Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Haberman, Ed.
Request for Comments:
9327 JHU
Category: Historic November 2022
ISSN: 2070-1721
Control Messages Protocol for Use with Network Time Protocol Version 4
Abstract
This document describes the structure of the control messages that
were historically used with the Network Time Protocol (NTP) before
the advent of more modern control and management approaches. These
control messages have been used to monitor and control the NTP
application running on any IP network attached computer. The
information in this document was originally described in
Appendix B of RFC 1305. The goal of this document is to provide an updated
description of the control messages described in
RFC 1305 in order to
conform with the updated NTP specification documented in
RFC 5905.
The publication of this document is not meant to encourage the
development and deployment of these control messages. This document
is only providing a current reference for these control messages
given the current status of
RFC 1305.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for the historical record.
This document defines a Historic Document for the Internet community.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
Standard; see
Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9327.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Terminology
1.2. Control Message Overview
1.3. Remote Facility Message Overview
2. NTP Control Message Format
3. Status Words
3.1. System Status Word
3.2. Peer Status Word
3.3. Clock Status Word
3.4. Error Status Word
4. Commands
5. IANA Considerations
6. Security Considerations
7. References
7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References
Appendix A. NTP Remote Facility Message Format
Acknowledgements
Contributors
Author's Address
1. Introduction
[
RFC1305] describes a set of control messages for use within the
Network Time Protocol (NTP) when a comprehensive network management
solution was not available. The definitions of these control
messages were not promulgated to [
RFC5905] when NTP version 4 was
documented. These messages were intended for use only in systems
where no other management facilities were available or appropriate,
such as in dedicated-function bus peripherals. Support for these
messages is not required in order to conform to [
RFC5905]. The
control messages are described here as a current reference for use
with an implementation of NTP from
RFC 5905.
The publication of this document is not meant to encourage the
development and deployment of these control messages. This document
is only providing a current reference for these control messages
given the current status of
RFC 1305.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "
MUST", "
MUST NOT", "
REQUIRED", "
SHALL", "
SHALL NOT",
"
SHOULD", "
SHOULD NOT", "
RECOMMENDED", "
NOT RECOMMENDED", "
MAY", and
"
OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [
RFC2119] [
RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Control Message Overview
The NTP mode 6 control messages are used by NTP management programs
(e.g., ntpq) when a more robust network management facility (e.g.,
SNMP) is not available. These control messages provide rudimentary
control and monitoring functions to manage a running instance of an
NTP server. These commands are not designed to be used for
communication between instances of running NTP servers.
The NTP control message has the value 6 specified in the mode field
of the first octet of the NTP header and is formatted as shown in
Figure 1. The format of the data field is specific to each command
or response; however, in most cases, the format is designed to be
constructed and viewed by humans and so is coded in free-form ASCII.
This facilitates the specification and implementation of simple
management tools in the absence of fully evolved network-management
facilities. As in ordinary NTP messages, the authenticator field
follows the data field. If the authenticator is used, the data field
is zero-padded to a 32-bit boundary, but the padding bits are not
considered part of the data field and are not included in the field
count.
IP hosts are not required to reassemble datagrams over a certain size
(576 octets for IPv4 [
RFC0791] and 1280 octets for IPv6 [
RFC8200]);
however, some commands or responses may involve more data than will
fit into a single datagram. Accordingly, a simple reassembly feature
is included in which each octet of the message data is numbered
starting with zero. As each fragment is transmitted, the number of
its first octet is inserted in the offset field and the number of
octets is inserted in the count field. The more-data (M) bit is set
in all fragments except the last.
Most control functions involve sending a command and receiving a
response, perhaps involving several fragments. The sender chooses a
distinct, nonzero sequence number and sets the status field, "R" bit,
and "E" bit to zero. The responder interprets the opcode and
additional information in the data field, updates the status field,
sets the "R" bit to one and returns the three 32-bit words of the
header along with additional information in the data field. In the
case of invalid message format or contents, the responder inserts a
code in the status field, sets the "R" and "E" bits to one and,
optionally, inserts a diagnostic message in the data field.
Some commands read or write system variables (e.g., s.offset) and
peer variables (e.g., p.stratum) for an association identified in the
command. Others read or write variables associated with a radio
clock or other device directly connected to a source of primary
synchronization information. To identify which type of variable and
association, the Association ID is used. System variables are
indicated by the identifier zero. As each association is mobilized a
unique, nonzero identifier is created for it. These identifiers are
used in a cyclic fashion, so that the chance of using an old
identifier that matches a newly created association is remote. A
management entity can request a list of current identifiers and
subsequently use them to read and write variables for each
association. An attempt to use an expired identifier results in an
exception response, following which the list can be requested again.
Some exception events, such as when a peer becomes reachable or
unreachable, occur spontaneously and are not necessarily associated
with a command. An implementation may elect to save the event
information for later retrieval, to send an asynchronous response
(called a trap), or both. In case of a trap, the IP address and port
number are determined by a previous command and the sequence field is
set as described below. Current status and summary information for
the latest exception event is returned in all normal responses. Bits
in the status field indicate whether an exception has occurred since
the last response and whether more than one exception has occurred.
Commands need not necessarily be sent by an NTP peer, so ordinary
access-control procedures may not apply; however, the optional mask/
match mechanism suggested in
Section 6 provides the capability to
control access by mode number, so this could be used to limit access
for control messages (mode 6) to selected address ranges.
1.3. Remote Facility Message Overview
The original development of the NTP daemon included a Remote Facility
for monitoring and configuration. This facility used mode 7 commands
to communicate with the NTP daemon. This document illustrates the
mode 7 packet format only. The commands embedded in the mode 7
messages are implementation specific and not standardized in any way.
The mode 7 message format is described in
Appendix A.
2. NTP Control Message Format
The format of the NTP Control Message header, which immediately
follows the UDP header, is shown in Figure 1. Following the figure
is a description of its header fields.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|LI | VN |Mode |R|E|M| opcode | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Status | Association ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Offset | Count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Data (up to 468 bytes) /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding (optional) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Authenticator (optional, 20 or 24 bits) /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: NTP Control Message Header
Leap Indicator (LI):
This is a 2-bit integer that is set to b00 for control message
requests and responses. The Leap Indicator value used at this
position in most NTP modes is in the system status word provided
in some control message responses.
Version Number (VN):
This is a 3-bit integer indicating a minimum NTP version number.
NTP servers do not respond to control messages with an
unrecognized version number. Requests may intentionally use a
lower version number to enable interoperability with earlier
versions of NTP. Responses carry the same version as the
corresponding request.
Mode:
This is a 3-bit integer indicating the mode. The value 6
indicates an NTP control message.
Response Bit (R):
Set to zero for commands; set to one for responses.
Error Bit (E):
Set to zero for normal responses; set to one for an error
response.
More Bit (M):
Set to zero for the last fragment; set to one for all others.
Operation Code (opcode):
This is a 5-bit integer specifying the command function. Values
currently defined include the following:
+=======+================================================+
| Code | Meaning |
+=======+================================================+
| 0 | reserved |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | read status command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | read variables command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | write variables command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 4 | read clock variables command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 5 | write clock variables command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 6 | set trap address/port command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 7 | trap response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 8 | runtime configuration command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 9 | export configuration to file command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 10 | retrieve remote address stats command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 11 | retrieve ordered list command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 12 | request client-specific nonce command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 13-30 | reserved |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 31 | unset trap address/port command/response |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Operation Codes
Sequence Number:
This is a 16-bit integer indicating the sequence number of the
command or response. Each request uses a different sequence
number. Each response carries the same sequence number as its
corresponding request. For asynchronous trap responses, the
responder increments the sequence number by one for each response,
allowing trap receivers to detect missing trap responses. The
sequence number of each fragment of a multiple-datagram response
carries the same sequence number, copied from the request.
Status:
This is a 16-bit code indicating the current status of the system,
peer, or clock with values coded as described in following
sections.
Association ID:
This is a 16-bit unsigned integer identifying a valid association
or zero for the system clock.
Offset:
This is a 16-bit unsigned integer indicating the offset, in
octets, of the first octet in the data area. The offset is set to
zero in requests. Responses spanning multiple datagrams use a
positive offset in all but the first datagram.
Count:
This is a 16-bit unsigned integer indicating the length of the
data field, in octets.
Data:
This contains the message data for the command or response. The
maximum number of data octets is 468.
Padding (optional):
Contains zero to 3 octets with a value of zero, as needed to
ensure the overall control message size is a multiple of 4 octets.
Authenticator (optional):
When the NTP authentication mechanism is implemented, this
contains the authenticator information defined in Appendix C of
[
RFC1305].
3. Status Words
Status words indicate the present status of the system, associations,
and clock. They are designed to be interpreted by network-monitoring
programs and are in one of four 16-bit formats shown in Figure 2 and
described in this section. System and peer status words are
associated with responses for all commands except the read clock
variables, write clock variables, and set trap address/port commands.
The association identifier zero specifies the system status word,
while a nonzero identifier specifies a particular peer association.
The status word returned in response to read clock variables and
write clock variables commands indicates the state of the clock
hardware and decoding software. A special error status word is used
to report malformed command fields or invalid values.
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LI| Clock Src | Count | Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
System Status Word
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Status | SEL | Count | Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Peer Status Word
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Clock Status | Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Radio Status Word
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Error Status Word
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Count | Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Clock Status Word
Figure 2: Status Word Formats
3.1. System Status Word
The system status word appears in the status field of the response to
a read status or read variables command with a zero association
identifier. The format of the system status word is as follows:
Leap Indicator (LI):
This is a 2-bit code warning of an impending leap second to be
inserted/deleted in the last minute of the current day, with bit 0
and bit 1, respectively, coded as follows:
+====+=================================================+
| LI | Meaning |
+====+=================================================+
| 00 | no warning |
+----+-------------------------------------------------+
| 01 | insert second after 23:59:59 of the current day |
+----+-------------------------------------------------+
| 10 | delete second 23:59:59 of the current day |
+----+-------------------------------------------------+
| 11 | unsynchronized |
+----+-------------------------------------------------+
Table 2: Leap Indicator Codes
Clock Source (Clock Src):
This is a 6-bit integer indicating the current synchronization
source, with values coded as follows:
+=======+========================================================+
| Code | Meaning |
+=======+========================================================+
| 0 | unspecified or unknown |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | Calibrated atomic clock (e.g., PPS, HP 5061) |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | VLF (band 4) or LF (band 5) radio (e.g., OMEGA,, WWVB) |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | HF (band 7) radio (e.g., CHU, MSF, WWV/H) |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 | UHF (band 9) satellite (e.g., GOES, GPS) |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 5 | local net (e.g., DCN, TSP, DTS) |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 6 | UDP/NTP |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 7 | UDP/TIME |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 8 | eyeball-and-wristwatch |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 9 | telephone modem (e.g., NIST) |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 10-63 | reserved |
+-------+--------------------------------------------------------+
Table 3: Clock Source Values
System Event Counter (Count):
This is a 4-bit integer indicating the number of system events
occurring since the last time the System Event Code changed. Upon
reaching 15, subsequent events with the same code are not counted.
System Event Code (Code):
This is a 4-bit integer identifying the latest system exception
event, with new values overwriting previous values, and coded as
follows:
+======+============================================================+
| Code | Meaning |
+======+============================================================+
| 0 | unspecified |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | frequency correction (drift) file not available |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | frequency correction started (frequency stepped) |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | spike detected and ignored, starting stepout timer |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 | frequency training started |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 5 | clock synchronized |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 6 | system restart |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 7 | panic stop (required step greater than panic threshold) |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 8 | no system peer |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 9 | leap second insertion/deletion armed for the current |
| | month |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 | leap second disarmed |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 11 | leap second inserted or deleted |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 12 | clock stepped (stepout timer expired) |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 13 | kernel loop discipline status changed |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 14 | leapseconds table loaded from file |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 15 | leapseconds table outdated, updated file needed |
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+
Table 4: System Event Codes
3.2. Peer Status Word
A peer status word is returned in the status field of a response to a
read status, read variables, or write variables command and appears
in the list of Association IDs and status words returned by a read
status command with a zero Association ID. The format of a peer
status word is as follows:
Peer Status (Status):
This is a 5-bit code indicating the status of the peer determined
by the packet procedure, with bits assigned as follows:
+=================+==========================================+
| Peer Status bit | Meaning |
+=================+==========================================+
| 0 | configured (peer.config) |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| 1 | authentication enabled (peer.authenable) |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| 2 | authentication okay (peer.authentic) |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| 3 | reachability okay (peer.reach != 0) |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| 4 | broadcast association |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------+
Table 5: Peer Status Bits
Peer Selection (SEL):
This is a 3-bit integer indicating the status of the peer
determined by the clock-selection procedure, with values coded as
follows:
+=====+=======================================================+
| Sel | Meaning |
+=====+=======================================================+
| 0 | rejected |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | discarded by intersection algorithm |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | discarded by table overflow (not currently used) |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | discarded by the cluster algorithm |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 | included by the combine algorithm |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 5 | backup source (with more than sys.maxclock survivors) |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 6 | system peer (synchronization source) |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
| 7 | PPS (pulse per second) peer |
+-----+-------------------------------------------------------+
Table 6: Peer Selection Values
Peer Event Counter (Count):
This is a 4-bit integer indicating the number of peer exception
events that occurred since the last time the peer event code
changed. Upon reaching 15, subsequent events with the same code
are not counted.
Peer Event Code (Code):
This is a 4-bit integer identifying the latest peer exception
event, with new values overwriting previous values, and coded as
follows:
+=================+===================================+
| Peer Event Code | Meaning |
+=================+===================================+
| 0 | unspecified |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 1 | association mobilized |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 2 | association demobilized |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 3 | peer unreachable (peer.reach was |
| | nonzero now zero) |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 4 | peer reachable (peer.reach was |
| | zero now nonzero) |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 5 | association restarted or timed |
| | out |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 6 | no reply (only used with one-shot |
| | clock set command) |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 7 | peer rate limit exceeded (kiss |
| | code RATE received) |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 8 | access denied (kiss code DENY |
| | received) |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 9 | leap second insertion/deletion at |
| | month's end armed by peer vote |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 10 | became system peer (sys.peer) |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 11 | reference clock event (see clock |
| | status word) |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 12 | authentication failed |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 13 | popcorn spike suppressed by peer |
| | clock filter register |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 14 | entering interleaved mode |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
| 15 | recovered from interleave error |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+
Table 7: Peer Event Code Values
3.3. Clock Status Word
There are two ways a reference clock can be attached to an NTP
service host: as a dedicated device managed by the operating system
and as a synthetic peer managed by NTP. As in the read status
command, the Association ID is used to identify the correct variable
for each clock: zero for the system clock and nonzero for a peer
clock. Only one system clock is supported by the protocol, although
many peer clocks can be supported. A system or peer clock status
word appears in the status field of the response to a read clock
variables or write clock variables command. This word can be
considered to be an extension of the system status word or the peer
status word as appropriate. The format of the clock status word is
as follows:
Reserved:
This is an 8-bit integer that is ignored by requesters and zeroed
by responders.
Count:
This is a 4-bit integer indicating the number of clock events that
occurred since the last time the clock event code changed. Upon
reaching 15, subsequent events with the same code are not counted.
Clock Code (Code):
This is a 4-bit integer indicating the current clock status, with
values coded as follows:
+==============+=================================+
| Clock Status | Meaning |
+==============+=================================+
| 0 | clock operating within nominals |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
| 1 | reply timeout |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
| 2 | bad reply format |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
| 3 | hardware or software fault |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
| 4 | propagation failure |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
| 5 | bad date format or value |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
| 6 | bad time format or value |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
| 7-15 | reserved |
+--------------+---------------------------------+
Table 8: Clock Code Values
3.4. Error Status Word
An error status word is returned in the status field of an error
response as the result of invalid message format or contents. Its
presence is indicated when the E (error) bit is set along with the
response (R) bit in the response. It consists of an 8-bit integer
coded as follows:
+==============+==================================+
| Error Status | Meaning |
+==============+==================================+
| 0 | unspecified |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 1 | authentication failure |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 2 | invalid message length or format |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 3 | invalid opcode |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 4 | unknown Association ID |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 5 | unknown variable name |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 6 | invalid variable value |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 7 | administratively prohibited |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
| 8-255 | reserved |
+--------------+----------------------------------+
Table 9: Error Status Word Codes
4. Commands
Commands consist of the header and optional data field shown in
Figure 1. When present, the data field contains a list of
identifiers or assignments in the form
<<identifier>>[=<<value>>],<<identifier>>[=<<value>>],... where
<<identifier>> is the ASCII name of a system or peer variable such as
the ones specified in
RFC 5905 and <<value>> is expressed as a
decimal, hexadecimal, or string constant in the syntax of the C
programming language. Where no ambiguity exists, the "sys." or
"peer." prefixes can be suppressed. Space characters (ASCII
nonprinting format effectors) can be added to improve readability for
simple monitoring programs that do not reformat the data field.
Representations of note are as follows:
* IPv4 internet addresses are written in the form [n.n.n.n], where n
is in decimal notation and the brackets are optional
* IPv6 internet addresses are formulated based on the guidelines
defined in [
RFC5952].
* Timestamps (including reference, originate, receive, and transmit
values) and the logical clock are represented in units of seconds
and fractions, preferably in hexadecimal notation.
* Delay, offset, dispersion, and distance values are represented in
units of milliseconds and fractions, preferably in decimal
notation.
* All other values are represented as is, preferably in decimal
notation.
Implementations may define variables other than those described in
RFC 5905; called "extramural variables", these are distinguished by
the inclusion of some character type other than alphanumeric or "."
in the name. For those commands that return a list of assignments in
the response data field, if the command data field is empty, it is
expected that all available variables defined in
RFC 5905 will be
included in the response. For the read commands, if the command data
field is nonempty, an implementation may choose to process this field
to individually select which variables are to be returned.
Commands are interpreted as follows:
Read Status (1):
The command data field is empty or contains a list of identifiers
separated by commas. The command operates in two ways depending
on the value of the Association ID. If this identifier is
nonzero, the response includes the peer identifier and status
word. Optionally, the response data field may contain other
information, such as described in the Read Variables command. If
the association identifier is zero, the response includes the
system identifier (0) and status word; the data field contains a
list of binary-coded pairs <<Association ID>> <<status word>>, one
for each currently defined association.
Read Variables (2):
The command data field is empty or contains a list of identifiers
separated by commas. If the Association ID is nonzero, the
response includes the requested peer identifier and status word;
the data field contains a list of peer variables and values as
described above. If the Association ID is zero, the data field
contains a list of system variables. If a peer has been selected
as the synchronization source, the response includes the peer
identifier and status word; otherwise, the response includes the
system identifier (0) and status word.
Write Variables (3):
The command data field contains a list of assignments as described
above. The variables are updated as indicated. The response is
as described for the Read Variables command.
Read Clock Variables (4):
The command data field is empty or contains a list of identifiers
separated by commas. The Association ID selects the system clock
variables or peer clock variables in the same way as in the Read
Variables command. The response includes the requested clock
identifier and status word; the data field contains a list of
clock variables and values, including the last timecode message
received from the clock.
Write Clock Variables (5):
The command data field contains a list of assignments as described
above. The clock variables are updated as indicated. The
response is as described for the read clock variables command.
Set Trap Address/Port (6):
The command Association ID, status, and data fields are ignored.
The address and port number for subsequent trap messages are taken
from the source address and port of the control message itself.
The initial trap counter for trap response messages is taken from
the sequence field of the command. The response association
identifier, status, and data fields are not significant.
Implementations should include logical timeouts that prevent trap
transmissions if the monitoring program does not renew this
information after a lengthy interval.
Trap Response (7):
This message is sent when a system, peer, or clock exception event
occurs. The opcode field is 7 and the R bit is set. The trap
counter is incremented by one for each trap sent and the sequence
field set to that value. The trap message is sent using the IP
address and port fields established by the set trap address/port
command. If a system trap, the Association ID field is set to
zero and the status field contains the system status word. If a
peer trap, the Association ID field is set to that peer and the
status field contains the peer status word. Optional ASCII-coded
information can be included in the data field.
Configure (8):
The command data is parsed and applied as if supplied in the
daemon configuration file.
Save Configuration (9):
Writes a snapshot of the current configuration to the file name
supplied as the command data. Further, the command is refused
unless a directory in which to store the resulting files has been
explicitly configured by the operator.
Read Most Recently Used (MRU) list (10):
Retrieves records of recently seen remote addresses and associated
statistics. This command supports all of the state variables
defined in Section 9 of [
RFC5905]. Command data consists of
name=value pairs controlling the selection of records, as well as
a requestor-specific nonce previously retrieved using this command
or opcode 12 (Request Nonce). The response consists of name=value
pairs where some names can appear multiple times using a dot
followed by a zero-based index to distinguish them and to
associate elements of the same record with the same index. A new
nonce is provided with each successful response.
Read ordered list (11):
Retrieves a list ordered by IP address (IPv4 information precedes
IPv6 information). If the command data is empty or is the seven
characters "ifstats", the associated statistics, status, and
counters for each local address are returned. If the command data
is the characters "addr_restrictions", then the set of IPv4 remote
address restrictions followed by the set of IPv6 remote address
restrictions (access control lists) are returned. Other command
data returns error code 5 (unknown variable name). Similar to
Read MRU, response information uses zero-based indexes as part of
the variable name preceding the equals sign and value, where each
index relates information for a single address or network. This
opcode requires authentication.
Request Nonce (12):
Retrieves a 96-bit nonce specific to the requesting remote
address, which is valid for a limited period. Command data is not
used in the request. The nonce consists of a 64-bit NTP timestamp
and 32 bits of hash derived from that timestamp, the remote
address, and salt known only to the server, which varies between
daemon runs. Inclusion of the nonce by a management agent
demonstrates to the server that the agent can receive datagrams
sent to the source address of the request, making source address
"spoofing" more difficult in a similar way as TCP's three-way
handshake.
Unset Trap (31):
Removes the requesting remote address and port from the list of
trap receivers. Command data is not used in the request. If the
address and port are not in the list of trap receivers, the error
code is 4 (bad association).
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. Security Considerations
A number of security vulnerabilities have been identified with these
control messages.
NTP's control query interface allows reading and writing of system,
peer, and clock variables remotely from arbitrary IP addresses using
commands mentioned in
Section 4. Overwriting these variables, but
not reading them, requires authentication by default. However, this
document argues that an NTP host must authenticate all control
queries and not just ones that overwrite these variables.
Alternatively, the host can use an access control list to explicitly
list IP addresses that are allowed to control query the clients.
These access controls are required for the following reasons:
NTP as a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) vector:
NTP timing query and response packets (modes 1-2, 3-4, and 5) are
usually short in size. However, some NTP control queries generate
a very long packet in response to a short query. As such, there
is a history of use of NTP's control queries, which exhibit such
behavior, to perform DoS attacks. These off-path attacks exploit
the large size of NTP control queries to cause UDP-based
amplification attacks (e.g., mode 7 monlist command generates a
very long packet in response to a small query [CVE-DOS]). These
attacks only use NTP as a vector for DoS attacks on other
protocols, but do not affect the time service on the NTP host
itself. To limit the sources of these malicious commands, NTP
server operators are recommended to deploy ingress filtering
[
RFC3704].
Time-shifting attacks through information leakage/overwriting:
NTP hosts save important system and peer state variables. An off-
path attacker who can read these variables remotely can leverage
the information leaked by these control queries to perform time-
shifting and DDoS attacks on NTP clients. These attacks do affect
time synchronization on the NTP hosts. For instance:
* In the client/server mode, the client stores its local time when
it sends the query to the server in its xmt peer variable. This
variable is used to perform TEST2 to non-cryptographically
authenticate the server (i.e., if the origin timestamp field in
the corresponding server response packet matches the xmt peer
variable, then the client accepts the packet). An off-path
attacker with the ability to read this variable can easily spoof
server response packets for the client, which will pass TEST2 and
can deny service or shift time on the NTP client. The specific
attack is described in [CVE-SPOOF].
* The client also stores its local time when the server response is
received in its rec peer variable. This variable is used for
authentication in interleaved-pivot mode. An off-path attacker
with the ability to read this state variable can easily shift time
on the client by passing this test. This attack is described in
[CVE-SHIFT].
Fast-Scanning:
NTP mode 6 control messages are usually small UDP packets. Fast-
scanning tools like ZMap can be used to spray the entire
(potentially reachable) Internet with these messages within hours
to identify vulnerable hosts. To make things worse, these attacks
can be extremely low-rate, only requiring a control query for
reconnaissance and a spoofed response to shift time on vulnerable
clients.
The mode 6 and 7 messages are vulnerable to replay attacks
[CVE-Replay]:
If an attacker observes mode 6/7 packets that modify the
configuration of the server in any way, the attacker can apply the
same change at any time later by simply sending the packets to the
server again. The use of the nonce (Request Nonce command)
provides limited protection against replay attacks.
NTP best practices recommend configuring NTP with the no-query
parameter. The no-query parameter blocks access to all remote
control queries. However, sometimes the hosts do not want to block
all queries and want to give access for certain control queries
remotely. This could be for the purpose of remote management and
configuration of the hosts in certain scenarios. Such hosts tend to
use firewalls or other middleboxes to blacklist certain queries
within the network.
Significantly fewer hosts respond to mode 7 monlist queries as
compared to other control queries because it is a well-known and
exploited control query. These queries are likely blocked using
blacklists on firewalls and middleboxes rather than the no-query
option on NTP hosts. The remaining control queries that can be
exploited likely remain out of the blacklist because they are
undocumented in the current NTP specification [
RFC5905].
This document describes all of the mode 6 control queries allowed by
NTP and can help administrators make informed decisions on security
measures to protect NTP devices from harmful queries and likely make
those systems less vulnerable. The use of the legacy mode 6
interface is
NOT RECOMMENDED. Regardless of which mode 6 commands an
administrator may elect to allow, remote access to this facility
needs to be protected from unauthorized access (e.g., strict Access
Control Lists (ACLs)). Additionally, the legacy interface for mode 6
commands
SHOULD NOT be utilized in new deployments or implementation
of NTP.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[
RFC1305] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)
Specification, Implementation and Analysis",
RFC 1305,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC1305, March 1992,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1305>.
[
RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[
RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84,
RFC 3704, DOI 10.17487/
RFC3704, March
2004, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3704>.
[
RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification",
RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5905, June 2010,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[
RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation",
RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC5952, August 2010,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.
[
RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14,
RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8174,
May 2017, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
[CVE-DOS] NIST National Vulnerability Database, "CVE-2013-5211
Detail", 2 January 2014,
<
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-5211>.
[CVE-Replay]
NIST National Vulnerability Database, "CVE-2015-8140
Detail", 30 January 2015,
<
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8140>.
[CVE-SHIFT]
NIST National Vulnerability Database, "CVE-2016-1548
Detail", 6 January 2017,
<
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1548>.
[CVE-SPOOF]
NIST National Vulnerability Database, "CVE-2015-8139
Detail", 30 January 2017,
<
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8139>.
[
RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC0791, September 1981,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[
RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86,
RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC8200, July 2017,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
Appendix A. NTP Remote Facility Message Format
The format of the NTP Remote Facility Message header, which
immediately follows the UDP header, is shown in Figure 3. A
description of its fields follows Figure 3. Bit positions marked as
zero are reserved and should always be transmitted as zero.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R|M| VN |Mode |A| Sequence | Implementation| Req Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Err | Count | MBZ | Size |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Data (up to 500 bytes) /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Encryption KeyID (when A bit set) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Message Authentication Code (when A bit set) /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: NTP Remote Facility Message Header
Response Bit (R):
Set to 0 if the packet is a request. Set to 1 if the packet is a
response.
More Bit (M):
Set to 0 if this is the last packet in a response; otherwise, set
to 1 in responses requiring more than one packet.
Version Number (VN):
Set to the version number of the NTP daemon.
Mode:
Set to 7 for Remote Facility messages.
Authenticated Bit (A):
If set to 1, this packet contains authentication information.
Sequence:
For a multi-packet response, this field contains the sequence
number of this packet. Packets in a multi-packet response are
numbered starting with 0. The More Bit is set to 1 for all
packets but the last.
Implementation:
The version number of the implementation that defined the request
code used in this message. An implementation number of 0 is used
for a request code supported by all versions of the NTP daemon.
The value 255 is reserved for future extensions.
Request Code (Req Code):
An implementation-specific code that specifies the operation being
requested. A request code definition includes the format and
semantics of the data included in the packet.
Error (Err):
Set to 0 for a request. For a response, this field contains an
error code relating to the request. If the Error is nonzero, the
operation requested wasn't performed.
0: no error
1: incompatible implementation number
2: unimplemented request code
3: format error
4: no data available
7: authentication failure
Count:
The number of data items in the packet. Range is 0 to 500.
Must Be Zero (MBZ):
A reserved field set to 0 in requests and responses.
Size:
The size of each data item in the packet. Range is 0 to 500.
Data:
A variable-sized field containing request/response data. For
requests and responses, the size in octets must be greater than or
equal to the product of the number of data items (Count) and the
size of a data item (Size). For requests, the data area is
exactly 40 octets in length. For responses, the data area will
range from 0 to 500 octets, inclusive.
Encryption KeyID:
A 32-bit unsigned integer used to designate the key used for the
Message Authentication Code. This field is included only when the
A bit is set to 1.
Message Authentication Code:
An optional Message Authentication Code defined by the version of
the NTP daemon indicated in the Implementation field. This field
is included only when the A bit is set to 1.
Acknowledgements
Tim Plunkett created the original version of this document. Aanchal
Malhotra provided the initial version of the Security Considerations
section.
Karen O'Donoghue, David Hart, Harlan Stenn, and Philip Chimento
deserve credit for portions of this document due to their earlier
efforts to document these commands.
Miroshav Lichvar, Ulrich Windl, Dieter Sibold, J Ignacio Alvarez-
Hamelin, and Alex Campbell provided valuable comments on various
draft versions of this document.
Contributors
Dr. David Mills specified the vast majority of the mode 6 commands
during the development of [
RFC1305] and deserves the credit for their
existence and use.
Author's Address
Brian Haberman (editor)
JHU