Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Santesson
Request for Comments:
9399 IDsec Solutions
Obsoletes:
3709,
6170 R. Housley
Category: Standards Track Vigil Security
ISSN: 2070-1721 T. Freeman
Amazon Web Services
L. Rosenthol
Adobe
May 2023
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509
Certificates
Abstract
This document specifies a certificate extension for including
logotypes in public key certificates and attribute certificates.
This document obsoletes RFCs 3709 and 6170.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in
Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9399.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(
https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Certificate-Based Identification
1.2. Selection of Certificates
1.3. Combination of Verification Techniques
1.4. Requirements Language
2. Different Types of Logotypes in Certificates
3. Logotype Data
4. Logotype Certificate Extension
4.1. Extension Format
4.2. Conventions for LogotypeImageInfo
4.3. Embedded Images
4.4. Other Logotypes
4.4.1. Loyalty Logotype
4.4.2. Certificate Background Logotype
4.4.3. Certificate Image Logotype
5. Type of Certificates
6. Use in Clients
7. Image Formats
8. Audio Formats
9. Security Considerations
10. Privacy Considerations
11. IANA Considerations
12. References
12.1. Normative References
12.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. ASN.1 Modules with 1988 Syntax
A.2. ASN.1 Module with 2002 Syntax
Appendix B. Examples
B.1. Example from
RFC 3709 B.2. Issuer Organization Logotype Example
B.3. Embedded Image Example
B.4. Embedded Certificate Image Example
B.5. Full Certificate Example
Appendix C. Changes since RFCs 3709 and 6170
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
This specification supplements [
RFC5280], which profiles public key
certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for use in the
Internet, and it supplements [
RFC5755], which profiles attribute
certificates for use in the Internet.
This document obsoletes [
RFC3709] and [
RFC6170].
Appendix C provides
a summary of the changes since the publication of [
RFC3709] and
[
RFC6170].
The basic function of a certificate is to bind a public key to the
identity of an entity (the subject). From a strictly technical
viewpoint, this goal could be achieved by signing the identity of the
subject together with its public key. However, the art of Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) has developed certificates far beyond this
functionality in order to meet the needs of modern global networks
and heterogeneous information and operational technology structures.
Certificate users must be able to determine certificate policies,
appropriate key usage, assurance level, and name form constraints.
Before a relying party can make an informed decision whether a
particular certificate is trustworthy and relevant for its intended
usage, a certificate may be examined from several different
perspectives.
Systematic processing is necessary to determine whether a particular
certificate meets the predefined prerequisites for an intended usage.
Much of the information contained in certificates is appropriate and
effective for machine processing; however, this information is not
suitable for a corresponding human trust and recognition process.
Humans prefer to structure information into categories and symbols.
Most humans associate complex structures of reality with easily
recognizable logotypes and marks. Humans tend to trust things that
they recognize from previous experiences. Humans may examine
information to confirm their initial reaction. Very few consumers
actually read all terms and conditions they agree to in accepting a
service; instead, they commonly act on trust derived from previous
experience and recognition.
A big part of this process is branding. Service providers and
product vendors invest a lot of money and resources into creating a
strong relation between positive user experiences and easily
recognizable trademarks, servicemarks, and logotypes.
Branding is also pervasive in identification instruments, including
identification cards, passports, driver's licenses, credit cards,
gasoline cards, and loyalty cards. Identification instruments are
intended to identify the holder as a particular person or as a member
of the community. The community may represent the subscribers of a
service or any other group. Identification instruments, in physical
form, commonly use logotypes and symbols, solely to enhance human
recognition and trust in the identification instrument itself. They
may also include a registered trademark to allow legal recourse for
unauthorized duplication.
Since certificates play an equivalent role in electronic exchanges,
we examine the inclusion of logotypes in certificates. We consider
certificate-based identification and certificate selection.
1.1. Certificate-Based Identification
The need for human recognition depends on the manner in which
certificates are used and whether certificates need to be visible to
human users. If certificates are to be used in open environments and
in applications that bring the user in conscious contact with the
result of a certificate-based identification process, then human
recognition is highly relevant and may be a necessity.
Examples of such applications include:
* Web server identification where a user identifies the owner of the
website.
* Peer email exchange in business-to-business (B2B), business-to-
consumer (B2C), and private communications.
* Exchange of medical records and system for medical prescriptions.
* Unstructured e-business applications (i.e., non-EDI applications).
* Wireless client authenticating to a service provider.
Most applications provide the human user with an opportunity to view
the results of a successful certificate-based identification process.
When the user takes the steps necessary to view these results, the
user is presented with a view of a certificate. This solution has
two major problems. First, the function to view a certificate is
often rather hard to find for a non-technical user. Second, the
presentation of the certificate is too technical and is not user
friendly. It contains no graphic symbols or logotypes to enhance
human recognition.
Many investigations have shown that users of today's applications do
not take the steps necessary to view certificates. This could be due
to poor user interfaces. Further, many applications are structured
to hide certificates from users. The application designers do not
want to expose certificates to users at all.
1.2. Selection of Certificates
One situation where software applications must expose human users to
certificates is when the user must select a single certificate from a
portfolio of certificates. In some cases, the software application
can use information within the certificates to filter the list for
suitability; however, the user must be queried if more than one
certificate is suitable. The human user must select one of them.
This situation is comparable to a person selecting a suitable plastic
card from their wallet. In this situation, substantial assistance is
provided by card color, location, and branding.
In order to provide similar support for certificate selection, the
users need tools to easily recognize and distinguish certificates.
Introduction of logotypes into certificates provides the necessary
graphic.
1.3. Combination of Verification Techniques
The use of logotypes will, in many cases, affect the user's decision
to trust and use a certificate. It is therefore important that there
be a distinct and clear architectural and functional distinction
between the processes and objectives of the automated certificate
verification and human recognition.
Since logotypes are only aimed for human interpretation and contain
data that is inappropriate for computer-based verification schemes,
the logotype certificate extension
MUST NOT be an active component in
automated certification path validation, as specified in
Section 6 of
[
RFC5280].
Automated certification path verification determines whether the end
entity certificate can be verified according to defined policy. The
algorithm for this verification is specified in [
RFC5280].
The automated processing provides assurance that the certificate is
valid. It does not indicate whether the subject is entitled to any
particular information or whether the subject ought to be trusted to
perform a particular service. These are authorization decisions.
Automatic processing will make some authorization decisions, but
others, depending on the application context, involve the human user.
In some situations, where automated procedures have failed to
establish the suitability of the certificate to the task, the human
user is the final arbitrator of the post certificate verification
authorization decisions. In the end, the human will decide whether
or not to accept an executable email attachment, to release personal
information, or to follow the instructions displayed by a web
browser. This decision will often be based on recognition and
previous experience.
The distinction between systematic processing and human processing is
rather straightforward. They can be complementary. While the
systematic process is focused on certification path construction and
verification, the human acceptance process is focused on recognition
and related previous experience.
There are some situations where systematic processing and human
processing interfere with each other. These issues are discussed in
the
Section 9.
1.4. Requirements Language
The key words "
MUST", "
MUST NOT", "
REQUIRED", "
SHALL", "
SHALL NOT",
"
SHOULD", "
SHOULD NOT", "
RECOMMENDED", "
NOT RECOMMENDED", "
MAY", and
"
OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [
RFC2119] [
RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Different Types of Logotypes in Certificates
This specification defines the inclusion of three standard logotype
types:
* community logotype
* issuer organization logotype
* subject organization logotype
The community logotype is the general mark for a community. It
identifies a service concept for entity identification and
certificate issuance. Many issuers may use a community logotype to
co-brand with a global community in order to gain global recognition
of its local service provision. This type of community branding is
very common in the credit card business, where local independent card
issuers include a globally recognized brand (such as Visa and
Mastercard). Certificate issuers may include more than one community
logotype to indicate participation in more than one global community.
The issuer organization logotype is a logotype representing the
organization identified as part of the issuer name in the
certificate.
The subject organization logotype is a logotype representing the
organization identified in the subject name in the certificate.
In addition to the standard logotype types, this specification
accommodates inclusion of other logotype types where each class of
logotype is defined by an object identifier. The object identifier
can be either locally defined or an identifier defined in
Section 4.4 of this document.
3. Logotype Data
This specification defines two types of logotype data: image data and
audio data. Implementations
MUST support image data; however,
support for audio data is
OPTIONAL.
Image and audio data for logotypes can be provided by reference by
including a URI that identifies the location to the logotype data and
a one-way hash of the referenced data in the certificate. The
privacy-related properties for remote logotype data depend on four
parties: the certificate relying parties that use the information in
the certificate extension to fetch the logotype data, the certificate
issuers that populate the certificate extension, certificate
subscribers that request certificates that include the certificate
extension, and server operators that provide the logotype data.
Alternatively, embedding the logotype data in the certificate with
direct addressing (as defined in
Section 4.3) provides improved
privacy properties and depends upon fewer parties. However, this
approach can significantly increase the size of the certificate.
Several image objects, representing the same visual content in
different formats, sizes, and color palates, may represent each
logotype image. At least one of the image objects representing a
logotype
SHOULD contain an image with a width between 60 pixels and
200 pixels and a height between 45 pixels and 150 pixels.
Several instances of audio data may further represent the same audio
sequence in different formats, resolutions, and languages. At least
one of the audio objects representing a logotype
SHOULD provide text-
based audio data suitable for processing by text-to-speech software.
A typical use of text-based audio data is inclusion in web
applications where the audio text is placed as the "alt" attribute
value of an HTML image (img) element, and the language value obtained
from LogotypeAudioInfo is included as the "lang" attribute of that
image.
If a logotype of a certain type (as defined in
Section 2) is
represented by more than one image object, then each image object
MUST contain variants of roughly the same visual content. Likewise,
if a logotype of a certain type is represented by more than one audio
object, then the audio objects
MUST contain variants of the same
audio information. A spoken message in different languages is
considered a variation of the same audio information. When more than
one image object or more than one audio object for the same logotype
type is included in the certificate, the certificate issuer is
responsible for ensuring that the objects contain roughly the same
content. Compliant applications
MUST NOT display more than one of
the image objects and
MUST NOT play more than one of the audio
objects for any logotype type (see
Section 2) at the same time.
A client
MAY simultaneously display multiple logotypes of different
logotype types. For example, it may display one subject organization
logotype while also displaying a community logotype, but it
MUST NOT display multiple image variants of the same community logotype.
Each logotype present in a certificate
MUST be represented by at
least one image data object.
Client applications
SHOULD enhance processing and off-line
functionality by caching logotype data.
4. Logotype Certificate Extension
This section specifies the syntax and semantics of the logotype
certificate extension.
4.1. Extension Format
The logotype certificate extension
MAY be included in public key
certificates [
RFC5280] or attribute certificates [
RFC5755]. The
logotype certificate extension
MUST be identified by the following
object identifier:
id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }
This extension
MUST NOT be marked critical.
Logotype data may be referenced through either direct or indirect
addressing. Client applications
SHOULD support both direct and
indirect addressing. Certificate issuing applications
MUST support
direct addressing, and certificate issuing applications
SHOULD support indirect addressing.
The direct addressing includes information about each logotype in the
certificate, and URIs point to the image and audio data object.
Multiple URIs
MAY be included for locations for obtaining the same
logotype object. Multiple hash values
MAY be included, each computed
with a different one-way hash function. Direct addressing supports
cases where just one or a few alternative images and audio objects
are referenced.
The indirect addressing includes one or more references to an
external hashed data structure that contains information on the type,
content, and location of each image and audio object. Indirect
addressing supports cases where each logotype is represented by many
alternative audio or image objects.
Both direct and indirect addressing accommodate alternative URIs to
obtain exactly the same logotype data. This opportunity for
replication is intended to improve availability. Therefore, if a
client is unable to fetch the item from one URI, the client
SHOULD try another URI in the sequence. All direct addressing URIs
SHOULD use the HTTPS scheme (https://...), the HTTP scheme (http://...), or
the DATA scheme (data://...) [
RFC3986]. However, the "data" URI
scheme
MUST NOT be used with the indirect addressing. Clients
MUST support retrieval of the referenced LogotypeData with HTTP [
RFC9110],
HTTP with TLS [
RFC8446], or subsequent versions of these protocols.
Client applications
SHOULD also support the "data" URI scheme
[
RFC2397] for direct addressing with embedded logotype data within
the extension.
Note that the HTTPS scheme (https://...) requires the validation of
other certificates to establish a secure connection. For this
reason, the HTTP scheme (http://...) may be easier for a client to
handle. Also, the hash of the logotype data provides data integrity.
The logotype certificate extension
MUST have the following syntax:
LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE {
direct [0] LogotypeData,
indirect [1] LogotypeReference }
LogotypeData ::= SEQUENCE {
image SEQUENCE OF LogotypeImage
OPTIONAL,
audio [1] SEQUENCE OF LogotypeAudio
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {
imageDetails LogotypeDetails,
imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {
audioDetails LogotypeDetails,
audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional
-- parameters
logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels
ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels
resolution LogotypeImageResolution
OPTIONAL,
language [4] IA5String
OPTIONAL } --
RFC 5646 Language Tag
LogotypeImageType ::= INTEGER { grayScale(0), color(1) }
LogotypeImageResolution ::= CHOICE {
numBits [1] INTEGER, -- Resolution in bits per pixel
tableSize [2] INTEGER } -- Number of colors or grey tones
LogotypeAudioInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
playTime INTEGER, -- In milliseconds, 0=unspecified
channels INTEGER, -- 0=unspecified,
-- 1=mono, 2=stereo, 4=quad
sampleRate [3] INTEGER
OPTIONAL, -- Samples per second
language [4] IA5String
OPTIONAL } --
RFC 5646 Language Tag
OtherLogotypeInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
logotypeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
info LogotypeInfo }
LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
-- Places to get the same LogotypeData
-- image or audio object
HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OCTET STRING }
When using indirect addressing, the URI (refStructURI) pointing to
the external data structure
MUST point to a resource that contains
the DER-encoded data with the syntax LogotypeData.
At least one of the optional elements in the LogotypeExtn structure
MUST be present.
When using direct addressing, at least one of the optional elements
in the LogotypeData structure
MUST be present.
The LogotypeReference and LogotypeDetails structures explicitly
identify one or more one-way hash functions employed to authenticate
referenced image or audio objects. Certification Authorities (CAs)
MUST include a hash value for each referenced object, calculated on
the whole object. CAs
MUST use the one-way hash function that is
associated with the certificate signature to compute one hash value,
and CAs
MAY include other hash values. Clients
MUST compute a one-
way hash value using one of the identified functions, and clients
MUST discard the logotype data if the computed hash value does not
match the hash value in the certificate extension.
A media type is used to specify the format of the image or audio
object containing the logotype data. The mediaType field
MUST contain a string that is constructed according to the ABNF [
RFC5234]
rule for media-type provided in Section 8.3.1 of [
RFC9110]. Media
types
MAY include parameters. To keep the mediaType field as small
as possible, optional whitespace
SHOULD NOT be included.
Image format requirements are specified in
Section 7, and audio
format requirements are specified in
Section 8.
When language is specified, the language tag
MUST use the syntax in
[
RFC5646].
The following logotype types are defined in this specification:
* community logotype: If communityLogos is present, the logotypes
MUST represent one or more communities with which the certificate
issuer is affiliated. The communityLogos
MAY be present in an end
entity certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate.
The communityLogos contains a sequence of community logotypes,
each representing a different community. If more than one
community logotype is present, they
MUST be placed in order of
preferred appearance. Some clients
MAY choose to display a subset
of the present community logos; therefore, the placement within
the sequence aids the client selection. The most preferred
logotype
MUST be first in the sequence, and the least preferred
logotype
MUST be last in the sequence.
* issuer organization logotype: If issuerLogo is present, the
logotype
MUST represent the issuer's organization. The logotype
MUST be consistent with, and require the presence of, an
organization name stored in the organization attribute in the
issuer field (for either a public key certificate or attribute
certificate). The issuerLogo
MAY be present in an end entity
certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate.
* subject organization logotype: If subjectLogo is present, the
logotype
MUST represent the subject's organization. The logotype
MUST be consistent with, and require the presence of, an
organization name stored in the organization attribute in the
subject field (for either a public key certificate or attribute
certificate). The subjectLogo
MAY be present in an end entity
certificate, a CA certificate, or an attribute certificate.
The relationship between the subject organization and the subject
organization logotype, and the relationship between the issuer and
either the issuer organization logotype or the community logotype,
are relationships asserted by the issuer. The policies and practices
employed by the issuer that check subject organization logotypes or
claims about its issuer and community logotypes are outside the scope
of this document.
4.2. Conventions for LogotypeImageInfo
When the optional LogotypeImageInfo is included with a logotype
image, the parameters
MUST be used with the following semantics and
restrictions.
The xSize and ySize fields represent the recommended display size for
the logotype image. When a value of 0 (zero) is present, no
recommended display size is specified. When non-zero values are
present and these values differ from corresponding size values in the
referenced image object, then the referenced image
SHOULD be scaled
to fit within the size parameters of LogotypeImageInfo while
preserving the x and y ratio. Dithering may produce a more
appropriate image than linear scaling.
The resolution field is redundant for all logotype image formats
listed in
Section 7. The optional resolution field
SHOULD be omitted
when the image format already contains this information.
4.3. Embedded Images
If the logotype image is provided through direct addressing, then the
image
MAY be stored within the logotype certificate extension using
the "data" scheme [
RFC2397]. The syntax of the "data" URI scheme is
shown below, which incorporates Errata ID 2045 and uses modern ABNF
[
RFC5234]:
dataurl = "data:" [ media-type ] [ ";base64" ] "," data
data = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped)
reserved = ";" / "/" / "?" / ":" / "@" / "&" / "=" / "+" /
"$" / ","
unreserved = alphanum / mark
alphanum = ALPHA / DIGIT
mark = "-" / "_" / "." / "!" / "~" / "*" / "'" / "(" / ")"
escaped = "%" hex hex
hex = HEXDIG / "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
where media-type is defined in Section 8.3.1 of [
RFC9110] and ALPHA,
DIGIT, and HEXDIG are defined in
Appendix B.1 of [
RFC5234].
When including the image data in the logotype certificate extension
using the "data" URI scheme, the following conventions apply:
* The value of mediaType in LogotypeDetails
MUST be identical to the
media type value in the "data" URL.
* The hash of the image
MUST be included in logotypeHash and
MUST be
calculated over the same data as it would have been if the image
had been referenced through a link to an external resource.
| NOTE: As the "data" URI scheme is processed as a data source
| rather than as a URL, the image data is typically not limited
| by any URL length limit settings that otherwise apply to URLs
| in general.
|
| NOTE: Implementations need to be cautious about the size of
| images included in a certificate in order to ensure that the
| size of the certificate does not prevent the certificate from
| being used as intended.
4.4. Other Logotypes
Logotypes identified by otherLogos (as defined in
Section 4.1) can be
used to enhance the display of logotypes and marks that represent
partners, products, services, or any other characteristic associated
with the certificate or its intended application environment when the
standard logotype types are insufficient.
The conditions and contexts of the intended use of these logotypes
are defined at the discretion of the local client application.
Three other logotype types are defined in the follow subsections.
4.4.1. Loyalty Logotype
When a loyalty logotype appears in otherLogos, it
MUST be identified
by the id-logo-loyalty object identifier.
id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 20 }
id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 }
A loyalty logotype, if present,
MUST contain a logotype associated
with a loyalty program related to the certificate or its use. The
relation between the certificate and the identified loyalty program
is beyond the scope of this document. The logotype certificate
extension
MAY contain more than one loyalty logotype.
If more than one loyalty logotype is present, they
MUST be placed in
order of preferred appearance. Some clients
MAY choose to display a
subset of the present loyalty logotype data; therefore, the placement
within the sequence aids the client selection. The most preferred
loyalty logotype data
MUST be first in the sequence, and the least
preferred loyalty logotype data
MUST be last in the sequence.
4.4.2. Certificate Background Logotype
When a certificate background logotype appears in otherLogos, it
MUST be identified by the id-logo-background object identifier.
id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 }
The certificate background logotype, if present,
MUST contain a
graphical image intended as a background image for the certificate
and/or a general audio sequence for the certificate. The background
image
MUST allow black text to be clearly read when placed on top of
the background image. The logotype certificate extension
MUST NOT contain more than one certificate background logotype.
4.4.3. Certificate Image Logotype
When a certificate image logotype appears in otherLogos, it
MUST be
identified by the id-logo-certImage object identifier.
id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }
The certificate image logotype, if present, aids human interpretation
of a certificate by providing meaningful visual information to the
user interface (UI). The logotype certificate extension
MUST NOT contain more than one certificate image logotype.
Typical situations when a human needs to examine the visual
representation of a certificate are:
* A person establishes a secured channel with an authenticated
service. The person needs to determine the identity of the
service based on the authenticated credentials.
* A person validates the signature on critical information, such as
signed executable code, and needs to determine the identity of the
signer based on the signer's certificate.
* A person is required to select an appropriate certificate to be
used when authenticating to a service or identity management
infrastructure. The person needs to see the available
certificates in order to distinguish between them in the selection
process.
The display of certificate information to humans is challenging due
to lack of well-defined semantics for critical identity attributes.
Unless the application has out-of-band knowledge about a particular
certificate, the application will not know the exact nature of the
data stored in common identification attributes, such as
serialNumber, organizationName, country, etc. Consequently, the
application can display the actual data but faces the problem of
labeling that data in the UI and informing the human about the exact
nature (semantics) of that data. It is also challenging for the
application to determine which identification attributes are
important to display and how to organize them in a logical order.
When present, the certificate image
MUST be a complete visual
representation of the certificate. This means that the display of
this certificate image represents all information about the
certificate that the issuer subjectively defines as relevant to show
to a typical human user within the typical intended use of the
certificate, giving adequate information about at least the following
three aspects of the certificate:
* certificate context
* certificate issuer
* certificate subject
Certificate context information is visual marks and/or textual
information that helps the typical user to understand the typical
usage and/or purpose of the certificate.
It is up to the issuer to decide what information -- in the form of
text, graphical symbols, and elements -- represents a complete visual
representation of the certificate. However, the visual
representation of certificate subject and certificate issuer
information from the certificate
MUST have the same meaning as the
textual representation of that information in the certificate itself.
Applications providing a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to the
certificate user
MAY present a certificate image as the only visual
representation of a certificate; however, the certificate user
SHOULD be able to easily obtain the details of the certificate content.
5. Type of Certificates
Logotypes
MAY be included in public key certificates and attribute
certificates at the discretion of the certificate issuer; however,
the relying party
MUST NOT use the logotypes as part of certification
path validation or automated trust decisions. The sole purpose of
logotypes is to enhance the display of a particular certificate,
regardless of its position in a certification path.
6. Use in Clients
All PKI implementations require relying party software to have some
mechanism to determine whether a trusted CA issues a particular
certificate. This is an issue for certification path validation,
including consistent policy and name checking.
After a certification path is successfully validated, the replying
party trusts the information that the CA includes in the certificate,
including any certificate extensions. The client software can choose
to make use of such information, or the client software can ignore
it. If the client is unable to support a provided logotype, the
client
MUST NOT report an error; instead, the client
MUST behave as
though no logotype certificate extension was included in the
certificate. Current standards do not provide any mechanism for
cross-certifying CAs to constrain subordinate CAs from including
private extensions (see
Section 9).
Consequently, if relying party software accepts a CA, then it should
be prepared to (unquestioningly) display the associated logotypes to
its human user, given that it is configured to do so. Information
about the logotypes is provided so that the replying party software
can select the one that will best meet the needs of the human user.
This choice depends on the abilities of the human user, as well as
the capabilities of the platform on which the replaying party
software is running. If none of the provided logotypes meets the
needs of the human user or matches the capabilities of the platform,
then the logotypes can be ignored.
A client
MAY, subject to local policy, choose to display none, one,
or any number of the logotypes in the logotype certificate extension.
In many cases, a client will be used in an environment with a good
network connection and also used in an environment with little or no
network connectivity. For example, a laptop computer can be docked
with a high-speed LAN connection, or it can be disconnected from the
network altogether. In recognition of this situation, the client
MUST include the ability to disable the fetching of logotypes.
However, locally cached logotypes can still be displayed when the
user disables the fetching of additional logotypes.
A client
MAY, subject to local policy, choose any combination of
audio and image presentation for each logotype. That is, the client
MAY display an image with or without playing a sound, and it
MAY play
a sound with or without displaying an image. A client
MUST NOT play
more than one logotype audio sequence at the same time.
The logotype is to be displayed in conjunction with other identity
information contained in the certificate. The logotype is not a
replacement for this identity information.
Care is needed when designing replying party software to ensure that
an appropriate context of logotype information is provided. This is
especially difficult with audio logotypes. It is important that the
human user be able to recognize the context of the logotype, even if
other audio streams are being played.
If the relying party software is unable to successfully validate a
particular certificate, then it
MUST NOT display any logotype data
associated with that certificate.
7. Image Formats
Animated images
SHOULD NOT be used.
The following table lists common image formats and the corresponding
media type. The table also indicates the support requirements for
these image formats. The file name extensions commonly used for each
of these formats is also provided. Implementations
MAY support other
image formats.
+========+==============+===========+============+============+
| Format | Media Type | Extension | References | Implement? |
+========+==============+===========+============+============+
| JPEG | image/jpeg | .jpg | [JPEG] |
MUST |
| | | .jpeg | [
RFC2046] | support |
+--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+
| GIF | image/gif | .gif | [GIF] |
MUST |
| | | | [
RFC2046] | support |
+--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+
| SVG | image/ | .svg | [SVGT] |
SHOULD |
| | svg+xml | | [SVGR] | support |
+--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+
| SVG + | image/ | .svgz | [SVGT] |
MUST |
| GZIP | svg+xml+gzip | .svg.gz | [SVGZR] | support |
+--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+
| PNG | image/png | .png | [ISO15948] |
SHOULD |
| | | | [PNGR] | support |
+--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+
| PDF | application/ | .pdf | [ISO32000] |
MAY |
| | pdf | | [ISO19005] | support |
| | | | [
RFC8118] | |
+--------+--------------+-----------+------------+------------+
Table 1: Image Formats
| NOTE: The image/svg+xml-compressed media type is widely
| implemented, but it has not yet been registered with IANA.
When a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) image is used, whether the
image is compressed or not, the SVG Tiny profile [SVGT]
MUST be
followed, with these additional restrictions:
* The SVG image
MUST NOT contain any Internationalized Resource
Identifier (IRI) references to information stored outside of the
SVG image of type B, C, or D, according to Section 14.1.4 of
[SVGT].
* The SVG image
MUST NOT contain any script element, according to
Section 15.2 of [SVGT].
* The XML structure in the SVG file
MUST use linefeed (0x0A) as the
end-of-line (EOL) character when calculating a hash over the SVG
image.
When a GZIP-compressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the client
will receive a response that includes these headers:
Content-Type: image/svg+xml
Content-Encoding: gzip
In this case, the octet stream of type image/svg+xml is compressed
with GZIP [
RFC1952], as specified in [SVGR].
When an uncompressed SVG image is fetched with HTTP, the client will
receive a response with the same Content-Type header but no Content-
Encoding header.
Whether the SVG image is GZIP-compressed or uncompressed, the hash
value for the SVG image is calculated over the uncompressed SVG
content with canonicalized EOL characters, as specified above.
When an SVG image is embedded in the certificate extension using the
"data" URL scheme, the SVG image data
MUST be provided in GZIP-
compressed form, and the XML structure, prior to compression,
SHOULD use linefeed (0x0A) as the end-of-line (EOL) character.
When a bitmap image is used, the PNG [ISO15948] format
SHOULD be
used.
According to [ISO32000], when a Portable Document Format (PDF)
document is used, it
MUST also be formatted according to the profile
PDF/A [ISO19005].
8. Audio Formats
Implementations that support audio
MUST support the MP3 audio format
[MP3] with a media type of "audio/mpeg" [
RFC3003]. Implementations
SHOULD support text-based audio data with a media type of "text/
plain;charset=UTF-8". Implementations
MAY support other audio
formats.
Text-based audio data using the media type of "text/
plain;charset=UTF-8" is intended to be used by text-to-speech
software. When this audio type is used, the following requirements
apply:
* LogotypeAudioInfo
MUST be present and specify the language of the
text.
* The fileSize, playTime, and channels elements of LogotypeAudioInfo
MUST have the value of 0.
* The sampleRate element of LogotypeAudioInfo
MUST be absent.
9. Security Considerations
Implementations that simultaneously display multiple logotype types
(subject organization, issuer organization, community, or other)
MUST ensure that there is no ambiguity as to the binding between the image
and the type of logotype that the image represents. "Logotype type"
is defined in
Section 1.1, and it refers to the type of entity or
affiliation represented by the logotype, not the of binary format of
the image or audio.
Logotypes are very difficult to securely and accurately define.
Names are also difficult in this regard, but logotypes are even
worse. It is quite difficult to specify what is, and what is not, a
legitimate logotype of an organization. There is an entire legal
structure around this issue, and it will not be repeated here.
However, issuers should be aware of the implications of including
images associated with a trademark or servicemark before doing so.
As logotypes can be difficult (and sometimes expensive) to verify,
the possibility of errors related to assigning wrong logotypes to
organizations is increased.
This is not a new issue for electronic identification instruments.
It is already dealt with in a number of similar situations in the
physical world, including physical employee identification cards. In
addition, there are situations where identification of logotypes is
rather simple and straightforward, such as logotypes for well-known
industries and institutes. These issues should not stop those
service providers who want to issue logotypes from doing so, where
relevant.
It is impossible to prevent fraudulent creation of certificates by
dishonest or badly performing issuers, containing names and logotypes
that the issuer has no claim to or has failed to check correctly.
Such certificates could be created in an attempt to socially engineer
a user into accepting a certificate. The premise used for the
logotype work is thus that logotype graphics in a certificate are
trusted only if the certificate is successfully validated within a
valid path. It is thus imperative that the representation of any
certificate that fails to validate is not enhanced in any way by
using the logotype data.
This underlines the necessity for CAs to provide reliable services
and the relying party's responsibility and need to carefully select
which CAs are trusted to provide public key certificates.
This also underlines the general necessity for relying parties to use
up-to-date software libraries to render or dereference data from
external sources, including logotype data in certificates, to
minimize risks related to processing potentially malicious data
before it has been adequately verified and validated. Implementers
should review the guidance in
Section 7 of [
RFC3986].
Referenced image objects are hashed in order to bind the image to the
signature of the certificate. Some image types, such as SVG, allow
part of the image to be collected from an external source by
incorporating a reference to an external file that contains the
image. If this feature were used within a logotype image, the hash
of the image would only cover the URI reference to the external image
file but not the referenced image data. Clients
SHOULD verify that
SVG images meet all requirements listed in
Section 7 and reject
images that contain references to external data.
CAs issuing certificates with embedded logotype images should be
cautious when accepting graphics from the certificate requester for
inclusion in the certificate if the hash algorithm used to sign the
certificate is vulnerable to collision attacks, as described in
[
RFC6151]. In such a case, the accepted image may contain data that
could help an attacker to obtain colliding certificates with
identical certificate signatures.
Certification paths may also impose name constraints that are
systematically checked during certification path processing, which,
in theory, may be circumvented by logotypes.
Certificate path processing, as defined in [
RFC5280], does not
constrain the inclusion of logotype data in certificates. A parent
CA can constrain certification path validation such that subordinate
CAs cannot issue valid certificates to end entities outside a limited
name space or outside specific certificate policies. A malicious CA
can comply with these name and policy requirements and still include
inappropriate logotypes in the certificates that it issues. These
certificates will pass the certification path validation algorithm,
which means the client will trust the logotypes in the certificates.
Since there is no technical mechanism to prevent or control
subordinate CAs from including the logotype certificate extension or
its contents, where appropriate, a parent CA could employ a legal
agreement to impose a suitable restriction on the subordinate CA.
This situation is not unique to the logotype certificate extension.
When a relying party fetches remote logotype data, a mismatch between
the media type provided in the mediaType field of the LogotypeDetails
and the Content-Type HTTP header of the retrieved object
MUST be
treated as a failure, and the fetched logotype data should not be
presented to the user. However, if more than one location for the
remote logotype data is provided in the certificate extension, the
relying party
MAY try to fetch the remote logotype data from an
alternate location to resolve the failure.
When a subscriber requests the inclusion of remote logotype data in a
certificate, the CA cannot be sure that any logotype data will be
available at the provided URI for the entire validity period of the
certificate. To mitigate this concern, the CA may provide the
logotype data from a server under its control, rather than a
subscriber-controlled server.
The controls available to a parent CA to protect itself from rogue
subordinate CAs are non-technical. They include:
* Contractual agreements of suitable behavior, including terms of
liability in case of material breach.
* Control mechanisms and procedures to monitor and follow the
behavior of subordinate CAs, including Certificate Transparency
[
RFC9162].
* Use of certificate policies to declare an assurance level of
logotype data, as well as to guide applications on how to treat
and display logotypes.
* Use of revocation functions to revoke any misbehaving CA.
There is not a simple, straightforward, and absolute technical
solution. Rather, involved parties must settle some aspects of PKI
outside the scope of technical controls. As such, issuers need to
clearly identify and communicate the associated risks.
10. Privacy Considerations
Certificates are commonly public objects, so the inclusion of
privacy-sensitive information in certificates should be avoided. The
more information that is included in a certificate, the greater the
likelihood that the certificate will reveal privacy-sensitive
information. The inclusion of logotype data needs to be considered
in this context.
Logotype data might be fetched from a server when it is needed. By
watching activity on the network, an observer can determine which
clients are making use of certificates that contain particular
logotype data. Since clients are expected to locally cache logotype
data, network traffic to the server containing the logotype data will
not be generated every time the certificate is used. Further, when
logotype data is not cached, activity on the network might reveal
certificate usage frequency. Even when logotype data is cached,
regardless of whether direct or indirect addressing is employed,
network traffic monitoring could reveal when logotype data is fetched
for the first time. Implementations
MAY encrypt fetches of logotype
data using HTTPS, padding the data to a common size to reduce
visibility into the data that is being fetched. Likewise, servers
MAY reduce visibility into the data that is being returned by
encrypting with HTTPS and padding to a few common sizes.
Similarly, when fetching logotype data from a server, the server
operator can determine which clients are making use of certificates
that contain particular logotype data. As above, locally caching
logotype data will eliminate the need to fetch the logotype data each
time the certificate is used, and lack of caching would reveal usage
frequency. Even when implementations cache logotype data, regardless
of whether direct or indirect addressing is employed, the server
operator could observe when logotype data is fetched for the first
time.
In addition, the use of an encrypted DNS mechanism, such as DNS over
TLS (DoT) [
RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS (DoH) [
RFC9230], hides the name
resolution traffic, which is usually a first step in fetching remote
logotype objects.
When the "data" URI scheme is used with direct addressing, there is
no network traffic to fetch logotype data, which avoids the
observations of network traffic or server operations described above.
To obtain this benefit, the certificate will be larger than one that
contains a URL. Due to the improved privacy posture, the "data" URI
scheme with direct addressing will be the only one that is supported
by some CAs. Privacy-aware certificate subscribers
MAY wish to
insist that logotype data is embedded in the certificate with the
"data" URI scheme with direct addressing.
In cases where logotype data is cached by the relying party, the
cache index should include the hash values of the associated logotype
data with the goal of fetching the logotype data only once, even when
it is referenced by multiple URIs. The index should include hash
values for all supported hash algorithms. The cached data should
include the media type as well as the logotype data. Implementations
should give preference to logotype data that is already in the cache
when multiple alternatives are offered in the LogotypeExtn
certificate extension.
When the "data" URI scheme is used, the relying party
MAY add the
embedded logotype data to the local cache, which could avoid the need
to fetch the logotype data if it is referenced by a URL in another
certificate.
When fetching remote logotype data, relying parties should use the
most privacy-preserving options that are available to minimize the
opportunities for servers to "fingerprint" clients. For example,
avoid cookies, ETags, and client certificates.
When a relying party encounters a new certificate, the lack of
network traffic to fetch logotype data might indicate that a
certificate with references to the same logotype data has been
previously processed and cached.
TLS 1.3 [
RFC8446] includes the ability to encrypt the server's
certificate in the TLS handshake, which helps hide the server's
identity from anyone that is watching activity on the network. If
the server's certificate includes remote logotype data, the client
fetching that data might disclose the otherwise protected server
identity.
11. IANA Considerations
For the new ASN.1 module in
Appendix A.2, IANA has assigned the
following OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier"
registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):
+=========+======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+======================+============+
| 107 | id-mod-logotype-2022 |
RFC 9399 |
+---------+----------------------+------------+
Table 2
IANA has updated the entries in the "Structure of Management
Information (SMI) Numbers" registry that referred to [
RFC3709] or
[
RFC6170] to refer to this document. These entries are noted in the
tables below.
From the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):
+=========+===========================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+===========================+============+
| 22 | id-mod-logotype |
RFC 9399 |
+---------+---------------------------+------------+
| 68 | id-mod-logotype-certimage |
RFC 9399 |
+---------+---------------------------+------------+
Table 3
From the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" registry
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1):
+=========+================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+================+============+
| 12 | id-pe-logotype |
RFC 9399 |
+---------+----------------+------------+
Table 4
From the "SMI Security for PKIX Other Logotype Identifiers" registry
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.20):
+=========+====================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+====================+============+
| 1 | id-logo-loyalty |
RFC 9399 |
+---------+--------------------+------------+
| 2 | id-logo-background |
RFC 9399 |
+---------+--------------------+------------+
| 3 | id-logo-certImage |
RFC 9399 |
+---------+--------------------+------------+
Table 5
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[GIF] CompuServe Incorporated, "Graphics Interchange Format",
Version 89a, July 1990,
<
https://www.w3.org/Graphics/GIF/spec-gif89a.txt>.
[ISO15948] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Computer graphics and
image processing -- Portable Network Graphics (PNG):
Functional specification", ISO/IEC 15948:2004, March 2004.
[JPEG] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Digital compression and
coding of continuous-tone still images: JPEG File
Interchange Format (JFIF)", ITU-T Recommendation T.871,
ISO/IEC 10918-5:2013, May 2013.
[MP3] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Generic coding of
moving pictures and associated audio information -- Part
3: Audio", ISO/IEC 13818-3:1998, April 1998.
[NEW-ASN1] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
<
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
[
RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version 4.3",
RFC 1952, DOI 10.17487/
RFC1952, May 1996,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1952>.
[
RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types",
RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC2046, November 1996,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[
RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[
RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme",
RFC 2397,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC2397, August 1998,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2397>.
[
RFC3003] Nilsson, M., "The audio/mpeg Media Type",
RFC 3003,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC3003, November 2000,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3003>.
[
RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/
RFC3986, January 2005,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[
RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68,
RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC5234, January 2008,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[
RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile",
RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5280, May 2008,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[
RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47,
RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5646,
September 2009, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
[
RFC5755] Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet
Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization",
RFC 5755, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5755, January 2010,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5755>.
[
RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14,
RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8174,
May 2017, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[
RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3",
RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8446, August 2018,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[
RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97,
RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC9110, June 2022,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[SVGT] World Wide Web Consortium, "Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG)
Tiny 1.2 Specification", W3C REC-SVGTiny12-20081222,
December 2008,
<
http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-SVGTiny12-20081222/>.
12.2. Informative References
[ISO19005] ISO, "Document management -- Electronic document file
format for long-term preservation -- Part 1: Use of PDF
1.4 (PDF/A-1)", ISO 19005-1:2005, October 2005.
[ISO32000] ISO, "Document management -- Portable document format --
Part 1: PDF 1.7", ISO 32000-1:2008, July 2008.
[OLD-ASN1] CCITT, "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1)", CCITT Recommendation X.208, November 1988,
<
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.208/en>.
[PNGR] World Wide Web Consortium, "Media Type Registration for
image/png",
<
https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/image/png>.
[
RFC3709] Santesson, S., Housley, R., and T. Freeman, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509
Certificates",
RFC 3709, DOI 10.17487/
RFC3709, February
2004, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3709>.
[
RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)",
RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC5912, June 2010,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[
RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6151, March 2011,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
[
RFC6170] Santesson, S., Housley, R., Bajaj, S., and L. Rosenthol,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate
Image",
RFC 6170, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6170, May 2011,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6170>.
[
RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)",
RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC6268, July 2011,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[
RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7858, May
2016, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[
RFC8118] Hardy, M., Masinter, L., Markovic, D., Johnson, D., and M.
Bailey, "The application/pdf Media Type",
RFC 8118,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC8118, March 2017,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8118>.
[
RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0",
RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/
RFC9162,
December 2021, <
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[
RFC9216] Gillmor, D. K., Ed., "S/MIME Example Keys and
Certificates",
RFC 9216, DOI 10.17487/
RFC9216, April 2022,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9216>.
[
RFC9230] Kinnear, E., McManus, P., Pauly, T., Verma, T., and C.A.
Wood, "Oblivious DNS over HTTPS",
RFC 9230,
DOI 10.17487/
RFC9230, June 2022,
<
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9230>.
[SVGR] World Wide Web Consortium, "Media Type Registration for
image/svg+xml", <
https://www.iana.org/assignments/media- types/image/svg+xml>.
[SVGZR] "A separate MIME type for svgz files is needed",
<
https://github.com/w3c/svgwg/issues/701>.
A.1. ASN.1 Modules with 1988 Syntax
This appendix contains two ASN.1 modules, both using the old syntax
[OLD-ASN1].
The first ASN.1 module provides the syntax for the logotype
certificate extension. Only comments have changed in the module from
[
RFC3709] and the IMPORTS now come from [
RFC5280].
The second ASN.1 module provides the certificate image object
identifier. The module is unchanged from [
RFC6170].
<CODE BEGINS>
LogotypeCertExtn
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-logotype(22) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
AlgorithmIdentifier FROM PKIX1Explicit88 --
RFC 5280 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18) };
-- Logotype Certificate Extension OID
id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }
-- Logotype Certificate Extension Syntax
LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL }
-- Note: At least one of the
OPTIONAL components
MUST be present
LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE {
direct [0] LogotypeData,
indirect [1] LogotypeReference }
LogotypeData ::= SEQUENCE {
image SEQUENCE OF LogotypeImage
OPTIONAL,
audio [1] SEQUENCE OF LogotypeAudio
OPTIONAL }
-- Note: At least one of the
OPTIONAL components
MUST be present
LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {
imageDetails LogotypeDetails,
imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {
audioDetails LogotypeDetails,
audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional
-- parameters
logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels
ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels
resolution LogotypeImageResolution
OPTIONAL,
language [4] IA5String
OPTIONAL } --
RFC 5646 Language Tag
LogotypeImageType ::= INTEGER { grayScale(0), color(1) }
LogotypeImageResolution ::= CHOICE {
numBits [1] INTEGER, -- Resolution in bits per pixel
tableSize [2] INTEGER } -- Number of colors or grey tones
LogotypeAudioInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
playTime INTEGER, -- In milliseconds, 0=unspecified
channels INTEGER, -- 0=unspecified,
-- 1=mono, 2=stereo, 4=quad
sampleRate [3] INTEGER
OPTIONAL, -- Samples per second
language [4] IA5String
OPTIONAL } --
RFC 5646 Language Tag
OtherLogotypeInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
logotypeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
info LogotypeInfo }
LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
-- Places to get the same LogotypeData
-- image or audio object
-- Note: The referenced LogotypeData binary file contains a
-- DER-encoded LogotypeData type
HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OCTET STRING }
-- Other logotype type OIDs
id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 20 }
id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 }
id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 }
END
CERT-IMAGE-MODULE { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-logotype-certimage(68) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL; -- export all items from this module
id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-logo(20) 3 }
END
<CODE ENDS>
A.2. ASN.1 Module with 2002 Syntax
Some developers like to use the latest version of ASN.1 standards.
This appendix provides an ASN.1 module to assist in that goal. It
uses the ASN.1 syntax defined in [NEW-ASN1], and it follows the
conventions established in [
RFC5912] and [
RFC6268].
This ASN.1 module incorporates the module from [
RFC3709] and the
module from [
RFC6170].
Note that [NEW-ASN1] was published in 2021, and all of the features
used in this module are backward compatible with the specification
that was published in 2002.
<CODE BEGINS>
LogotypeCertExtn-2022
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-logotype-2022(107) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 --
RFC 5912 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } ;
-- Logotype Certificate Extension
ext-logotype EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX LogotypeExtn
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-logotype }
-- Logotype Certificate Extension OID
id-pe-logotype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 12 }
-- Logotype Certificate Extension Syntax
LogotypeExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
communityLogos [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
issuerLogo [1] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
subjectLogo [2] EXPLICIT LogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL,
otherLogos [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OtherLogotypeInfo
OPTIONAL }
-- At least one of the
OPTIONAL components
MUST be present
( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., communityLogos PRESENT } |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., issuerLogo PRESENT } |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., subjectLogo PRESENT } |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., otherLogos PRESENT } )
LogotypeInfo ::= CHOICE {
direct [0] LogotypeData,
indirect [1] LogotypeReference }
LogotypeData ::= SEQUENCE {
image SEQUENCE OF LogotypeImage
OPTIONAL,
audio [1] SEQUENCE OF LogotypeAudio
OPTIONAL }
-- At least one image component
MUST be present
( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., image PRESENT } )
LogotypeImage ::= SEQUENCE {
imageDetails LogotypeDetails,
imageInfo LogotypeImageInfo
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeAudio ::= SEQUENCE {
audioDetails LogotypeDetails,
audioInfo LogotypeAudioInfo
OPTIONAL }
LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
mediaType IA5String, -- Media type name and optional
-- parameters
logotypeHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
logotypeURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
xSize INTEGER, -- Horizontal size in pixels
ySize INTEGER, -- Vertical size in pixels
resolution LogotypeImageResolution
OPTIONAL,
language [4] IA5String
OPTIONAL } --
RFC 5646 Language Tag
LogotypeImageType ::= INTEGER { grayScale(0), color(1) }
LogotypeImageResolution ::= CHOICE {
numBits [1] INTEGER, -- Resolution in bits
tableSize [2] INTEGER } -- Number of colors or grey tones
LogotypeAudioInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
fileSize INTEGER, -- In octets, 0=unspecified
playTime INTEGER, -- In milliseconds, 0=unspecified
channels INTEGER, -- 0=unspecified
-- 1=mono, 2=stereo, 4=quad
sampleRate [3] INTEGER
OPTIONAL, -- Samples per second
language [4] IA5String
OPTIONAL } --
RFC 5646 Language Tag
OtherLogotypeInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
logotypeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
info LogotypeInfo }
LogotypeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
refStructHash SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
refStructURI SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }
-- Places to get the same LogotypeData
-- image or audio object
-- Note: The referenced LogotypeData binary file contains a
-- DER-encoded LogotypeData type
HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
hashValue OCTET STRING }
-- Other logotype type OIDs
id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 20 }
id-logo-loyalty OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 1 }
id-logo-background OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 2 }
id-logo-certImage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }
END
<CODE ENDS>
B.1. Example from RFC 3709
The following example displays a logotype certificate extension
containing one issuer organization logotype using direct addressing.
The issuer organization logotype image is of the type image/gif. The
logotype image is referenced through one URI, and the image is hashed
with SHA-256. This example is changed from [
RFC3709] to use SHA-256
instead of SHA-1.
The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the
length (in decimal).
30 122: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
04 110: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 108: SEQUENCE {
A1 106: [1] {
A0 104: [0] {
30 102: SEQUENCE {
30 100: SEQUENCE {
30 98: SEQUENCE {
16 9: IA5String 'image/gif'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: 6A 58 50 2E 59 67 F9 DD D1 8A FE BD 0D B1 FE 60
: A5 13 1B DF 0F B2 BE F0 B5 73 45 50 BA 1B BF 19
: }
: }
30 34: SEQUENCE {
16 32: IA5String '
http://logo.example.com/logo.gif' : }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
B.2. Issuer Organization Logotype Example
The following example displays a logotype certificate extension
containing one issuer organization logotype using direct addressing.
The issuer organization logotype image is of the type image/jpeg.
The logotype image is referenced through one URI, and the image is
hashed with SHA-256.
The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the
length (in decimal).
30 124: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
04 112: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 110: SEQUENCE {
A1 108: [1] {
A0 106: [0] {
30 104: SEQUENCE {
30 102: SEQUENCE {
30 100: SEQUENCE {
16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: 1E 8F 96 FD D3 50 53 EF C6 1C 9F FC F0 00 2E 53
: B4 9C 24 9A 32 C5 E9 0C 2C 39 39 D3 AD 6D A9 09
: }
: }
30 35: SEQUENCE {
16 33: IA5String '
http://logo.example.com/logo.jpeg' : }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
B.3. Embedded Image Example
The following example displays a logotype certificate extension
containing one subject organization logotype using direct addressing.
The subject organization logotype image uses image/svg+xml+gzip. The
logotype image is embedded in the certificate extension with a
"data:" URI, and the image is hashed by SHA-256. This technique
produces a large certificate extension but offers reduced latency and
improved privacy.
The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the
length (in decimal).
30 2148: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
04 2134: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 2130: SEQUENCE {
A2 2126: [2] {
A0 2122: [0] {
30 2118: SEQUENCE {
30 2114: SEQUENCE {
30 2110: SEQUENCE {
16 18: IA5String 'image/svg+xml+gzip'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: C5 AC 94 1A 0A 25 1F B3 16 6F 97 C5 52 40 9B 49
: 9E 7B 92 61 5A B0 A2 6C 19 BF B9 D8 09 C5 D9 E7
: }
: }
30 2035: SEQUENCE {
16 2031: IA5String
: ''
: '28tY29weS5zdmcApVbbbhs3EH3nV0y3Lw2Q9fK2JLewHDROU'
: 'BRo2iBxW+RRlTa2UFkypIWV5ut7zlB2UqF9cuLlUktyLmfOz'
: 'PD8xafbtdyPu/1qu5k17sw2sp/mm+V8vd2Ms2azbV5cmPNvX'
: 'v16efXh7WvZ31/L299e/vzTpTRt1/0RLrvu1dUref/7j+Ktd'
: 'Xawsete/9IYaW6m6e77rjscDmeHcLbdXXdX7zpu6t69vmxxo'
: 'n08AREdRDt7tpyWDRRSz7+tgp2b/ew/hEKI5WGoPKyW082s8'
: 'SmeWf13NzVyM66ub6ZZk+xXH+9X4+Hl9tOssWLly3553ARpd'
: '7txP+7uxx/2d+NiejefVttZ8+nNavkBj9yO40RLb8dpvpxP8'
: 'wtzuRvn07iUP/+Wu+20my9GcWfOPpfDbjVN44YLb8dp3Mn7c'
: 'b3aXGNCAICCc+a8+yLo/FpwfLP/uN3dzhqdriH5uwfbnj9a+'
: 'Uz2i/maK66utA+zZ435uFqvZ823R38Q1t32Lw3pZqThd/PpR'
: 'paz5o2LNkocvCzaIm0vrQvSpog359lLy3my0ga+e3Hp+B4In'
: 'jVFPD9awdhnrGEFW30Sl/Pnpvta2QBVxUEVxFbJ2VUFfYC01'
: 'pUs+O4GK84V/k6CHUFyhvhiDVQF8Y5aPDbmnsrXbS74DANjg'
: 'uwgENZLPwjUYVTRJQgEpiLR0ctiWj+Ig8rCvZAArxKExEEWM'
: 'JLqMA1F+ggnsQDXgpQeomJPCVhtCRycNrAWxgAI+g1Qsr6IU'
: 'xlomBswjydYBEgOeVCDoRreBjiFjX2SdSA60BP5DgQM63xoP'
: 'lWHbNq+egAEeAzxyNAdCQz+sDEMOhaGisKJdSlS6gtWWm4M1'
: 'rQwP0egEBIhhFLoXuCJhR4mT5RJBaiLKqqFROUEzYr1idG0g'
: 'ahwCzEnk+AMJLdp0FevQQ6VZ+SKOwGlOIJOh1MVjo0eB6DRA'
: '10SRpSY6il/eFFKAm+MKSIWNFqSo4OFnORfwH5wJHCMNM0ql'
: 'DRlcIwUEkDlgiSBhiEpBgMKOx5FdAYqI3KYewKKkAItTABTk'
: 'p5khI86kgbOgRywEBR0VGcwAjf8t9wqvdUMG6gLAbI0QQ8Cb'
: 'zCTtCSn/DEhCbm++duQaiRG1mQkdWHnminHA+r5wpLvsJbCA'
: 'LUKsDW5NAj43J+AD5vpfamUzJqiRJACmCWwIMhQq4HmYGKai'
: 'iJPmIvpS80UzTtAjdSraApQZogslgFcJHw0y5WoEXDYr/aTq'
: 'fxk2qhcg3z6ETQL+S18llvHOZQvlEOVEVpzqCozE9V6JZhh/'
: 'lCslg7mUFY4AR7IlcApmgV6gz3DCSDe56fQ0SRS7el0NJWO8'
: 'mQ6mkc6ylPpaL7QUZ5IR/M/dEwoJiEp+L6iT4cdSyIp4ljDk'
: 'oaZpQlgMoz0ApahjTiTWbZYu9v+MUqVjY61j2Bxr68bPF3uS'
: '1232qAyAQDMhr4MRyVZq5l2QcuwgY/oTozbgoIKycH+yQxhz'
: 'QsPJQ/ne9OmRKvYH1AeKA/EQRtzrmaYUiHUhpJOW4breSaxZ'
: '/TVc3ZAQJKOagAJiw6pRHVkBMIBa5E+SUMWi0ZNW1Rfn/xQX'
: 'ywHXyMHN5G8WF6gZ2IVjANHMIJQ1lAJQE8MJjZHJiUtQZAWz'
: 'mkisDywTVWSqLkkQG2NNB3wwyaerqRGLNKpvwUOhaQFiYcqv'
: 'iSjvp1n8WnRRzXFs9IXDxiiDd8HU/ROoAGn9+QgTPEVu6HaN'
: '6i0VPuv1SCzwyZeHwBA1EjFYoAk2jJ3OFeJ5Gp1E+3Dlf3Aj'
: '70bbvmag5oyKHunVyGPq6+EnvTua/JUn3iadMHlqUapsK2T8'
: 'SwCBJUF1JnEmhu0ntBthJoQpZqumsBk5mA1hRc0LR5ZFerdj'
: 'ksaCqt3IUWXcXW16vb6xdWyHLTgCaKXWKUKK1kOp9HK5B3EL'
: 'jSdXb0loB5RYtS01L6h9yTPW51Wpqwgosr5I927aw6401+Yf'
: 'wDria4WoQwAAA=='
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
B.4. Embedded Certificate Image Example
The following example displays a logotype certificate extension
containing one certificate image logotype using direct addressing.
The certificate image logotype uses image/svg+xml+gzip. The logotype
image is embedded in the certificate extension with a "data:" URI,
and the image is hashed by SHA-256. This example contains the image
from
Appendix B of [
RFC6170]; however, the media type used here is
explicit about the use of GZIP compression [
RFC1952].
The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the
length (in decimal).
30 2902: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
04 2888: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 2884: SEQUENCE {
A3 2880: [3] {
30 2876: SEQUENCE {
30 2872: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 20 3'
A0 2858: [0] {
30 2854: SEQUENCE {
30 2850: SEQUENCE {
30 2846: SEQUENCE {
16 18: IA5String 'image/svg+xml+gzip'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: 83 14 B3 26 9B D3 8B 0B 2A E6 6E 42 74 E2 A7 57
: 7A 40 B7 E1 2E 53 42 44 CC 7C AE 14 68 1B 0E B6
: }
: }
30 2771: SEQUENCE {
16 2767: IA5String
: ''
: 'nRJbWFnZURlbW8uc3ZnANVaW2/bOBZ+n19BqBigwdoS7xK9j'
: 'meapB0EWHQHzez2WZZoR1tZMiQ5jvvr95CSL7Gl1Em8C9d9i'
: 'ERSPOd85+O5EB3+9jhL0YMuyiTPLh3iYgfpLMrjJJteOv/66'
: '1M/cFBZhVkcpnmmL50sd34b/TIsH6YoiS+da11UySSJwkqj2'
: '1k41Q6CDbNyUMSTS+e+quYDz1sul+6SuXkx9YhSysPUo7QPK'
: '/rlKqvCx35Wvmu+a/uGYow9EOigh0Qvr/LHSwcjjDjGiGHQ9'
: '14n0/sKlMf4Vwctk7i6X7/sGEYdNA5L/WeRT5IUDKmSbLVWN'
: 'oo2cqNCh1XyoKN8Nsuz0iqwVW8Qb1fOF0Vqp+PI06me6awqP'
: 'eISzxn9goYzXYVxWIUWpfWLCMwcGoLpgy83n8wzGkbR4Gtef'
: 'ENmMBznC7DEroKpOBpM8mIWVqPEYGtA+BvoMfS2E5uF1Wqu7'
: 'R6FLvNFEelWReNolpiV3l2VpGntMW9nk6RKdf0+9BrFrMbeV'
: 'uWhtzbHvMR6UlobPyVpBWjXBk7six2vH5nCwY6nXCo5xb7Yu'
: 'svFVPqCOGh16fSxSxglmPkScLfvmDDmC4FlDc1wov8IF2WZh'
: 'NlVumgEPRliimDD3PhGPyTgUUMC6lKqKAjxaptq1boUJvQFs'
: 'vi+LOJyxZkPE/vCwHuAmXmoj1AarnRBatzqkbv7cK5Ls2ORf'
: 'wM/vsOG5lURZqXxOnDXPKZw5t5jVzIhFKO0B6D6hARSXDR6F'
: 'zqq7H7mQeJAOQiUSPvFIrUHOfuui3zrFI5dYVeAmpcOcOb9u'
: '63vLjae4kYX4yRifYPrTa2SlMigYdO+cEWeGADMLZLH96SH4'
: 'R9xRYApl6q3Y02f+NzlRAl+cZSKhB6qSIVa80fsqMnWOqZJp'
: 'msXwAPoyNaQ95uNIGasKPwhxGzQzOXzMIIzBKabmLIil470z'
: 'fSjWWn+kvpvLQ9g1l3yRIc8gukz0uysEcakcDfy3KMk+l0SO'
: 'XlOopltJL7EPtUlzZfP4tnM70k8xkKCySt92MwfIXPoTe0pn'
: 'u4dYbp7hJ/kxWySN0ey0o/1qbiCsxDXJMWWo37QekBcAUFPS'
: 'GkPCnUJF5wwBacDK5cGlEp4BC2lYoJcrNNGVc7DzIqxT4CKs'
: 'PlrAG8mL8whRejiQe9EmImIAoz3sds9NxP4RZEzugqzb7c3Q'
: '89u3WQKY9aegbsA/AUJB/bJs6pfJt9BHFEuk5DWITzOH5uZS'
: 'ThLUsDjQ5GE6RMsyihMTaQLfA6BIiAQMAhnHHN1sd61WtUhD'
: 'VJiuhkrdBXd740+hLB9Vm1HjQe4ywLOBLWOMMiyQAXNB8sm9'
: 'Gx2qdGgGkMG6wY8aLfqgH4dfnmrVc+pPrE/Z/QnZOs8C1Okb'
: '2/ggwLdxlDC1D6DFPZDD98txv8xQf5TEc7Ax6ZyaDf6BC4Sy'
: 'lWKCMqtizp80+UMchATal63qHq0M3ZTs83Ob/XO6LYsFzpGV'
: 'Y5+iLxdWvwY+NaKoR/0iJIXL3dBjT2hG+wO+NXm53XStSh1e'
: 'ogfeojV35BTOaqh/cmPUe2Mdp91pQp2CjWOO2k7OamhjU1HB'
: '3DLGm66n6iajz4bqn2oICmNFxDR/x2mC5s+rKhlkUA3Ne3P8'
: 'lgP0qJfjf9uvu+HWXSfFwNoH4uqGUmTadYMtOc7yjEEd9EUh'
: 'kwEEOcDSHKQ+yhnSvUYRH8miQo2FK5TCjWZZGWKB8iHPud16'
: 'wApnCvTOzjIFAj9TQdCxa+ddOTizaa1xJvD0qMrKx+Ydaj6i'
: 'wJQG0vaSdYWpTv4HwVRAP3Z6ONjOJunEIeKRVmhujpA2+wPm'
: 'QR9WFQAFhh9bGQzFEXX+WwOnXq8pV35P2Acdn0pGebcMg7Og'
: 'QKaEdOKEAkFlk/9HuEKGBVwucc4AjnJ/LBYU09hVwWY1F0Hl'
: 'BUC2lbyIuYF58O8p+adMwUt9YAoX/IwRtAC9NAdBAyGuEB3V'
: 'R59u8/TGYx9/Xjz8bPB/Z/F9B0SghBK+4xxfiwtr0GXECqed'
: 'QQ9PRVpEAQ+26MidbGSmPm8RwRzcQsT17EPSmoorH3+av4Jc'
: 'j78O/vIp/uzMEkHKAE6/F7VHHSj8HddR0Q3ymcGZfRVjwfmO'
: 'nNn3GuWR+FzhcPmPqiptHcayacT28T8j3Cs0/LQCwo6J2iYx'
: 'P4R58AsobjFegusoJhuq7VNS2evRPcqASvQki+gbkBYwETNP'
: 't/1A2pT6UErR1zMzUITZRvF5Lp5basO1fk2U4aBSjkji8quL'
: '3cDyW7TpI3unxezMcSTNhQJhfpGctKgKN2Amo7/7ShSev4oX'
: 'icPSYS+6GkCm9a1Qw3VEchCUA+z5HtTcbQhK6F14YFUp+Yn7'
: 'WgmzwpZCDf5DDiXT9B7U6RdHAHpdb7IqmLVjqZSLnTW61zjQ'
: '7/G7D3hm9E846uTDZoNMADmLlm7IG2ieXfUtu1US9TeNGUHi'
: 'bE9Nv//2jRJGZfQmK3v7ykJJOv1IXjBsDCPpmgWppe6sHxR3'
: 'KVSQKqp+WIqammuJbtqkxZmMHry4oS/9pLhdCXKq8uR0R+LD'
: 'EqCKRxqc5VXdvPvIP+ggwR0RkyBfO9iKZvrWGAKVdz31cuoc'
: 'voO/qemClFMYEFEH7oI+vpkek4s4bCMBqK+5mHQUlDpE/oyl'
: 'py+2/6pWXK31PEYagP04epV1cE50UMy6IQZeQM7+Ol74Z+eH'
: 'fpHNc7OjffQ/HeV0X8BopoDkGEkAAA='
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
B.5. Full Certificate Example
The following example contains a certificate for Alice; it is
essentially a renewal of the certificate that appears in [
RFC9216].
Of course, the serial number and issue dates are different. In
addition, Alice's certificate now has a logotype certificate
extension. The extension contains URLs for two community logotype
images, both at fictional URLs. The extension also contains URLs for
two subject organization logotype images, both at fictional URLs. An
implementation would display at most three of these images, both of
the community logotype images and one of the subject organization
logotype images. Direct addressing is used for all of the images,
and the images are hashed by SHA-256.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The following displays the logotype certificate extension from
Alice's certificate. The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in
hexadecimal) and the length (in decimal).
30 464: SEQUENCE {
06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER logotype (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 12)
04 450: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 446: SEQUENCE {
A0 227: [0] {
30 224: SEQUENCE {
A0 111: [0] {
30 109: SEQUENCE {
30 107: SEQUENCE {
30 105: SEQUENCE {
16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: AF FC 10 16 46 CB 56 25 B4 99 7D E5 89 3E AE 3A
: 84 6F 5A 02 D3 82 D6 DA 8E D4 EE F8 7C BD 1D ED
: }
: }
30 40: SEQUENCE {
16 38: IA5String '
http://www.example.net/images/logo.jpg' : }
: }
: }
: }
: }
A0 109: [0] {
30 107: SEQUENCE {
30 105: SEQUENCE {
30 103: SEQUENCE {
16 9: IA5String 'image/gif'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: 88 90 81 81 AD FB 66 AE 2F 66 D0 49 A0 4D 8E A0
: EC 4E A8 64 42 38 5B 36 4A BF 2C 8B D2 E9 E9 66
: }
: }
30 39: SEQUENCE {
16 37: IA5String '
http://www.example.org/logo-image.gif' : }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
A2 213: [2] {
A0 210: [0] {
30 207: SEQUENCE {
30 101: SEQUENCE {
30 99: SEQUENCE {
16 9: IA5String 'image/gif'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: 6A 58 50 2E 59 67 F9 DD D1 8A FE BD 0D B1 FE 60
: A5 13 1B DF 0F B2 BE F0 B5 73 45 50 BA 1B BF 19
: }
: }
30 35: SEQUENCE {
16 33: IA5String '
http://www.smime.example/logo.gif' : }
: }
: }
30 102: SEQUENCE {
30 100: SEQUENCE {
16 10: IA5String 'image/jpeg'
30 49: SEQUENCE {
30 47: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SEQUENCE {
06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
: }
04 32: OCTET STRING
: BD CB 7B 75 72 6D 8C 1B 33 A4 2C DE AC 79 72 DA
: 4A D9 F2 79 84 0A 58 58 6A CE 2F 02 80 EA D7 A5
: }
: }
30 35: SEQUENCE {
16 33: IA5String '
http://www.smime.example/logo.jpg' : }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
Appendix C. Changes since RFCs 3709 and 6170
This appendix summarizes the changes since [
RFC3709]. The changes
are:
* Combine RFCs 3709 and 6170 into one document, and encourage
implementers to support the "data" URI scheme (data:...) that was
originally specified in
RFC 6170. Merging RFCs 3709 and 6170 led
to many editorial changes throughout the document.
* Drop SHA-1 as the mandatory-to-implement hash algorithm, and
encourage use of the one-way hash function that is employed by the
certificate signature algorithm.
*
RFC 3709 required client applications to support both direct and
indirect addressing. This requirement is changed to
SHOULD support both direct and indirect addressing to allow
implementations to be more privacy preserving.
* Update the reference for language tags to be
RFC 5646 instead of
the now obsolete
RFC 3066.
* Update the reference for the URI Generic Syntax to be
RFC 3986 instead of the now obsolete
RFC 2396.
* Update the reference for the application/pdf media type to be
RFC 8118 instead of the now obsolete
RFC 3778.
* No longer require support for the FTP scheme (ftp://...) URI.
* Require support for the HTTP scheme (http://...) URI and the HTTPS
scheme (https://...) URI.
* Provide syntax of the "data" URI scheme using modern ABNF.
* Require support for the compressed SVG image format with the
image/svg+xml+gzip media type.
* Media types
MUST follow the ABNF [
RFC5234] that is provided in
Section 8.3.1 of [
RFC9110]. This change resolves Errata ID 2679.
* Remove the requirement that the LogotypeData file name have a file
extension of ".LTD". This change resolves Errata ID 2325.
* Encourage, instead of requiring, each logotype to be represented
by at least one image.
* Encourage the inclusion of text-based audio data suitable for
processing by a text-to-speech software using the media type of
"text/plain;charset=UTF-8".
* Encourage the use of dithering if an image needs to be scaled.
* Require that the logotype certificate extension not contain more
than one certificate image logotype.
* Privacy-related topics that were previously discussed in the
Security Considerations section are now covered in a separate
Privacy Considerations section. Additional topics are covered in
both sections.
* Provide ASN.1 modules for both the older syntax [OLD-ASN1] and the
most recent ASN.1 syntax [NEW-ASN1].
* Provide additional references.
* Provide additional examples.
* Several editorial changes to improve clarity.
* The example in
Appendix B.1 was changed to use SHA-256 instead of
SHA-1.
Acknowledgments
* Acknowledgments from
RFC 3709 This document is the result of contributions from many
professionals. The authors appreciate contributions from all
members of the IETF PKIX Working Group. We extend a special
thanks to Al Arsenault, David Cross, Tim Polk, Russel Weiser,
Terry Hayes, Alex Deacon, Andrew Hoag, Randy Sabett, Denis Pinkas,
Magnus Nystrom, Ryan Hurst, and Phil Griffin for their efforts and
support.
Russ Housley thanks the management at RSA Laboratories, especially
Burt Kaliski, who supported the development of this specification.
The vast majority of the work on this specification was done while
Russ was employed at RSA Laboratories.
* Acknowledgments from
RFC 6170 The authors recognize valuable contributions from members of the
PKIX working group, the CA Browser Forum, and James Manger, for
their review and sample data.
* Additional Acknowledgments
Combining RFCs 3709 and 6170 has produced an improved
specification. The authors appreciate contributions from all
members of the IETF LAMPS Working Group. We extend a special
thanks to Alexey Melnikov for his guidance on media types. We
extend a special thanks to Tim Geiser for his careful checking of
the new examples in Appendices
B.4 and
B.5. We extend a special
thanks to Corey Bonnell, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Roman Danyliw, Paul
Wouters, Paul Kyzivat, Shuping Peng, Sheng Jiang, Rob Wilton, Éric
Vyncke, Donald Eastlake 3rd, and Dan Harkins for their careful
review and helpful comments.
Authors' Addresses
Stefan Santesson
IDsec Solutions AB
Forskningsbyn Ideon
SE-223 70 Lund
Sweden
Email: sts@aaa-sec.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
Trevor Freeman
Amazon Web Services
1918 8th Ave
Seattle, WA 98101
United States of America
Email: frtrevor@amazon.com
Leonard Rosenthol
Adobe
345 Park Avenue
San Jose, CA 95110
United States of America
