domain [
RFC8402]. Within this framework, the
Authentication Header (AH) is not used to secure the SRH as described
in Section 7.5 of [
RFC8754]. Hence, the discussion of applicability
of PSP along with AH usage is beyond the scope of this document.
In the context of this specification, the End, End.X, and End.T
behaviors with PSP do not contravene
Section 4 of [
RFC8200] because
the destination address of the incoming packet is the address of the
node executing the behavior.
One use case for the PSP functionality is streamlining the operation
of an egress border router.
+----------------------------------------------------+
| |
+-+-+ +--+ +--+ +--+ +-+-+
|iPE+-------->+R2+-------->+R3+-------->+R4+-------->+ePE|
| R1| +--+ +--+ +--+ |R5 |
+-+-+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-+-+
| |IPv6 | |IPv6 | |IPv6 | |IPv6 | |
| |DA=R3| |DA=R3| |DA=R5| |DA=R5| |
| +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ |
| | SRH | | SRH | | IP | | IP | |
| |SL=1 | |SL=1 | +-----+ +-----+ |
| | R5 | | R5 | |
| +-----+ +-----+ |
| | IP | | IP | |
| +-----+ +-----+ |
| |
+----------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: PSP Use Case Topology
In the above illustration, for a packet sent from the ingress
provider edge (iPE) to the egress provider edge (ePE), node R3 is an
intermediate traffic-engineering waypoint and is the penultimate
segment endpoint router; this node copies the last segment from the
SRH into the IPv6 Destination Address and decrements Segments Left to
0. The Software-Defined Networking (SDN) controller knows that no
other node after R3 needs to inspect the SRH, and it instructs R3 to
remove the exhausted SRH from the packet by using a PSP-flavored SID.
The benefits for the egress PE are straightforward:
* As part of the decapsulation process, the egress PE is required to
parse and remove fewer bytes from the packet.
* If a lookup on an upper-layer IP header is required (e.g., per-VRF
VPN), the header is more likely to be within the memory accessible
to the lookup engine in the forwarding ASIC (Application-Specific
Integrated Circuit).
4.16.2. USP: Ultimate Segment Pop of the SRH
The SRH processing of the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors are
modified; the instructions S02-S04 are substituted by the following
ones:
S02. If (Segments Left == 0) {
S03.1. Update the Next Header field in the preceding header to
the Next Header value of the SRH
S03.2. Decrease the IPv6 header Payload Length by
8*(Hdr Ext Len+1)
S03.3. Remove the SRH from the IPv6 extension header chain
S03.4. Proceed to process the next header in the packet
S04. }
One of the applications of the USP flavor is when a packet with an
SRH is destined to an application on hosts with smartNICs ("Smart
Network Interface Cards") implementing SRv6. The USP flavor is used
to remove the consumed SRH from the extension header chain before
sending the packet to the host.
4.16.3. USD: Ultimate Segment Decapsulation
The Upper-Layer header processing of the End, End.X, and End.T
behaviors are modified as follows:
End:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S04. } Else if (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) {
S05. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S06. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S07. Else {
S08. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S09. }
End.T:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T
S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S05. } Else if (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) {
S06. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S07. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T
S08. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for
transmission to the new destination
S09. Else {
S10. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S11. }
End.X:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ||
Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) {
S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers
S03. Forward the exposed IP packet to the L3 adjacency J
S04. } Else {
S05. Process as per
Section 4.1.1 S06. }
One of the applications of the USD flavor is the case of a Topology
Independent Loop-Free Alternate (TI-LFA) in P routers with
encapsulation. The USD flavor allows the last SR Segment Endpoint
Node in the repair path list to decapsulate the IPv6 header added at
the TI-LFA Point of Local Repair and forward the inner packet.
5. SR Policy Headend Behaviors
This section describes a set of SRv6 Policy Headend [
RFC8402]
behaviors.
+-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| H.Encaps | SR Headend with Encapsulation in an SR Policy |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| H.Encaps.Red | H.Encaps with Reduced Encapsulation |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| H.Encaps.L2 | H.Encaps Applied to Received L2 Frames |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| H.Encaps.L2.Red | H.Encaps.Red Applied to Received L2 Frames |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
Table 2: SR Policy Headend Behaviors
This list is not exhaustive, and future documents may define
additional behaviors.
5.1. H.Encaps: SR Headend with Encapsulation in an SR Policy
Node N receives two packets P1=(A, B2) and P2=(A,B2)(B3, B2, B1;
SL=1). B2 is neither a local address nor SID of N.
Node N is configured with an IPv6 address T (e.g., assigned to its
loopback).
N steers the transit packets P1 and P2 into an SRv6 Policy with a
Source Address T and a segment list <S1, S2, S3>.
The H.Encaps encapsulation behavior is defined as follows:
S01. Push an IPv6 header with its own SRH
S02. Set outer IPv6 SA = T and outer IPv6 DA to the first SID
in the segment list
S03. Set outer Payload Length, Traffic Class, Hop Limit, and
Flow Label fields
S04. Set the outer Next Header value
S05. Decrement inner IPv6 Hop Limit or IPv4 TTL
S06. Submit the packet to the IPv6 module for transmission to S1
| Note:
|
| S03: As described in [
RFC2473] and [
RFC6437].
After the H.Encaps behavior, P1' and P2' respectively look like:
* (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2)
* (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)
The received packet is encapsulated unmodified (with the exception of
the IPv4 TTL or IPv6 Hop Limit that is decremented as described in
[
RFC2473]).
The H.Encaps behavior is valid for any kind of L3 traffic. This
behavior is commonly used for L3VPN with IPv4 and IPv6 deployments.
It may be also used for TI-LFA [SR-TI-LFA] at the Point of Local
Repair.
The push of the SRH
MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains
one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
5.2. H.Encaps.Red: H.Encaps with Reduced Encapsulation
The H.Encaps.Red behavior is an optimization of the H.Encaps
behavior.
H.Encaps.Red reduces the length of the SRH by excluding the first SID
in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 header. The first SID is only placed
in the Destination Address field of the pushed IPv6 header.
After the H.Encaps.Red behavior, P1' and P2' respectively look like:
* (T, S1) (S3, S2; SL=2) (A, B2)
* (T, S1) (S3, S2; SL=2) (A, B2) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)
The push of the SRH
MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains
one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
5.3. H.Encaps.L2: H.Encaps Applied to Received L2 Frames
The H.Encaps.L2 behavior encapsulates a received Ethernet
[IEEE.802.3_2018] frame and its attached VLAN header, if present, in
an IPv6 packet with an SRH. The Ethernet frame becomes the payload
of the new IPv6 packet.
The Next Header field of the SRH
MUST be set to 143.
The push of the SRH
MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains
one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
The encapsulating node
MUST remove the preamble (if any) and frame
check sequence (FCS) from the Ethernet frame upon encapsulation, and
the decapsulating node
MUST regenerate, as required, the preamble and
FCS before forwarding the Ethernet frame.
5.4. H.Encaps.L2.Red: H.Encaps.Red Applied to Received L2 Frames
The H.Encaps.L2.Red behavior is an optimization of the H.Encaps.L2
behavior.
H.Encaps.L2.Red reduces the length of the SRH by excluding the first
SID in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 header. The first SID is only
placed in the Destination Address field of the pushed IPv6 header.
The push of the SRH
MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains
one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
6. Counters
A node supporting this document
SHOULD implement a pair of traffic
counters (one for packets and one for bytes) per local SID entry, for
traffic that matched that SID and was processed successfully (i.e.,
packets that generate ICMP Error Messages or are dropped are not
counted). The retrieval of these counters from MIB, NETCONF/YANG, or
any other data structure is outside the scope of this document.
7. Flow-Based Hash Computation
When a flow-based selection within a set needs to be performed, the
IPv6 Source Address, the IPv6 Destination Address, and the IPv6 Flow
Label of the outer IPv6 header
MUST be included in the flow-based
hash.
This may occur in any of the following scenarios:
* A FIB lookup is performed and multiple ECMP paths exist to the
updated destination address.
* End.X, End.DX4, or End.DX6 is bound to an array of adjacencies.
* The packet is steered in an SR Policy whose selected path has
multiple SID lists.
Additionally, any transit router in an SRv6 domain includes the outer
flow label in its ECMP flow-based hash [
RFC6437].
8. Control Plane
In an SDN environment, one expects the controller to explicitly
provision the SIDs and/or discover them as part of a service
discovery function. Applications residing on top of the controller
could then discover the required SIDs and combine them to form a
distributed network program.
The concept of "SRv6 Network Programming" refers to the capability of
an application to encode any complex program as a set of individual
functions distributed through the network. Some functions relate to
underlay SLA, others to overlay/tenant, and others to complex
applications residing in VMs and containers.
While not necessary for an SDN control plane, the remainder of this
section provides a high-level illustrative overview of how control-
plane protocols may be involved with SRv6. Their specification is
outside the scope of this document.
The End, End.T, and End.X SIDs express topological behaviors and
hence are expected to be signaled in the IGP together with the
flavors PSP, USP, and USD. The IGP should also advertise the Maximum
SID Depth (MSD) capability of the node for each type of SRv6
operation -- in particular, the SR source (e.g., H.Encaps),
intermediate endpoint (e.g., End and End.X), and final endpoint
(e.g., End.DX4 and End.DT6) behaviors. These capabilities are
factored in by an SR source node (or a controller) during the SR
Policy computation.
The presence of SIDs in the IGP does not imply any routing semantics
to the addresses represented by these SIDs. The routing reachability
to an IPv6 address is solely governed by the non-SID-related IGP
prefix reachability information that includes locators. Routing is
neither governed nor influenced in any way by a SID advertisement in
the IGP.
These SIDs provide important topological behaviors for the IGP to
build Fast Reroute (FRR) solutions based on TI-LFA [SR-TI-LFA] and
for TE processes relying on an IGP topology database to build SR
Policies.
BGP-LS provides the functionality for topology discovery that
includes the SRv6 capabilities of the nodes, their locators, and
locally instantiated SIDs. This enables controllers or applications
to build an inter-domain topology that can be used for computation of
SR Policies using the SRv6 SIDs.
8.3. BGP IP/VPN/EVPN
The End.DX4, End.DX6, End.DT4, End.DT6, End.DT46, End.DX2, End.DX2V,
End.DT2U, and End.DT2M SIDs can be signaled in BGP.
In some scenarios, an egress PE advertising a VPN route might wish to
abstract the specific behavior bound to the SID from the ingress PE
and other routers in the network. In such case, the SID may be
advertised using the Opaque SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint defined
in Table 6. The details of such control-plane signaling mechanisms
are out of the scope of this document.
The following table summarizes which SID behaviors may be signaled in
which control-plane protocol.
+=======================+=====+========+=================+
| | IGP | BGP-LS | BGP IP/VPN/EVPN |
+=======================+=====+========+=================+
| End (PSP, USP, USD) | X | X | |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.X (PSP, USP, USD) | X | X | |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.T (PSP, USP, USD) | X | X | |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DX6 | X | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DX4 | X | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DT6 | X | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DT4 | X | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DT46 | X | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DX2 | | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DX2V | | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DT2U | | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.DT2M | | X | X |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.B6.Encaps | | X | |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.B6.Encaps.Red | | X | |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| End.B6.BM | | X | |
+-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
Table 3: SRv6 Locally Instantiated SIDs Signaling
The following table summarizes which SR Policy Headend capabilities
may be signaled in which control-plane protocol.
+=================+=====+========+=================+
| | IGP | BGP-LS | BGP IP/VPN/EVPN |
+=================+=====+========+=================+
| H.Encaps | X | X | |
+-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| H.Encaps.Red | X | X | |
+-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| H.Encaps.L2 | | X | |
+-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
| H.Encaps.L2.Red | | X | |
+-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
Table 4: SRv6 Policy Headend Behaviors Signaling
The previous table describes generic capabilities. It does not
describe specific instantiated SR Policies.
For example, a BGP-LS advertisement of H.Encaps behavior would
describe the capability of node N to perform H.Encaps behavior.
Specifically, it would describe how many SIDs could be pushed by N
without significant performance degradation.
As a reminder, an SR Policy is always assigned a Binding SID
[
RFC8402]. Binding SIDs are also advertised in BGP-LS as shown in
Table 3. Hence, Table 4 only focuses on the generic capabilities
related to H.Encaps.
9. Security Considerations
The security considerations for Segment Routing are discussed in
[
RFC8402].
Section 5 of [
RFC8754] describes the SR Deployment Model
and the requirements for securing the SR Domain. The security
considerations of [
RFC8754] also cover topics such as attack vectors
and their mitigation mechanisms that also apply the behaviors
introduced in this document. Together, they describe the required
security mechanisms that allow establishment of an SR domain of
trust. Having such a well-defined trust boundary is necessary in
order to operate SRv6-based services for internal traffic while
preventing any external traffic from accessing or exploiting the
SRv6-based services. Care and rigor in IPv6 address allocation for
use for SRv6 SID allocations and network infrastructure addresses, as
distinct from IPv6 addresses allocated for end users and systems (as
illustrated in
Section 5.1 of [
RFC8754]), can provide the clear
distinction between internal and external address space that is
required to maintain the integrity and security of the SRv6 Domain.
Additionally, [
RFC8754] defines a Hashed Message Authentication Code
(HMAC) TLV permitting SR Segment Endpoint Nodes in the SR domain to
verify that the SRH applied to a packet was selected by an authorized
party and to ensure that the segment list is not modified after
generation, regardless of the number of segments in the segment list.
When enabled by local configuration, HMAC processing occurs at the
beginning of SRH processing as defined in Section 2.1.2.1 of
[
RFC8754].
This document introduces SRv6 Endpoint and SR Policy Headend
behaviors for implementation on SRv6-capable nodes in the network.
The definition of the SR Policy Headend should be consistent with the
specific behavior used and any local configuration (as specified in
Section 4.1.1). As such, this document does not introduce any new
security considerations.
The SID behaviors specified in this document have the same HMAC TLV
handling and mutability properties with regard to the Flags, Tag, and
Segment List field as the SID behavior specified in [
RFC8754].
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. Ethernet Next Header Type
IANA has allocated "Ethernet" (value 143) in the "Assigned Internet
Protocol Numbers" registry (see <
https://www.iana.org/assignments/ protocol-numbers/>). Value 143 in the Next Header field of an IPv6
header or any extension header indicates that the payload is an
Ethernet frame [IEEE.802.3_2018].
10.2. SRv6 Endpoint Behaviors Registry
IANA has created a new top-level registry called "Segment Routing"
(see <
https://www.iana.org/assignments/segment-routing/>). This
registry serves as a top-level registry for all Segment Routing
subregistries.
Additionally, IANA has created a new subregistry called "SRv6
Endpoint Behaviors" under the top-level "Segment Routing" registry.
This subregistry maintains 16-bit identifiers for the SRv6 Endpoint
behaviors. This registry is established to provide consistency for
control-plane protocols that need to refer to these behaviors. These
values are not encoded in the function bits within a SID.
10.2.1. Registration Procedures
The range of the registry is 0-65535 (0x0000-0xFFFF). The table
below contains the allocation ranges and registration policies
[
RFC8126] for each:
+=============+===============+=========================+===========+
| Range | Range (Hex) | Registration | Note |
| | | Procedures | |
+=============+===============+=========================+===========+
| 0 | 0x0000 | Reserved | Not to be |
| | | | allocated |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 1-32767 | 0x0001-0x7FFF | First Come | |
| | | First Served | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 32768-34815 | 0x8000-0x87FF | Private Use | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 34816-65534 | 0x8800-0xFFFE | Reserved | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 65535 | 0xFFFF | Reserved | Opaque |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 5: Registration Procedures
10.2.2. Initial Registrations
The initial registrations for the subregistry are as follows:
+=============+===============+=========================+===========+
| Value | Hex | Endpoint Behavior | Reference |
+=============+===============+=========================+===========+
| 0 | 0x0000 | Reserved | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 1 | 0x0001 | End |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 2 | 0x0002 | End with PSP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 3 | 0x0003 | End with USP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 4 | 0x0004 | End with PSP & USP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 5 | 0x0005 | End.X |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 6 | 0x0006 | End.X with PSP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 7 | 0x0007 | End.X with USP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 8 | 0x0008 | End.X with PSP & USP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 9 | 0x0009 | End.T |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 10 | 0x000A | End.T with PSP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 11 | 0x000B | End.T with USP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 12 | 0x000C | End.T with PSP & USP |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 13 | 0x000D | Unassigned | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 14 | 0x000E | End.B6.Encaps |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 15 | 0x000F | End.BM |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 16 | 0x0010 | End.DX6 |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 17 | 0x0011 | End.DX4 |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 18 | 0x0012 | End.DT6 |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 19 | 0x0013 | End.DT4 |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 20 | 0x0014 | End.DT46 |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 21 | 0x0015 | End.DX2 |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 22 | 0x0016 | End.DX2V |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 23 | 0x0017 | End.DT2U |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 24 | 0x0018 | End.DT2M |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 25 | 0x0019 | Reserved |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 26 | 0x001A | Unassigned | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 27 | 0x001B | End.B6.Encaps.Red |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 28 | 0x001C | End with USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 29 | 0x001D | End with PSP & USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 30 | 0x001E | End with USP & USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 31 | 0x001F | End with PSP, USP & |
RFC 8986 |
| | | USD | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 32 | 0x0020 | End.X with USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 33 | 0x0021 | End.X with PSP & USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 34 | 0x0022 | End.X with USP & USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 35 | 0x0023 | End.X with PSP, USP |
RFC 8986 |
| | | & USD | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 36 | 0x0024 | End.T with USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 37 | 0x0025 | End.T with PSP & USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 38 | 0x0026 | End.T with USP & USD |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 39 | 0x0027 | End.T with PSP, USP |
RFC 8986 |
| | | & USD | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 40-32766 | 0x0028-0x7FFE | Unassigned | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 32767 | 0x7FFF | The SID defined in |
RFC 8986, |
| | |
RFC 8754 |
RFC 8754 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 32768-34815 | 0x8000-0x87FF | Reserved for Private |
RFC 8986 |
| | | Use | |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 34816-65534 | 0x8800-0xFFFE | Reserved |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| 65535 | 0xFFFF | Opaque |
RFC 8986 |
+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 6: Initial Registrations
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[IEEE.802.3_2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Ethernet", IEEE 802.3-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8457469, 31 August 2018,
<
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8457469>.
[
RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[
RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
IPv6 Specification",
RFC 2473, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2473,
December 1998, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2473>.
[
RFC6437] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
"IPv6 Flow Label Specification",
RFC 6437,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC6437, November 2011,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>.
[
RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14,
RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8174,
May 2017, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[
RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86,
RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC8200, July 2017,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[
RFC8402] Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Ginsberg, L.,
Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment
Routing Architecture",
RFC 8402, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8402,
July 2018, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402>.
[
RFC8754] Filsfils, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J.,
Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header
(SRH)",
RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8754, March 2020,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8754>.
11.2. Informative References
[
RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses",
RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/
RFC4193, October 2005,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[
RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs)",
RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/
RFC4364, February
2006, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.
[
RFC4664] Andersson, L., Ed. and E. Rosen, Ed., "Framework for Layer
2 Virtual Private Networks (L2VPNs)",
RFC 4664,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC4664, September 2006,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4664>.
[
RFC4761] Kompella, K., Ed. and Y. Rekhter, Ed., "Virtual Private
LAN Service (VPLS) Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and
Signaling",
RFC 4761, DOI 10.17487/
RFC4761, January 2007,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4761>.
[
RFC4762] Lasserre, M., Ed. and V. Kompella, Ed., "Virtual Private
LAN Service (VPLS) Using Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)
Signaling",
RFC 4762, DOI 10.17487/
RFC4762, January 2007,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4762>.
[
RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A.,
Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based
Ethernet VPN",
RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7432, February
2015, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7432>.
[
RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8126, June 2017,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[
RFC8214] Boutros, S., Sajassi, A., Salam, S., Drake, J., and J.
Rabadan, "Virtual Private Wire Service Support in Ethernet
VPN",
RFC 8214, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8214, August 2017,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8214>.
[
RFC8317] Sajassi, A., Ed., Salam, S., Drake, J., Uttaro, J.,
Boutros, S., and J. Rabadan, "Ethernet-Tree (E-Tree)
Support in Ethernet VPN (EVPN) and Provider Backbone
Bridging EVPN (PBB-EVPN)",
RFC 8317, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8317,
January 2018, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8317>.
[SR-TI-LFA]
Litkowski, S., Bashandy, A., Filsfils, C., Francois, P.,
Decraene, B., and D. Voyer, "Topology Independent Fast
Reroute using Segment Routing", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rtgwg-segment-routing-ti-lfa-
06, 1 February 2021, <
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft- ietf-rtgwg-segment-routing-ti-lfa-06>.
[SRV6-NET-PGM-ILLUST]
Filsfils, C., Camarillo, P., Ed., Li, Z., Matsushima, S.,
Decraene, B., Steinberg, D., Lebrun, D., Raszuk, R., and
J. Leddy, "Illustrations for SRv6 Network Programming",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-filsfils-spring-
srv6-net-pgm-illustration-03, 25 September 2020,
<
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-filsfils-spring-srv6- net-pgm-illustration-03>.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge Stefano Previdi, Dave Barach,
Mark Townsley, Peter Psenak, Thierry Couture, Kris Michielsen, Paul
Wells, Robert Hanzl, Dan Ye, Gaurav Dawra, Faisal Iqbal, Jaganbabu
Rajamanickam, David Toscano, Asif Islam, Jianda Liu, Yunpeng Zhang,
Jiaoming Li, Narendra A.K, Mike Mc Gourty, Bhupendra Yadav, Sherif
Toulan, Satish Damodaran, John Bettink, Kishore Nandyala Veera Venk,
Jisu Bhattacharya, Saleem Hafeez, and Brian Carpenter.
Contributors
Daniel Bernier
Bell Canada
Canada
Email: daniel.bernier@bell.ca
Dirk Steinberg
Lapishills Consulting Limited
Cyprus
Email: dirk@lapishills.com
Robert Raszuk
Bloomberg LP
United States of America
Email: robert@raszuk.net
Bruno Decraene
Orange
France
Email: bruno.decraene@orange.com
Bart Peirens
Proximus
Belgium
Email: bart.peirens@proximus.com
Hani Elmalky
Google
United States of America
Email: helmalky@google.com
Prem Jonnalagadda
Barefoot Networks
United States of America
Email: prem@barefootnetworks.com
Milad Sharif
SambaNova Systems
United States of America
Email: milad.sharif@sambanova.ai
David Lebrun
Google
Belgium
Email: dlebrun@google.com
Stefano Salsano
Universita di Roma "Tor Vergata"
Italy
Email: stefano.salsano@uniroma2.it
Ahmed AbdelSalam
Gran Sasso Science Institute
Italy
Email: ahmed.abdelsalam@gssi.it
Gaurav Naik
Drexel University
United States of America
Email: gn@drexel.edu
Arthi Ayyangar
Arrcus, Inc
United States of America
Email: arthi@arrcus.com
Satish Mynam
Arrcus, Inc
United States of America
Email: satishm@arrcus.com
Wim Henderickx
Nokia
Belgium
Email: wim.henderickx@nokia.com
Shaowen Ma
Juniper
Singapore
Email: mashao@juniper.net
Ahmed Bashandy
Individual
United States of America
Email: abashandy.ietf@gmail.com
Francois Clad
Cisco Systems, Inc.
France
Email: fclad@cisco.com
Kamran Raza
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Canada
Email: skraza@cisco.com
Darren Dukes
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Canada
Email: ddukes@cisco.com
Patrice Brissete
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Canada
Email: pbrisset@cisco.com
Zafar Ali
Cisco Systems, Inc.
United States of America
Email: zali@cisco.com
Ketan Talaulikar
Cisco Systems, Inc.
India
Email: ketant@cisco.com
Authors' Addresses
Clarence Filsfils (editor)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Belgium
Email: cf@cisco.com
Pablo Camarillo Garvia (editor)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Spain
Email: pcamaril@cisco.com
John Leddy
Akamai Technologies
United States of America
Email: john@leddy.net
Daniel Voyer
Bell Canada
Canada
Email: daniel.voyer@bell.ca
Satoru Matsushima
SoftBank
Japan
Email: satoru.matsushima@g.softbank.co.jp
Zhenbin Li
Huawei Technologies
China